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I can recall walking eastward on the Chicago Midway on a summer evening.  The light 
held after nine o’clock, and the ground was covered with clover, more than a mile of 
green between Cottage Grove and Stony Island.  The blight hadn’t yet carried off the 
elms, and under them drivers had pulled over, parking bumper to bumper, and turned on 
their radios to hear Roosevelt.  They had rolled down the windows and opened their car 
doors.  Everywhere the same voice, its odd Eastern accent, which in anyone else would 
have irritated Midwesterners.  You could follow without missing a single word as you 
strolled by.  You felt joined to these unknown drivers, men and women smoking their 
cigarettes in silence, not so much considering the President’s words as affirming the 
rightness of his tone and taking assurance from it.  You had in some sense the weight of 
the troubles that made them so attentive, and of the ponderable fact, the one common 
element, on which so many unknowns could agree. 
 
 
Saul Bellow, “In the Days of Mr. Roosevelt” 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
My friends . . . Let us sit down . . . together again,  
you and I, to consider our own pressing problems that confront us.
1
 
 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 26, 1940 
 
 On January 5, 1941, Mrs. Helen J. Quinn from Corning, New York, penned a letter 
to President Franklin Delano Roosevelt in response to his “Fireside Chat” the week earlier.  
“Dear Sir,” she wrote, “I am just one of the common folks to whom you spoke last Sunday 
evening.”  Mrs. Quinn explained that although she was the mother of three children, she 
“hardly read war news or listen[ed] to war talks on the radio [because] . . . if I assumed 
managership of this war along with my own personal worries I would soon suffer nervous 
collapse and not be of use to anyone.”  She continued, 
With this in mind I spun my [d]ial from station to station to tune out your 
speech.  Wherever I tuned “there you were before me” so in spite of myself I 
listened and have been thankful ever since that I did.  No ranting, no raving – 
no bullying, no bragging but logical, understandable facts, told in a calm, 
unruffled voice that carried conviction, confidence and courage right into my 
heart . . . I do feel that as long as . . . we have God-fearing men like yourself 
at the head of our country, willing to be guided by Him, we’ll never be 
hopelessly lost even though the going may be rough.  I feel as though I have 
had a personal interview with you and I want to thank you for your Fireside 
Chat.
2
 
 
In this short letter, Mrs. Quinn expressed how the majority of U.S. citizens felt about 
Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats.”  In the comfort and safety of their own homes, the President 
of the United States spoke not just to them but with them, explaining the problems facing the 
nation and invoking a spirit of “confidence and courage” in his audience.  Together, as a 
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unified nation, the people of the United States could face any crisis.  “Together,” said the 
president, “we cannot fail.”3 
 This study analyzes the five “Fireside Chats”4 delivered by President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt between the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939, and the Japanese 
attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941.  This project considers these particular 
“Chats” to assess how they were designed to shift U.S. public opinion from isolationism to 
intervention in the Second World War by convincing the audience that sending aid to Great 
Britain was the best way to stay out of war with Germany.  Although Roosevelt used 
multiple avenues of communication during this period, including addresses to Congress, 
press conferences, and other radio addresses, the friendly, communal nature of the “Fireside 
Chats,” as created by Roosevelt provided a unique opportunity for him to communicate 
directly to the U.S. public during a period of growing international crisis.  This was not the 
first time Roosevelt used “Fireside Chats” to communicate to his audience during a national 
crisis.  Eight days into his presidency, Roosevelt spoke directly to his audience in the midst 
of the banking crisis.  The Los Angeles Times reported the president’s desire to “. . . to 
‘explain clearly and in simple language to all of you just what has been achieved and the 
sound reasons which underlie this declaration to you.’”5  “The President said that the 
Constitution laid upon him the duty of reporting to Congress assembled in Washington the 
condition of the country,” an article in The New York Times read, “and he believed that he 
had a like duty to convey to the people themselves a clear picture of the situation.”6  Barely 
a week into his administration, Roosevelt bypassed traditional media outlets, press 
conferences, and newspaper reporters to speak directly to his constituency, the citizenry 
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whom he addressed as “my friends.”  
 Six and a half years later, on September 3, 1939, Franklin D. Roosevelt sat down to 
give the fourteenth “Fireside Chat” of his presidency.  Instead of focusing on domestic 
issues facing the nation, as previous “Chats” had, the president turned to the international 
realm.  Germany had invaded Poland in an attempt to regain land lost under the 1918 Treaty 
of Versailles; in response, Great Britain and France declared war on Germany hours before 
Roosevelt spoke over the airwaves in the United States.
7
  “My countrymen and my friends,” 
Roosevelt began, “tonight my single duty is to speak to the whole of America.”8  Just days 
into a global crisis which would ultimately result in the bombing of Pearl Harbor and the 
U.S. entry into World War II, Roosevelt again turned to the radio, a medium that allowed 
the president to speak directly to his audience, unencumbered by the press or his political 
opponents. 
 The central research question of this study asks how President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
used these “Fireside Chats” to appeal to his audience and convince them that sending 
military and economic aid to Great Britain was the surest way to keep out of war with 
Germany.  What particular rhetorical devices did he use?  How did he create his audience 
through these radio addresses?  By constructing a personal, conversational rhetorical 
exchange between the president and the citizenry, how did Roosevelt use identification as a 
means of persuasion in these five “Chats”?  How did Roosevelt use these strategies to 
respond to protests from prominent isolationist leaders and members of the America First 
Committee, including aviator Charles Lindbergh, prominent historian Charles Beard, 
newspaper magnate William Hearst, and U.S. senator Gerald P. Nye?   To answer these 
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questions, this study argues that Roosevelt’s rhetorical approach was one designed to appeal 
to the U.S. public’s desires for two specific things: economic growth and stability at home, 
and freedom from international entanglements abroad.  Although these two desires could be 
attributed to many periods in U.S. history, they are particularly applicable to a U.S. public 
who had survived the Great War and suffered through the more recent Great Depression.  In 
September 1939, the vast majority of U.S. citizens believed that sending aid to Great 
Britain would undermine the great social and economic gains made by the United States 
during the New Deal. For a nation recovering from the greatest economic crisis in its 
history, the idea of sending precious military and economic resources to Great Britain 
seemed to many an overreaction to a war that did not concern the United States.  In 
addition, because a vast majority of the voting public either remembered the Great War 
or heard first-hand accounts of its horrors, the idea of entering another European conflict, 
one which many believed would not impact the United States, was intervention of the 
worst possible kind.  After the failure of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points after the 
Great War, the general public was hesitant to take any action that would lead to further 
international entanglements or, the worst-case scenario, war.  This project aims to prove 
that President Roosevelt directly addressed these two specific fears and desires in his five 
“Fireside Chats” between September 1939 and December 1941, arguing that the surest 
way to guarantee both the economic growth and security of the United States at home and 
freedom from international entanglements abroad was to support Great Britain’s struggle 
against Germany. 
 In the rest of this chapter, I provide a historical discussion of Roosevelt’s “Fireside 
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Chats” as a means of persuasion and briefly describe the five texts which make up this 
study.  I then detail the theoretical methods I use in this analysis, discuss relevant literature 
on the “Fireside Chats,” and explain how this project supplements current scholarship.  The 
final section of this chapter provides an overview of the three content chapters and my 
conclusion.  
Historical Background and Discussion of the Texts 
 The Rise of Radio
9
 
 
 When Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office in March of 1933, over seventeen 
million U.S. households owned a radio.
10
  Although there were only three million radio sets 
in the United States in 1924, that number increased to 30 million sets by 1936.  By 1938, 91 
percent of all urban households and 70 percent of all rural households owned at least one 
radio.
 11
  Robert J. Brown suggests that for many U.S. citizens, “the radio set became a 
highly valued and permanent piece of living room furniture, and an integral part of family 
life.”12  In their 1929 study of a small U.S. town in the Midwest, Robert Lynd and Helen 
Merrell Lynd listed radio as “among the necessities in the family standard of living.”13  
Families would gather around their set after dinner, listening to news programs, dramas, 
musical concerts, and the like.  “Radio sets were not then very powerful,” Henry Fairlie 
reflected, “and there was always static.  Families had to sit near the set, with someone 
always fiddling with the knobs.  It was like sitting around a hearth, with someone poking the 
fire . . . it was we who were at our firesides.”14 
 In his pioneering study of the psychological impact of radio, Hadley Cantril reported 
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that the medium was  
more personal than the printed word.  A voice belongs to a living person, and 
living people arrest our attention and sustain our interest better than do 
printed words . . . a voice broadcasting news possesses an intimacy and 
eventfulness absent from the evening newspaper.  If the voice is that of a 
well-known radio favorite, it seems friendly.  We respond to it, and even 
obey its commands.
15
 
 
The radio, Cantril said, made the world seem smaller as it connected listeners across the 
United States, making listeners from Boston, Dallas, Des Moines, and Sacramento feel 
connected to the speaker in a “novel way.”16  Radio also functioned as a “powerful agent of 
democracy,” Cantril said.  “Millions of people listen to the same thing at the same time—
and they themselves are aware of the fact.”  Moreover, the radio minimized the differences; 
“rural and urban communities, men and women, age and youth, social classes, creeds, states, 
and nations are abolished.”  These were replaced by a “consciousness of equality and a 
community of interest,” because when this vast audience heard the same messages over the 
radio, they acquired “in some degree common interests, common states, and common 
attitudes.”17  Published in 1935, the sentiments expressed in this study reflect how U.S. 
citizens in the 1930s and 1940s viewed radio’s impact on their social and political 
consciousness.  It unified them, reaching across barriers of location and class.  It encouraged 
them to take action.  And, beginning in 1933, a friendly and confident voice came across the 
airwaves, connecting with his audience in a personal way and calmly addressing the 
problems of the Great Depression.  That voice was Franklin Delano Roosevelt.  
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Roosevelt and the Radio 
 
 Although Roosevelt gave approximately 300 radio addresses over the course of his 
presidency, he designated only twenty-seven as “Fireside Chats.”18  Roosevelt advisor and 
chief speechwriter Samuel Rosenman credited this to Roosevelt’s “acute sense of timing,” 
noting that the president wanted to preserve the rhetorical force and public appeal of the 
“Chats.”  Roosevelt spaced them so that he would not “talk so frequently as to wear out his 
welcome in the homes of his listeners, but not so seldom as to lose the potentiality of the 
radio appeal.”19  He designed the “Chats” to speak to everyday Americans on an individual 
level, choosing words from among the “1,000 most common words in the English 
language.”20  In a study of Roosevelt’s rate of speaking, Halford Ryan explained that the 
president “spoke slowly whether he addressed live audiences or used the radio.”  Although 
“most orators talk at about 125-175 words per minute (wpm)…[and] in the sound 
environment of radio, a rate of 175-200 wpm is deemed suitable,” Roosevelt’s “rate for the 
Fireside Chats was about 30 percent slower than the optimum wpm for a radio broadcast.”  
This slow, deliberate style of speaking communicated “trust, competency, and tranquility at 
the helm of state.”21 Roosevelt’s ability to connect with his audience on a friendly, 
individual level contributed to the wide success of the “Fireside Chats” during the course of 
his presidency.  
 Franklin D. Roosevelt initiated the idea of speaking directly to “the people” over the 
radio during his term as governor of New York.  Grace Tully, his personal secretary, 
recalled the time Roosevelt became “ensnarled with a recalcitrant legislature a year or so 
after becoming [g]overnor.  Fed up with the pulling and hauling of customary political 
 8 
 
bargaining, he declared curtly: ‘I’ll take the issue to the people.’” Mail flooded into the 
New York legislature in support of Roosevelt’s proposal.  Going forward, Roosevelt took 
the same approach in communicating with the people of New York.  He 
considered radio presentation not an instrument of pressure but rather a 
way to sit down with the American public and discuss with them the 
issues which pertained to their own well-being.  It was, again, a part of 
this feeling that the judgment of the people would be sound and that their 
confidence in their Government would be strengthened by an exposition of 
a situation presented to them initially in full.  The editorializing and the 
opposition could follow, by whatever media chosen, but the President’s 
own case could thus be set forth by him and in his own words.
22
   
 
The quote above comes from Grace Tully, the president’s personal secretary, who 
worked with him on his “Fireside Chats” throughout his presidency.  She reflects 
Roosevelt’s belief that the people deserved to hear facts about their “own well-being” 
directly from their president.  So it was that in 1932, eight days into his presidency and 
during the worst economic crisis in the history of the United States, Roosevelt turned 
again to the radio as a way to speak directly to the U.S. citizenry. 
 To a nation weighed down by economic uncertainty, depression, hunger, and 
unemployment, Franklin D. Roosevelt’s radio address of March 12, 1933, was an immediate 
demonstration of the new president’s ability to lead.  After introducing an emergency 
banking bill to the U.S. Congress which required banks gradually to open their doors again 
to the public, Roosevelt went on the air to explain his actions to the people of the United 
States.  He adopted the tone of a patient teacher, beginning his address with an overview of 
the “banking and legal terms” which he stated “should be explained for the benefit of the 
average citizen.”  He directly addressed the fears of his audience, responding to those 
“worrying about State banks not members of the Federal Reserve System” and questions 
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as to why all banks would not open on the same day around the country.  Because frantic 
waves of bank withdrawals had directly contributed to the current crisis, he referred to 
money hoarding as “an exceedingly unfashionable pastime,” one driven by fear.  After 
stating that banks would open on a rolling basis over the next several weeks, he told his 
audience that he expected their full cooperation in remedying this “bad banking situation.”  
He called for the “cooperation of the public,” stating that national “cooperation and courage 
are the essentials of success in carrying out our plan . . . it is up to you to support and make 
it work.  Together,” Roosevelt concluded, “we cannot fail.”  
 Roosevelt articulated his expectation of his audience, calling forth a certain type of 
citizen who would return money to their individual bank, have faith in the government’s 
ability to slowly resolve the banking crisis, and maintain the “loyal support [they had] given 
[him] in their acceptance of the judgment that has dictated our course, even though all our 
processes may not have seemed clear to them.” 23  In the first “Fireside Chat” of his 
presidency, Franklin D. Roosevelt clearly laid out the facts of the banking situation, 
identified and sympathized with the fear and uncertainty his audience was experiencing, and 
called for his audience to respond to the crisis with national unity, cooperation, and personal 
responsibility.  This address also established a personal and direct form of communication 
with the public, one that set a precedent for how these particular addresses would function as 
a rhetorical device throughout his presidency. 
 The public response to Roosevelt’s March 12, 1933, “Chat” was overwhelmingly 
positive.
24
  “The President of the greatest Nation on earth honored every home with a 
personal visit last night,” wrote Mr. and Mrs. F. B. Graham from Dubuque, Iowa, the day 
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after Roosevelt’s address.  “He came into our living-room in a kindly neighborly way and 
in simple words explained the great things he had done so that all of us unfamiliar with 
the technicalities might understand.  When his voice died away we realized our ‘friend’ 
had gone home again but left us his courage, his faith and absolute confidence.”25  Mrs. 
Louise Hill from Chicago stated that Roosevelt’s broadcast over the radio transformed 
“our little home [into] a church, our radio a pulpit—and you the preacher.  Thank you for 
the courage and faith you have given us.”26  Some wrote of the physical closeness they 
felt to the president through his words.  “It almost seemed the other night, sitting in my 
easy chair in the library, that you were across the room from me.  A great many of my 
friends have said the same thing,” remarked Mr. James A. Green from Cincinnati.  Others 
expressed how Roosevelt encouraged them to feel as if they had a stake in the 
government.  “Washington has seemed a long way off . . . Some how [sic], last night, we 
were made to feel that we are a part of the government and that we have some 
responsibility.  That sense has been lacking on part of many of us who would have it 
otherwise.”27   
 For many, the new president spoke, for the first time, directly to the citizenry 
about their individual and personal problems.  In the words of Mrs. Paul Russell from 
Haskell, Oklahoma, “In your ten minute radio talk Sunday Night you said more than Mr. 
Hoover did in four years, and although you have culture, aristocratic breeding and wealth 
you have one priceless gift, that of reaching out to the ‘common people’ with a deep 
sympathy and understanding, that goes into their hearts and you can talk their language 
and when you talked banking you talked banking so all could understand.”28  Finally, in a 
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short letter written three days after Roosevelt’s radio address, Mr. John Watson from 
Reiffton, Pennsylvania, exclaimed, “Don’t cut any fire for a long, long time.  Think of 
having a President talk to us in our parlor.  Thats great!!!  good voice too [sic].”29   
 These letters reflect how Roosevelt’s first “Chat” immediately boosted the morale 
of the U.S. public.  For the audience, it seemed as if President Roosevelt sat across from 
them just as a neighbor might.  He identified with their concerns, addressed their fears, 
and explained his solution to their immediate problems.  He called them to join together 
in national unity, to participate in their government as involved citizens, taking 
responsibility for the condition of the country and working with him towards a solution.  
Robert Sherwood, one of Roosevelt’s speechwriters, described how Roosevelt’s first 
“Fireside Chat” shifted the tone of presidential discourse: 
Here was the first real demonstration of Roosevelt’s superb ability to use 
the first persona plural and bring the people right into the White House 
with him.  The very fact of a “chat” was in itself surprising and 
immeasurably stimulating: traditionally, when a president spoke to the 
people, it was an “Address,” which might be intended as an exhortation, or 
an elaborate apologia, or a stern lecture.  But Roosevelt spoke simply, 
casually, as a friend or relative, who had figured out a way to prevent 
foreclosure of the mortgage, and those of us who heard that speech will 
never forget the surge of confidence that his buoyant spirit evoked.  It was 
all the more thrilling after the hair-shirted carping and petulance that we 
had been hearing from Hoover.
30
 
 
Beginning his first presidential “Fireside Chat” with the statement that he wanted “to talk 
for a few minutes with the people of the United States about banking,” Roosevelt 
declared that he wished to talk with the citizenry, not to them.
31
  In direct contrast to 
Hoover, Roosevelt expressed his desire to communicate directly with the U.S. public.  As 
Samuel Rosenman, advisor and chief speechwriter to Roosevelt, notes, the president saw 
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this method of communication as a way to convince his audience, individually and 
corporately, of the rightness of his approach to the economic situation.  
[The “Fireside Chats” were a way for Roosevelt to talk] directly to the 
people of the nation—or rather to each person in the nation.   The function 
of the fireside chat was to explain by the use of simple, everyday language 
and homely analogy the complex problems of government.  He believed 
that if the people understood the facts, if they understood the reason 
behind a government action or policy, if they were taken into the 
confidence of their government and received a full and truthful statement 
of what was happening, they would generally choose the right course.  
And he felt it was part of his job of leadership to give them those facts.  
There lay the greatest source of the President’s strength.  He was able to 
explain to the people the most intricate problems of government.  He 
could do it by the use of simple language and by the clear, confident, and 
persuasive tone of his voice.
32
 
 
Here lay the strength of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s now-famous “Fireside Chats.”  Through his 
friendly and relaxed tone, fatherly persona, and clear explanation of the facts facing the 
nation, Roosevelt made his audience, the entire nation, feel that he spoke to them 
individually and personally.  He continued this practice throughout the Great Depression, 
talking with the U.S. people about issues such as the introduction of the New Deal in 1933, 
the Works Progress Administration in 1935, and the 1937 Unemployment Census.
33
  Thus, 
when Germany invaded Poland in 1939 and the international skies grew dark, Roosevelt 
turned again to this trusted medium of communication between himself and the people of 
the United States. 
The Rhetorical Appeal of Roosevelt’s Pre-War “Fireside Chats” 
 
 As the onset of World War II in Europe forced the Roosevelt administration to shift 
its focus from domestic policies to the question of U.S. involvement in the growing 
international crisis, the content of Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats” changed as well.  The 
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president gave five “Fireside Chats” between the German invasion of Poland on September 
1, 1939, and the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, in which he sought 
to explain the U.S. policy towards Nazi Germany and the Allied powers, particularly Great 
Britain.  Although Roosevelt made many other speeches and radio addresses during this 
period, these “Chats” are of particular interest because they illustrate how the president 
attempted to condition the U.S. public to a gradual shift in U.S. foreign policy from 
isolationism to intervention. 
 These five particular radio addresses also indicate what Roosevelt viewed as 
watershed moments in the progression of U.S. policy towards the war in Europe.  As noted 
previously, the president chose deliberate moments in public policy to address the U.S. 
public with a “Fireside Chat.”  Most often, the timing corresponded to periods in which 
Roosevelt wanted to explain a certain course of action to the general public and, in the 
address, request their public support for such a policy.  We see a similar pattern in the timing 
of these five “Fireside Chats” leading up to U.S. entry into World War II.  In what follows, I 
briefly discuss the five “Fireside Chats” on which this study focuses and highlight major 
shifts in public opinion as a result of these radio addresses.  My three content chapters will 
consider how Roosevelt accomplished these shifts through his rhetorical strategies; this 
section provides the historical background to understand just how powerful these shifts were 
in the pre-war U.S. public culture. 
September 3, 1939: “On the European War” 
 
 On September 1, 1939, Germany invaded Poland.  Two days later, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt delivered his fourteenth “Fireside Chat” three hours after Great Britain and 
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France declared war on Germany.
34
  In the speech, Roosevelt informed his audience that a 
proclamation of U.S. neutrality was being prepared towards the crisis erupting in Europe.  
However, Roosevelt declared that although the United States would “remain a neutral 
nation . . . I cannot ask that every American remain neutral in thought as well. Even a 
neutral has a right to take account of facts. Even a neutral cannot be asked to close his 
mind or close his conscience.”35  Roosevelt’s statement stood in stark contrast to 
Woodrow Wilson’s words at the beginning of the Great War. In 1914, Wilson called on 
the nation to be “impartial in thought as well as in action.”36  Instead, Roosevelt 
cautioned his audience that although the United States would remain “a neutral nation,” 
the “simple but unalterable fact” was that “[w]hen peace has been broken anywhere, the 
peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.”37  In a Gallup Poll taken on August 30, 
1939, almost eighty-four percent of respondents supported this proclamation of U.S. 
neutrality when they said that the United States should not send the “army or navy abroad 
to fight Germany.”  However, fifty-eight percent of respondents agreed that the U.S. 
should sell airplanes and other war materials to England & France.”38  Two weeks after 
Roosevelt’s speech, ninety-two percent affirmed that the U.S. should not send troops 
abroad and sixty-five percent stated that Great Britain and France should be allowed to 
purchase war materials from the United States.
39
  The gradual rise in U.S. public support 
for allowing Great Britain and France to purchase airplanes and war materials from the 
United States was directly related to Roosevelt’s congressional attempts to repeal 
portions of the Neutrality Laws.  On September 21, Roosevelt requested that restrictions 
on arms transfers between the United States and the Allied powers be lifted.  Congress 
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passed a revised Neutrality Act which allowed Great Britain and France to pay cash for 
U.S. war materials and transport them with the use of their own ships (commonly referred 
to as “Cash-Carry”) on November 4, 1939.40   
May 26, 1940: “On National Defense” 
 
 After the German invasion of Poland in September 1939, the “eery [sic] lull that 
settled over much of Europe . . . compounded Roosevelt’s problem in late 1939 and early 
1940, as he faced the task of educating Americans about the real and present danger they 
faced.”41  Hitler sent “bogus peace feelers” to London and Paris.42  In December, English 
children who had been evacuated in September because of the threat of German air raids 
returned to their homes for Christmas.  With little conflict apparent on the western front, 
one U.S. senator scoffed at the “Phony War” between Germany, France, and Great 
Britain.
43
  After the winter thaw, however, Germany began attacks against Denmark, 
Norway, Holland, Luxembourg, and Belgium.  On May 26, 1940, the president went on 
the air again to speak to the U.S. public in his fifteenth “Fireside Chat.”  The German 
advance into Norway and Holland particularly concerned the United States since these 
nations controlled Iceland and Greenland, two territories which lay within the Western 
hemisphere.
44
 In this “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt took the opportunity at “this moment of 
sadness throughout most of the world” to explain the military situation in the United 
States, responding directly to those isolationists calling the U.S. drastically unprepared to 
defend the nation against a German invasion.
45
  In a lengthy enumeration of military 
numbers and statistics for the United States Army and Navy, Roosevelt called for a 
military appropriations bill to supplement the current U.S. military reserves: “In line with 
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my request the Congress, this week, is voting the largest appropriation ever asked by the 
Army or the Navy in peacetime.”46  Highlighting the “public-government partnership that 
had worked so well in addressing the problems of the Great Depression,” Roosevelt 
declared it the resolve of himself and his audience to take action to “meet the present 
emergency.”47  Three days before Roosevelt delivered the “Fireside Chat,” sixty-three 
percent of Gallup respondents said it was more important to keep the United States out of 
the war instead of helping England and France win against Germany.
48
  A public opinion 
poll administered three days after the “Chat” demonstrated how the citizenry responded 
to the president’s speech.  Ninety percent of survey participants supported an increase in 
U.S. military personnel and weaponry and eighty-six percent said that a billion dollars 
should be appropriated for the military.  Shortly after the address, Congress approved 
$1.6 billion appropriation for defense spending.
49
  However, the public did not agree on 
whether the nation should provide military weaponry to the Allied forces.  The same poll 
asked respondents if the United States should sell all, some, or none of the 5,000 
airplanes currently in U.S. reserves to the French and British.  Eight percent said all, forty 
percent supported selling some airplanes, and forty-seven percent said that no planes 
should be sold in any circumstance.
50
   
December 29, 1940: “On National Security” 
 
Between his “Fireside Chat” of May 26, 1940, and his December 29, 1940, radio 
address announcing Lend-Lease to the U.S. public, Franklin D. Roosevelt decided to run 
for an unprecedented third term as President of the United States.  All other U.S. 
presidents had followed George Washington’s example; none had ever attempted to 
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achieve the office more than twice.
51
  However, Roosevelt did not directly announce his 
candidacy to the U.S. public; instead, he waited for the Democratic Party to nominate 
him at the national convention in July 1940.
 52
  In his acceptance speech, the president 
declared that he had a “clear duty . . . to preserve our neutrality, to shape our program of 
defense, to meet rapid changes, to keep our domestic affairs adjusted to shifting world 
conditions, and sustain the policy of the Good Neighbor.”  Although he had had 
intentions of retiring from public life, Roosevelt explained that his “obvious duty to 
maintain to the utmost the influence of this mighty nation in our effort to prevent the 
spread of war” compelled him to postpone “personal plans” and accept the nomination if 
conferred by the Democratic National Convention.
53
   
The Republican nominee for president, corporate lawyer Wendell Willkie, openly 
supported a repeal of the Neutrality Laws and supplying Great Britain with economic aid 
and military weaponry to fend of the Germans.
54
  Roosevelt was more careful, deeply 
conscious of U.S. public opinion and the citizenry’s desire to stay out of the war.  
Although most of the U.S. public supported building up U.S. military reserves for the 
national defense, a vast majority did not approve of supplying Great Britain and France 
with weapons of war.  However, as the Allied situation worsened during the fall of 1940, 
Roosevelt grew more convinced that sending U.S. aid to Great Britain would be the only 
way to keep the United States out of eventual war with Germany.  According to Robert 
Sherwood, one of Roosevelt’s speechwriters, the fall of France in June 1940 left 
Roosevelt certain “that if Britain fell[,] disastrous war for the United States would be 
inevitable” with Germany.55  On July 10, Roosevelt requested an additional $4 billion 
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dollars from the U.S. Congress for defense purposes.  Just over a week later, Roosevelt 
initiated the first peacetime draft in U.S. history.  When a reporter advised Republican 
presidential candidate Wendell Willkie that “if you want to win the election you will 
come out against the proposed draft,” Willkie replied, “I would rather not win the 
election than do that.”56  The bill passed the U.S. Congress on September 16, 1940, with 
support from both presidential candidates, and on November 1, 1.2 million new enlistees 
and 800,000 reservists reported for military service.
57
   
Although still maintaining an official position of neutrality in the European war, 
these actions indicated Roosevelt’s growing fear that the United States would eventually 
become involved in the conflict.  Two months before the presidential election, Roosevelt 
traded fifty World War I naval destroyers to Great Britain in exchange for the right to use 
air fields and naval bases in the Caribbean and western Atlantic for ninety-nine years.
58
  
Roosevelt completed the transfer by executive order, completely bypassing 
Congressional authorization of the deal.
59
  Meanwhile, the German Luftwaffe carried out 
daily air strikes over the skies of Great Britain; from September 7 to November 13, the 
Luftwaffe sent approximately 300 to 600 bombers over London each day.  In September 
1940, the German air strikes claimed the lives of almost 7,000 British civilians; in 
October, the number was 6,334.
60
 Not only were the British suffering death and 
widespread injury as a result of these attacks, but their cash reserves also were quickly 
running out. 
As Roosevelt searched for ways to assist Great Britain in its fight against Nazi 
Germany and the 1940 presidential contest between Roosevelt and Willkie neared, a 
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group of U.S. politicians, businessmen, public intellectuals, newspaper owners, and 
several former military officials formed the America First Committee in September 
1940.
61
  Prominent members of America First included aviator Charles Lindbergh, 
newspaper magnate William Hearst, prominent historian Charles Beard, U.S. Senators 
Burton Wheeler (R-MT), Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), Richard LaFollette (Progressive-
WI), Gerald P. Nye (R-ND), and U.S. Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY).
62
  National 
membership in the committee was at least 800,000; other estimates place the figure at 1.2 
million.
63
  The America First Committee said that Roosevelt’s desire to send aid to Great 
Britain would lead to U.S. involvement in World War II.  Instead, the committee argued 
that the nation should focus on strengthening its own military and economy.  Some even 
said that the United States should encourage Great Britain to make peace with Germany.  
From its creation in September 1940 to its disbandment after Pearl Harbor in December 
1941, the America First Committee was the most outspoken opponent of Roosevelt’s 
policies.  The rhetoric of the movement will be discussed in the third chapter of this 
project. 
On November 5, 1940, the U.S. public reelected Roosevelt to a third term as 
President of the United States.  He won 54.7 percent of the popular vote and 447 electoral 
votes to Willkie’s 44.8 percent and 82 electoral votes.64  Roosevelt saw his victory over 
Willkie as an expression of the citizenry’s confidence in his ability to lead the nation 
through both domestic and international crises, and he used this mandate to introduce his 
Lend-Lease plan to the U.S. public.  Although Roosevelt had sent fifty destroyers to 
Great Britain in September, the British military needed airplanes, tanks, guns, 
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ammunition, and other military supplies to guarantee its survival.  In a “remarkable 
4,000-word letter,” Winston Churchill laid out the desperate situation in Great Britain, 
pleading for the United States to come to the aid of her democratic ally.
65
  “The moment 
approaches when we shall no longer be able to pay cash for shipping and other supplies,” 
he wrote, and if “after victory was won with our blood, civilsation [sic] saved, and time 
gained for the United States to be fully armed against all eventualities, we should stand 
stripped to the bone.  Such a course would not be in the moral or economic interests of 
either of our countries.”66 
In response to Churchill’s request for help, Roosevelt came up with the idea of 
“Lend-Lease.”  In a press conference on December 17, 1940, Roosevelt explained his 
plan:  
Suppose my neighbor’s home catches fire, and I have a length of garden 
hose four or five hundred feet away.  If he can take my garden hose and 
connect it up with his hydrant, I may help him to put out his fire.  Now, 
what do I do?  I don’t say to him before that operation, “Neighbor, my 
garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay me $15 for it.”  What is the 
transaction that goes on?  I don’t want $15 – I want my garden hose back 
after the fire is over.  All right.  If it goes through the fire all right, intact, 
without any damage to it, he gives it back to me and thanks me very much 
for the use of it.  But suppose it gets smashed up – holes in it – during the 
fire; we don't have to have too much formality about it, but I say to him, “I 
was glad to lend you that hose; I see I can't use it any more, it’s all 
smashed up.” He says, “How many feet of it were there?” I tell him, 
“There were 150 feet of it.”  He says, “All right, I will replace it.”  Now, if 
I get a nice garden hose back, I am in pretty good shape.
67
 
 
Through this simple metaphor, Halford Ryan states that Roosevelt “successfully 
personalized America’s relationship to England in its time of trouble.  It was not 
repudiated but rather acclaimed as one of FDR’s most successful subterfuges.”68  Two 
weeks later, Roosevelt took to the airwaves to deliver his sixteenth “Fireside Chat” in 
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order to persuade the U.S. public of his plan for Lend-Lease.  Clearly stating at the outset 
of the address that this was not a “fireside chat on war” but one on “national security,” 
Roosevelt communicated his belief in the absolute necessity of sending military aid to 
Great Britain:  
I make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less 
chance of the United States getting into war if we do all we can now to 
support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if 
we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait 
our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on. 
 
Roosevelt acknowledged that there would be “risk in any course we may take,” but 
expressed his confidence “that the great majority of our people agree that the course that I 
advocate involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.”  
He argued that the United States must supply the “implements of war, the planes, the 
tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable [the British] to fight for their liberty and 
for our security . . . so that we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of 
war which others have had to endure.”  In his peroration, Roosevelt proclaimed, “We 
must be the great arsenal of democracy.”69 
 The Gallup Poll administered a survey two days after Roosevelt’s address.  The 
first question asked whether or not the respondent had listened to the President’s speech.  
Fifty-eight percent responded that they had, and another sixteen percent indicated they 
had read about it in the newspaper.  In response to the survey’s second question, which 
inquired if the respondent agreed with Roosevelt’s proposal, seventy-nine percent said 
they were in favor of Lend-Lease.  In seven months, the number of U.S. citizens who 
supported not just selling but even lending military armaments to the British had 
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doubled.
70
  On February 8, 1941, the U.S. House passed the Lend-Lease Act 250-167; 
one month later, the Senate passed it 60-31.  The bill authorized the lease of U.S. military 
ships, airplanes, tanks, guns, and other supplies and also appropriated $7 billion dollars to 
implement the plan.
71
 
May 27, 1941: “Announcing Unlimited National Emergency” 
 
 Five months after Roosevelt introduced the Lend-Lease Bill (H.R. 1776) to the 
U.S. Congress and the public, the president used his May 27, 1941, “Fireside Chat” to 
declare a state of “unlimited national emergency.”  Speaking to a large audience of 
ambassadors and ministers representing all nations of the Western Hemisphere, 
Roosevelt addressed the immediate audience and the millions listening around the world 
as “My fellow Americans of all the Americas; My Friends.”72  In the “Chat,” Roosevelt 
detailed the alarming number of instances in which German submarines had torpedoed 
and sunk merchant ships carrying supplies to Great Britain over the last five months.  At 
present, the president stated, the “rate of Nazi sinkings of merchant ships is more than 
three times as high as the capacity of British shipyards to replace them; it is more than 
twice the combined British and American output of merchant ships today.”73  Indeed, the 
situation was alarming.  Between January and May, 1941, German U-boats and surface 
raiders sank almost “two million tons of American and Allied merchant shipping, along 
with inestimable quantities of beef, butter, wheat, rubber, oil and military equipment 
needed by Britain.”74  In response to these attacks, Roosevelt asserted the “freedom of the 
seas” and extended the neutrality zone in U.S. waters to the mid-Atlantic.75  He vaguely 
alluded to an increase in U.S. military support for delivery of supplies, stating that “[a]ll 
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additional measures necessary to deliver the goods will be taken.”76  According to 
Samuel Rosenman, the two main goals of the speech were to explain to the U.S. public 
“the facts that made necessary the declaration of an unlimited emergency, and the drastic 
measures such an emergency required.  It was also a detailed argument which sought to 
convince the American people . . . that their very safety depended upon these drastic 
steps.”77  As Rosenman indicated, the public responded favorably to Roosevelt’s 
declaration of “unlimited national emergency.”  Two days after the “Chat,” on May 29, 
Gallup asked respondents which was more important: keeping the U.S. out of war or 
helping Britain, even if that aid meant the U.S. would become involved in the war.  Fifty-
nine percent said it was of utmost importance to continue aiding Britain in her fight 
against Germany.  When asked if U.S. warships should accompany supply convoys to 
Great Britain, fifty-nine percent agreed and thirty-four percent said they should not.  In 
the same survey, when asked if the United States should enter the war, sixty-seven 
percent said no.
78
  Thus, although a majority of the U.S. public supported aid to the 
British, citizens vocally opposed entering the war with Germany and Italy. 
 During the summer of 1941, Roosevelt continued to escalate U.S. involvement in 
the war, even though the nation was not directly involved in the conflict.  When Germany 
invaded the Soviet Union in June, the president froze all German financial assets in the 
United States.  In July, the U.S. military established a presence on Greenland and 
Iceland.
79 
 In August, the U.S. Congress barely passed the reauthorization of the Selective 
Service Act.  Just four months before Pearl Harbor, Republicans argued that the defense 
situation was better than the previous year and deemed the renewal unnecessary.  The bill 
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passed by a single vote in the House, and this “perilously thin margin in the House vote 
provided a sobering reminder of the nation’s continuing reluctance to move to a full war 
footing.”80  We see this reluctance not only from the U.S. public, but from Roosevelt 
himself.   
 Secretary of the Interior Harold Ickes noted that the president seemed to be 
“waiting for the Germans to create an ‘incident.’”  In response to advisors who urged him 
to use the German sinkings of merchant ships to escalate U.S. involvement, Roosevelt 
replied, “I am not willing to take the first shot.”  Treasury Secretary Henry Morgenthau 
recorded Roosevelt as saying, “I want to be pushed into this situation.”81  Upon the 
German invasion of the Soviet Union, Secretary of War Henry Stimson wrote in his 
diary: “It is a problem whether this country has it in itself to meet such an emergency.  
Whether we are really powerful enough and sincere enough and devoted enough to meet 
the Germans is getting to be more and more of a real problem.”  The following day, 
Stimson wrote to the president, suggesting that the U.S. declare war on Germany and 
included a draft of a war message to Congress.
82
  However, according to Lawrence 
Levine and Cornelia Levine, 
FDR had not yet crossed that bridge.  He still had not given up the hope 
that he could help England withstand the Germany juggernaut short of 
entering the war. This is what accounts for his indecision, for his 
contradictory statements and actions.  It was not really, as he blurted out in 
front of several advisers, that he feared impeachment; it was that he feared 
being wrong, feared leading the American people into bloody strife if he 
could find another path.  He also feared getting too far ahead of public 
opinion as he had in the Court fight . . . Although he has been accused by 
historians and politicians of maneuvering the United States into war, he 
was not so much Machiavellian as uncertain.
83
 
 
Although Roosevelt had several opportunities to declare war on Germany after submarine 
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sinkings of U.S. merchant ships, he did not.  However, the U.S.S. Greer incident in early 
September 1941 provided the president the opportunity to speak again on the “freedom of 
the seas” and introduce his “shoot on sight” policy in the Atlantic. 
September 11, 1941: “On Maintaining Freedom of the Seas” 
 
 On September 4, 1941, the U.S.S. Greer was en route to Iceland for a routine mail 
and supplies delivery mission to Iceland.  While patrolling the area, a British air 
reconnaissance plane spotted a submerged German U-boat and notified the U.S.S. Greer 
of its existence.  In response, the U.S.S. Greer located and tracked the submarine for 
several hours and reported its location to a British bomber.  The bomber dropped four 
depth charges into the ocean, but missed the submarine completely.  Assuming that the 
U.S.S. Greer was the vessel that had released the charges, the German U-boat fired 
torpedoes on the U.S. destroyer.  The U.S.S. Greer responded by releasing eight depth 
charges of its own.  Although neither the U.S.S. Greer nor the British bomber suffered 
damages, Roosevelt chose to use this particular incident to his advantage.
84
 
 In his “Fireside Chat” of September 11, 1941, Roosevelt misrepresented the 
actual events surrounding the U.S.S. Greer incident.  Roosevelt described the U.S.S. 
Greer as “proceeding in full daylight towards Iceland . . . carrying American mail to 
Iceland. She was flying the American flag. Her identity as an American ship was 
unmistakable.”  He continued,  
She was then and there attacked by a submarine. Germany admits that it 
was a German submarine.  The submarine deliberately fired a torpedo at 
the GREER, followed later by another torpedo attack.  In spite of what 
Hitler’s propaganda bureau has invented, and in spite of what any 
American obstructionist organization may prefer to believe, I tell you the 
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blunt fact that the German submarine fired first upon this American 
destroyer without warning, and with deliberate design to sink her. 
 
What Roosevelt failed to mention in his description was the British bomber who first 
fired on the German submarine.  Instead of revealing how the British had provoked the 
U-boat, the president instead described the event as an indication of “indiscriminate 
violence against any vessel sailing the seas,” calling it an act of “piracy – piracy legally 
and morally.”  This incident was more than a “mere episode in a struggle between two 
nations. This was one determined step towards creating a permanent world system based 
on force, on terror and on murder.”  After relaying the U.S.S. Greer incident to the U.S. 
public, Roosevelt went on to describe other instances of German U-boat attacks on 
merchant ships, including the U.S.S. Robin Moor, the S. S. Sessa, and the U.S.S. Steel 
Seafarer.  It would be “unworthy of a great nation to exaggerate an isolated incident, or 
to become inflamed by some one act of violence.  But it would be inexcusable folly to 
minimize such incidents in the face of evidence which makes it clear that the incident is 
not isolated, but is part of a general plan.”  The Nazi intent, said Roosevelt, was to “seize 
control of the oceans.”  In response, Roosevelt set forth what would be called the “shoot 
on sight” policy: 
This is the time for prevention of attack. If submarines or raiders attack in 
distant waters, they can attack equally well within sight of our own shores. 
Their very presence in any waters which America deems vital to its 
defense constitutes an attack.  
In the waters which we deem necessary for our defense, American naval 
vessels and American planes will no longer wait until Axis submarines 
lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface of the sea, strike 
their deadly blow – first.  
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Upon our naval and air patrol – now operating in large number over a vast 
expanse of the Atlantic Ocean – falls the duty of maintaining the 
American policy of freedom of the seas – now. That means, very simply, 
very clearly, that our patrolling vessels and planes will protect all 
merchant ships – not only American ships but ships of any flag – engaged 
in commerce in our defensive waters. They will protect them from 
submarines; they will protect them from surface raiders.
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From this point forward, Roosevelt ordered all U.S. ships and airplanes to open fire on 
any German or Italian vessel encountered while delivering supplies to Great Britain or 
other U.S. military posts.  “With Roosevelt’s words,” wrote British historian Martin 
Gilbert, “an undeclared state of war existed between the United States and Germany in 
the North Atlantic.”86  
Roosevelt’s intentional misrepresentation of the U.S.S. Greer incident 
demonstrates his willingness to bend the truth so as to move the United States closer to 
war with Germany, and it is this specific choice just three months before Pearl Harbor 
that has left historians questioning the president’s motives during this period.  According 
to Robert Dallek, Roosevelt’s manipulation of the facts “created a precedent for the 
manipulation of public opinion” and a future legacy of deception “that would be both 
emulated and abhorred.”87  Moreover, Robert Brown explains that because of Roosevelt’s 
actions during this incident, “many members of Congress were incredulous when he 
reported the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor a few months later . . . In the House, one 
representative who voted against a declaration of war, Jeanette Rankin, warned: ‘This 
might be another Roosevelt trick.  How do we know Hawaii has been bombed?  
Remember the Kerney [Greer]!’”88  In the Senate, isolationists and members of the 
America First Committee led a congressional inquiry that revealed Roosevelt’s 
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distortions of the incident, but “neither a congressional nor a national majority demanded 
a change in policy.”89  
Interestingly enough, Samuel Rosenman, one of the three speechwriters who 
crafted this address, says nothing in his memoirs of the strategic misrepresentation set 
forth in the “Chat.”  Instead, he simply commented on Roosevelt’s strategy during this 
period: 
He was determined, as he had said in his September 11 speech, that 
incidents like the Greer should not provoke us into war; but he was as 
equally determined that we should shoot it out with the Germans if that 
was necessary to get the goods to England and Russia . . . [Roosevelt’s 
strategy was] to keep one step ahead of public opinion, not to be 
stampeded in one direction or the other, and to encourage full debate 
before taking too drastic action.
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In a Gallup Poll taken six days after Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chat,” public opinion 
indicated once again that the majority of the U.S. public supported the president.  
Responding to a question that asked whether respondents agreed or disagreed with having 
the U.S. navy “shoot German submarines or warships on sight,” sixty-one percent agreed 
and twenty-eight percent disagreed.  Sixty-five percent of respondents said they agreed 
with the way Roosevelt was handling foreign policy.  And yet, when asked whether the 
United States should enter the war against Germany, seventy-three percent said no.
91
   
 Franklin D. Roosevelt would not deliver another “Fireside Chat” until December 
9, 1941, two days after Pearl Harbor.  Shocked by Japan’s deliberate attack on the U.S. 
military base in Hawaii, the U.S. public expressed their support for the president when 
almost 97 percent of survey respondents approved of the United States’ declaration of 
war against Japan.
92
  According to Samuel Rosenman, 
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[t]hat sneak attack did our fleet the greatest damage in its history.  But it 
did something else.  It did something that the Nazis and the Japanese 
should have feared more than the American fleet and the British fleet 
combined—it created a unified, outraged and determined America.  The 
dictators of the world could not have made a more serious blunder in their 
plans for world conquest than they did on that peaceful Sunday morning.
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For over two years, Roosevelt had sought to unify the U.S. public through his “Fireside 
Chats” and help them understand the enormous danger Germany posed to the safety and 
security of the United States.  Although he was successful at slowly shifting public 
opinion towards sending U.S. military and economic aid to Great Britain, Pearl Harbor 
ultimately convinced the U.S. citizenry of the necessity of going to war against Germany, 
Italy, and Japan. 
Theoretical Methods and Literature 
 
 For the purposes of this project, I examine these five “Fireside Chats” as a body 
of rhetoric rather than discussing them individually.  I make this choice for several 
reasons. Considering these five radio addresses as a whole allows me to discuss 
Roosevelt’s rhetorical strategies towards the mass U.S. public from 1939 to 1941.  
Primarily, I discuss how he attempted to persuade his audience that sending military and 
economic aid to Great Britain was essential to keeping the United States out of war with 
Germany.  In these five “Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt appealed to two specific priorities 
his audience shared: their desire for domestic and economic security and their aversion to 
any U.S. involvement in the European war.  As such, I consider how Roosevelt addressed 
these desires throughout these five “Fireside Chats” in an attempt to move his audience 
from strict isolationism to supporting his plan to send U.S. aid to Great Britain.  In the 
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section above, I provided a historical overview of the situations and events to which 
Roosevelt responded in these “Fireside Chats.”  In the chapters that follow, I consider 
how Roosevelt structured these addresses to identify with his audience, remind them of 
their past shared struggles, call them to civic duty and a specific type of citizenship, and 
encourage them to make specific types of sacrifice for the good of their nation.  I draw 
upon several theoretical methods and bodies of literature to do this. 
 First and foremost, I rely on close textual analysis to discuss how Roosevelt 
presented his argument that sending U.S. aid to Great Britain was the best way to avoid 
war with Germany in these five “Fireside Chats.”  I consider his use of metaphor and 
how he enabled his audience to visualize what he was talking about over the radio.  I 
examine Roosevelt’s tone, persona, and the evidence and strategies he used to support his 
argument and thus persuade his audience.  To assess Roosevelt’s success as a rhetorician, 
I draw upon Lawrence and Cornelia Levine’s helpful work The People and the President: 
America’s Conversation with FDR, a compilation of letters written to Roosevelt from 
citizens across the nation in response to his “Fireside Chats.”  These letters provide a very 
human answer to the question of how these “Chats” impacted and persuaded his 
audience.  I combine these letters with public opinion polls administered during this 
period to paint a picture of what the broad U.S. public thought of Roosevelt’s policies 
and his attempt to convince his audience of the necessity of sending military and 
economic aid to Great Britain.  
 I draw upon three specific theoretical models to discuss Roosevelt’s means of 
persuasion in these “Fireside Chats.”  First, I utilize several articles published on the 
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relationship between a rhetor and his/her audience to discuss Roosevelt’s attempt to 
create a certain type of citizenry through his “Fireside Chats.”  In his influential article 
“The Second Persona,” Edwin Black argues that auditors of a particular speech act “look 
to the discourse they are attending for cues that tell them how they are to view the 
world.”94  In discourse, the audience “find[s] enticements not simply to believe 
something, but to be something.  [They] are solicited by the discourse to fulfill its 
blandishments with our very selves.  And it is this dimension of rhetorical discourse that 
leads us finally to moral judgment.”  In his “Fireside Chats” from 1939 to 1941, 
Roosevelt called on his listeners to be and to become an active, involved, united, and 
supportive audience.  As he described the international events which threatened Great 
Britain (and ultimately, he argued, the United States), Roosevelt invited his audience to 
view the world a certain way and respond to it.  Walter J. Ong explains that a writer 
constitutes a “well-marked role” for his/her reader to play, one which draws upon the 
reader’s sympathies, imaginations, and personal connection with the writer.95  Roosevelt 
communicated this “well-marked role” in these five “Fireside Chats,” explaining how 
international events impacted the domestic sphere and expressing confidence that his 
audience would respond with courage, duty, and patriotism.  Finally, Lisa Ede and 
Andrea Lunsford differentiate between the idea of an audience addressed (the “concrete 
reality” of a certain audience) and an audience invoked (the audience a writer/speaker 
constructs within the discourse, a “created fiction”).96  They ultimately argue that the 
audience of any discourse must refer “not just to the intended, actual, or eventual readers 
of a discourse, but to all those whose image, ideas, or actions influence a writer during 
 32 
 
the process of composition.”97  For the purposes of this project, I consider Ong’s and Ede 
and Lunsford’s insights as they relate to the audience of a particular speech act or body of 
discourse.  As such, I argue that one of Roosevelt’s major successes in these “Chats” is 
his ability to create, move, and sustain a certain type of audience through his rhetoric. 
 Second, I consider Kenneth Burke’s view of identification as a means of 
persuasion.  In A Rhetoric of Motives, Burke argues that a speaker persuades by “causing 
the audience to identify itself with the speaker’s interests; and the speaker draws on the 
identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his audience.”98  These 
shared interests function as a type of rhetoric, because “the ideas are so related that they 
have in them, either explicitly or implicitly, inducements to some social and political 
choices rather than others.”99  Franklin D. Roosevelt consistently used his identification 
with the audience, and how the audience identified with one another, to move them to 
action.  He reminded them of shared U.S. values and morals, past struggles they 
confronted and conquered together, and the desire he and his audience shared to “keep 
out of this war.”100  In doing so, he attempted to create a unified audience that would 
support his plan of sending aid to Great Britain. 
 Finally, I draw upon Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and Kathleen Hall Jamieson’s work 
on presidential rhetoric, and in particular, their discussion of what constitutes presidential 
war rhetoric.  In their book, Presidents Creating the Presidency: Deeds Done in Words, 
Campbell and Jamieson provide five criteria that characterize all texts of presidential war 
rhetoric.
101
   
[P]residential war rhetoric throughout U.S. history manifests five pivotal 
characteristics: (1) every element in it proclaims that the momentous 
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decision to resort force is deliberate, the product of thoughtful 
consideration; (2) forceful intervention is justified through a chronicle or 
narrative from which argumentative claims are drawn; (3) the audience is 
exhorted to unanimity of purpose and total commitment; (4) the rhetoric 
not only justifies the use of force, but also seeks to legitimize presidential 
assumption of the extraordinary powers of commander in chief; and, as a 
function of these other characteristics, (5) strategic misrepresentations 
play an unusually significant role in its appeals.
102
 
 
Roosevelt’s final pre-war “Fireside Chat” of September 11, 1941, displays all five 
elements.  I use this framework to discuss how the president justified his “shoot on sight” 
policy in the Atlantic Ocean by declaring it a product of careful deliberation, providing a 
narrative chronicle of incidents leading up to the incident, calling on the citizenry to 
support this new policy, assuming the powers of commander in chief, and strategically 
misrepresenting the facts of the U.S.S. Greer’s encounter with the German submarine.   
Current Scholarship on the “Fireside Chats” 
 
 Numerous works have been written on Franklin Delano Roosevelt, and a number 
of scholars have focused their work on Roosevelt’s rhetorical appeal to the U.S. public 
during his presidency.  Some have focused on a specific “Fireside Chat” or a combination 
of the “Chats.”  In his examination of Roosevelt’s first “Fireside Chat” on the national 
banking crisis, Amos Kiewe details how the “simple and direct speaking style aiding the 
straightforward message was all Roosevelt needed to appeal to most Americans, who 
absorbed every word, every syllable and intonation.”  Kiewe explores how the wide 
success of this first “Chat” ingratiated Roosevelt with the U.S. electorate, explaining that 
“the American people appreciated their leader’s trust in them; they gave him their 
complete trust in return.” 103  Keiko Aoki’s brief analysis of FDR’s December 9, 1941 
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“Fireside Chat” details how the president used clear, simple language, concrete examples, 
clear organization of the text, the use of the pronoun “we,” and a gradual shift from “soft” 
to “hard” language to persuade his listeners.104  Applying the theory of media events to 
Roosevelt’s first eight “Fireside Chats,” David Michael Ryfe argues that the president 
shaped these specific addresses around a “new mode of publicness initiated by the culture 
industries of the 20
th
 century,” determined to use the radio to create a relationship with 
his constituency that transcended time and space.
105
 
Others have discussed the “Fireside Chats” as a body of rhetoric.  In an essay 
published in Rhetoric & Public Affairs in 2003, Elvin T. Lim argues that Roosevelt’s 
“Fireside Chats” should not be described as an “intimate rhetorical genre” because 
Roosevelt’s word choice in the “Fireside Chats” was not “on the orator’s inmost thoughts 
nor directed at subject matter that was conducive to establishing an emotional or social 
rapport between speaker and audience.”106  Lim also claims that the “declamatory 
statements” in the “Chats” against Hitler or even isolationists do not provide an intimate 
form of communication because they position the speaker in a position of moral authority 
versus maintaining equal footing with the audience.
107
  Although Roosevelt did not share 
intimate personal details of his life or thoughts, the “Fireside Chats” did establish a 
friendly, personal, direct means of communication between himself and the U.S. public.  
The president spoke to millions over the radio, but members of the audience frequently 
remarked that they felt he was speaking directly to them.  Roosevelt believed he had a 
duty to the U.S. public to report the actions of the U.S. government, giving an account for 
certain policies and actions just as he was required to report to the U.S. Congress.  As a 
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result, Roosevelt’s audience felt trusted, confided in, and personally informed of the 
domestic and international affairs of the state.   
In their collection of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats,” historians Russell 
D. Buhite and David W. Levy discuss how Franklin Roosevelt’s audience looked to him 
to provide an indication of what they, as a nationally unified audience, were fighting 
against, whether the Great Depression at home or a growing German threat abroad.  They 
explain that Roosevelt often sought to unite the audience “by calling attention to some 
enemy, some small minority of the perverse or wrongheaded, whose pernicious ideas the 
rest of us had to resist at all costs.”  These attempts to find and name “an enemy signaled 
to average Americans what attitudes and actions were unpatriotic; but the device also 
served the larger purpose of instilling in listeners feelings of unity with the vast majority 
of their fellow citizens.” 108   
 Other scholars have considered Roosevelt’s skill as a rhetorician.  In Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s Rhetorical Presidency, Halford R. Ryan charts the rhetorical strategies used 
by Roosevelt during various domestic and international crises of his presidency, noting 
that Roosevelt’s use of the radio had a greater impact on the broad U.S. public than 
individual speeches to certain groups.  Although he was not the first president to speak to 
the nation over radio, Ryan argues that “he was the first one to realize its potential for 
persuading the mass audience by extending his voice into the living rooms of the 
nation.”109  Ryan details the specific rhetorical strategies of the various “Chats,” noting 
that they covered various types of presidential rhetoric, including national “pep talks,” 
calls for national unity, and even direct responses to his critics.
110
  For Roosevelt, public 
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opinion was a major factor in determining his rhetorical strategies.   
 Steven Casey documents Roosevelt’s reliance on public opinion in Cautious 
Crusade: Franklin D. Roosevelt, American Public Opinion, and the War Against Nazi 
Germany, exploring how Roosevelt and those around him carefully monitored U.S. 
public opinion before and during the Second World War.  Although the majority of this 
book focuses on the period when the United States was engaged in the war in Europe, 
Casey’s meticulous research of primary sources provides an illuminating picture of how 
the president measured, interpreted, and then used U.S. public opinion to his benefit 
during 1939 to 1941.  For example, Casey explains that the president was acutely aware 
that “the domestic mood [over the growing German threat and the possibility of the U.S. 
entering the war] could not be merely ignored.”111 Carefully attuned to U.S. public 
opinion, Casey explains how Roosevelt saved the “Fireside Chats” for two broad 
purposes: “mobiliz[ing] opinion behind a specific initiative” and “to drive home the full 
implications of any change in the external environment, so as to further erode the public’s 
complacency about European developments.”112  
 In his essay “Franklin D. Roosevelt and American Public Opinion,” U.S. military 
and diplomatic historian Mark A. Stoler describes how and why Roosevelt and his 
administration traced public opinion so carefully during this period.  He explains that one 
primary reason was because Roosevelt “feared [public opinion], primarily as a result of 
his experiences during and after World War I.”  Stoler remarks that Roosevelt watched 
Woodrow Wilson’s “public support evaporate during the fight over the League of 
Nations and Treaty of Versailles,” an action which led to the “Senate rejection of that 
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treaty and of U.S. membership in the League [and]… his own defeat as the Democratic 
vice presidential nominee in the 1920 election.” 113  Roosevelt’s awareness of Wilson’s 
failure with the League of Nations resulted in a concerted effort by the president and his 
staff to carefully monitor the pulse of the nation and then use various modes of 
communication, including the “Fireside Chats,” to address concerns clearly and directly. 
 Historians also have written more generally on the sweeping impact of radio 
during the 1920s and 1930s.  Of specific importance to this study is Robert J. Brown’s 
book entitled Manipulating the Ether: The Power of Broadcast Radio in Thirties America 
and Douglas B. Craig’s Fireside Politics: Radio and Political Culture in the United 
States, 1920-1940.  Both works explore how this new medium changed the political and 
cultural scene in the United States and provided a medium Roosevelt could use to 
communicate with the U.S. public in a fresh, new way.
114
 
 This study bridges two specific streams of literature on Roosevelt and his 
presidency.  Although scholars such as Amos Kiewe have paid great attention to 
Roosevelt’s first “Fireside Chat” and its ability to still public anxiety over the banking 
crisis, no one has yet written on the significance of Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats” leading 
up to the United States’ entrance into World War II.  Although several historians and 
rhetoricians have worked on Roosevelt’s use of rhetorical devices to appeal to the U.S. 
public during this period, none has focused on how Roosevelt attempted to use the 
“Fireside Chats,” an established medium of trust and personal connection between 
Roosevelt and the mass public, to move the U.S. public away from isolationism and 
closer to supporting U.S. intervention in the European conflict.  This project builds upon 
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both streams of literature and connects historical and rhetorical scholarship to assess how 
Roosevelt used these “Chats” as a particular persuasive device and how his audience, the 
U.S. public, responded. 
Outline of Chapters 
 
This project considers these five “Fireside Chats” as a body of rhetoric designed to 
persuade the U.S. public that sending military and economic aid to Great Britain was the 
best way to keep the United States out of war with Germany.  Chapter two discusses how 
Roosevelt addressed his audience’s fear that sending U.S. aid to Great Britain would 
undermine the social and domestic gains accomplished during the past seven years and 
bring about a second economic crisis.  Instead, Roosevelt argued that this aid was essential 
to preserving economic stability and the U.S. “way of life” since a Nazi victory in Great 
Britain would bring the war closer to U.S. shores.
115
  Drawing on Black, Ong, and Ede and 
Lunsford’s work on audience addressed / audience invoked, I discuss how Roosevelt 
invoked a citizenry united around his plan and motivated by a shared desire to keep the 
United States out of war.  The third chapter of this project examines how Roosevelt used 
identification with his audience to argue that supporting the Allied nations, particularly 
Great Britain, in their fight against Germany would shelter the United States from the 
European conflict.  Keenly aware that the U.S. public feared a second world war, Roosevelt 
called his audience to sacrifice as if “we were at war” but stated that sending U.S. 
armaments to England would allow the British to “fight for their liberty and our security.”116  
This chapter also discusses the rhetoric of the America First Committee and their attempt to 
label Roosevelt as a “war lord” trying to get the United States into war with Germany.  
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Chapter four considers Roosevelt’s final pre-war “Fireside Chat” on September 11, 1941, as 
an example of presidential war rhetoric.  I examine why Roosevelt chose to use the U.S.S. 
Greer incident to introduce his “shoot on sight” policy and use Campbell and Jamieson’s 
framework for war rhetoric to conduct a rhetorical analysis of the text.  My final chapter 
argues that to fully understand the historical, political, social, economic, and cultural climate 
of the United States between 1939 to 1941, one must consider these five “Fireside Chats” as 
an essential rhetorical text.  I discuss the insights they provide to Roosevelt as President, 
Roosevelt as rhetorician, and how they demonstrate Roosevelt’s keen understanding of the 
U.S. public at this uncertain time in U.S. history.  Finally, I provide areas for future study. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
CITIZEN ADDRESSED, CITIZENRY INVOKED:  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S CALL FOR CIVIC DUTY 
 
We met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism.  We face this new crisis – this new 
threat to the security of our nation – with the same courage and realism.117 
 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 29, 1940 
 
 
 After listening to the president’s May 27, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” Private Jerry 
Ryan, a recent enlistee in the U.S. army, penned a letter to Roosevelt: “Tonight I listened 
to your speech,” he wrote, “and I wish to express my admiration for you, both as my 
President and Commander in Chief.”  He had enlisted in the U.S. army four months ago, 
Private Ryan explained.  “I quit my job, left my mother and [s]weetheart behind, for there 
is something inside me that told me I had to help protect all of the fine things that 
America means to me.”  He continued, 
When I think of what other Americans before me have gone through in 
order to let me have the wonderful opportunities I have had, it seems I 
have really done nothing.  But I’m where I can help now, and I’m willing 
to help in every way that I can . . . last week I was sent down here from 
Hamilton Field to study a course in Airplane Mechanics at California 
Flyers Inc.  So I will at the end of six months be in more of a position to 
really help out in the defence [sic] work.  When I think of what a 
wonderful opportunity this is, I feel humble to Uncle Sam . . . I feel 
humble writing this letter to you – perhaps you will never see it.  But I 
thought you might wonder how we soldiers feel.  [We’re] behind each 
other, [we’re] behind you, and [we’re] behind America, and we intend to 
remain there[,] ready to give our lives if necessary . . .
118
 
 
In this letter to President Roosevelt, Private Ryan expressed the sense of duty he felt to 
his country, indicating his willingness to “help in every way” that he could to defend the 
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United States of America and “all of the fine things that America” meant to him.  He and 
his fellow soldiers were “behind each other,” their president, and their country.  They 
intended to “remain there,” he wrote.  United by a common sense of duty to their nation 
and their fellow citizens, Private Ryan and his fellow soldiers responded to Roosevelt’s 
call for sacrifice, resolve, and patriotism by offering their loyalty, their service and, if 
necessary, their very lives. 
 This chapter considers how President Franklin D. Roosevelt used these five 
“Fireside Chats” to invoke a certain type of U.S. citizen, namely one who would support 
sending U.S. aid to Great Britain.  He argued that supporting the British effort against 
Nazi Germany was the best way to ensure domestic and economic stability at home and 
preserve the values, freedoms, and overall “way of life” that U.S. citizens enjoyed.119  
Speaking to a nation fearful of a second economic crisis and convinced that sending 
military aid to Great Britain would undermine U.S. economic growth, Roosevelt argued 
instead that sending U.S. support to Great Britain would actually ensure the safety and 
security of the United States.  To move his audience to action, the president compared the 
European war with the Great Depression, asking his audience to demonstrate similar 
“courage and realism” in the face of this new international threat.120  In what follows, I 
provide a brief historical context of the Great Depression and explain how Roosevelt both 
addressed and invoked his audience during his Great Depression “Fireside Chats.”  I then 
theorize my claim that Roosevelt addressed and invoked a specific type of citizen and 
citizenry in his five pre-war “Fireside Chats.”  After this historical and theoretical 
background, I consider how Roosevelt invoked the ideal citizen / citizenry in these five 
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“Fireside Chats.”  Although Roosevelt employed numerous rhetorical strategies to do 
this, for the purposes of this chapter I examine five specific ways in which Roosevelt 
called forth an ideal citizenry through his rhetoric. 
Historical Context 
 
 When Franklin Delano Roosevelt took the presidential oath of office on March 4, 
1933, the United States was in the midst of the greatest economic crisis in the nation’s 
history.  After the stock market crash in October 1929, the U.S. economy plummeted and 
millions of U.S. citizens found themselves without jobs.  Between 1929 and 1932, the Gross 
National Product was cut in half from $103.1 billion to $55.6 billion.  More than one 
hundred thousand businesses failed.  The value of both U.S. imports and exports declined by 
more than sixty-five percent.  Although U.S. unemployment stood at 3.2 percent in 1929, it 
quickly rose to 8.9 percent in 1930, 16.3 percent in 1931, and 24.1 percent in 1932.  By the 
time Roosevelt moved into the White House, 25.2 percent of the U.S. workforce was 
jobless, and a “fog of despair hung over the land.” 121   
 In October 1928, the New York City Health Department found that more than one-
fifth of public school children were malnourished.
122
  With commodity prices plummeting, 
farmers were unable to find a market for their corn, wheat, and soybeans.  As a result, many 
farms fell into foreclosure, leaving the former occupants with no place to live.
123
  Iowa 
farmers stopped milk trucks and emptied the cartons out along empty fields, roads, and 
ditches.
124
  In West Virginia, families of miners set up tents on the side of road, surviving on 
“pinto beans and black coffee.”125  A job picking cotton in Arizona left its earner only thirty 
cents a week after bills for food and housing were paid.
126
  For those who held savings 
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accounts, the “bank holidays” provided a source of great anxiety and unrest.  Many banks 
across the country began imposing “holidays” (closing the bank without warning for days 
on end), or shut their doors altogether.  In 1929, a total of 659 banks, with deposits nearing 
$250,000,000 closed their doors; in 1930, 1,352 banks with deposits of $853,000,000 did the 
same.
127
  In a period before federal deposit insurance guaranteed the safety of one’s savings, 
many individuals and families found themselves suddenly bankrupt.
 128
 
 The collapse of the economy symbolized what historian David M. Kennedy called 
“the end of an era.” 129  “So came to an end the Jazz Age, the Roaring Twenties, the 
Republican Prosperity, the New Economic Era,” wrote another.130  The U.S. industrial 
prowess of the 1920s screeched to a halt, for “the roaring industrial expansion that had 
boomed since the Civil War hushed to a near standstill for half a generation.”131  By 
September 1931, manufacturing volume had reduced by fifty percent, and by 1932, the 
nation’s steel plants operated at only eleven percent of their capacity.132  This financial 
collapse brought forth new skepticism towards capitalism and big business.  Although 
wealthy tycoons such as Henry Ford, John D. Rockefeller, and Charles Schwab responded 
to the stock market crash with optimistic confidence, the rapidly increasing unemployment 
numbers and soup kitchen lines signaled that something was terribly wrong with the U.S. 
economy.
133
   
 However, many economists and government officials, including President Herbert 
Hoover, believed that the economic crisis would be short lived, a mere blip on the economic 
radar.  They compared the rise in unemployment following the stock market crash to the 
depression of 1920-22.
134
  On the surface, the early 1920s did seem worse.  According to a 
 44 
 
report published by the Works Progress Administration in 1937, administrator Harry L. 
Hopkins compared the unemployment numbers in 1921 of 4.2 million people to 1.8 million 
unemployed workers in 1929.
135
  What Hoover and others failed to realize, however, was 
the full extent of economic upheaval, an upheaval which would take several years to fully 
manifest itself throughout the U.S. economy.   
 On May 1, 1930, Hoover infamously declared that the United States had passed 
“through one of those great economic storms which periodically bring hardship and 
suffering upon our people . . . [and] I am convinced we have now passed the worst and with 
continued unity of effort we shall rapidly recover.”136  In a speech to the American Bankers 
Association in October, Hoover described the depression as a “severe shock” causing 
“disorganization in our economic system” and yet argued that  “the fundamental assets of 
the Nation, the education, intelligence, virility, and the spiritual strength of our 120,000,000 
people have been unimpaired . . . [and the] resources of our country in lands and minds are 
undiminished.”137  Yet the worst was not over.  In 1932, U.S. unemployment reached 24.1 
percent.
138
  That November the U.S. public, desperate for economic relief, rallied around 
New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt and his promise to address the economic crisis.  
On election day, three million more voters went to the polls than in 1928.
139
   After a hard 
fought campaign, Governor Roosevelt claimed a victory of 22,810,000 votes to Hoover’s 
15,759,000.  Roosevelt carried all but six states, giving him a total of 472 electoral votes 
compared to Hoover’s fifty-nine.140  After Hoover’s overwhelming loss, TIME referred to 
the outgoing executive as “President Reject,” stating that Hoover’s defeat “was the worst 
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any President had had in a straight two-party campaign since . . . [1864] when Lincoln beat 
General McClellan 212 to 21.”141  
 Franklin Delano Roosevelt took office on March 4, 1933.  In his inaugural address, 
Roosevelt proclaimed that the only thing the nation needed to fear was “fear itself” and 
promised to “wage a war against the emergency, as great as the power that would be given 
to me if we were in fact invaded by a foreign foe.”142  As Davis Houck records in his 
rhetorical analysis of Roosevelt’s First Inaugural, FDR and Fear Itself, Roosevelt’s 
audience responded to his words with hope, confidence, and courage.
143
  “After listening to 
your touching inaugural address,” wrote Dorothy Fullinger of Florida, “I felt as if I could 
stretch out my arms and cry: ‘I’m glad I’m an American!’  It gave me a new thrill in life, 
something to live for.”144   Raymond Hummel from California expressed the physical 
impact Roosevelt’s words had on him: “To-day sitting among a gathering of the all but 
‘forgotten men’ during your inaugural address, I seen [sic] those worried looks replaced by 
smiles and confidence, eyes fill up with tears of gratitude, shoulders lifted and chest out.”145  
Eight days later, Roosevelt delivered his first “Fireside Chat,” an address in which he 
explained to the U.S. public the current banking situation and laid out his plans for 
economic recovery.  In stark contrast to Hoover’s lack of direct communication with the 
citizenry, Roosevelt addressed his audience as “friends” and equals, indicating his desire to 
talk with them about the problems that confronted them individually and as a nation.  As 
discussed in the initial chapter of this project, Roosevelt’s first “Fireside Chat” greatly 
boosted the confidence and morale of the U.S. citizenry.  Amos Kiewe writes in his study of 
the address, FDR’s First Fireside Chat: Public Confidence and the Banking Crisis, that 
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Roosevelt’s March 4, 1933, radio address drastically changed the “public psychology” by 
instilling courage and confidence in his audience, allaying their fears, generating support for 
his economic program, and providing faith and inspiration.
146
   
 Throughout his first and second terms as president, Roosevelt continued to use 
“Fireside Chats” to update the public on the progress of various social programs, the state of 
the U.S. economy, and the overall progress of the nation.  Citizens frequently expressed 
their appreciation that he took the time to explain the details and facts of the domestic and 
economic issues the United States faced, even when difficult.  In these Depression-era 
“Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt spoke to the U.S. public about how the economic crisis 
impacted them individually and the nation as a whole.  According to Samuel Rosenman, 
Roosevelt’s ability to “create a feeling of intimacy with each of his listeners” came from the 
fact that Roosevelt “felt that intimacy himself.” 
As he spoke, it was obvious that he was thinking of the different kinds of 
people he was talking with, rather than talking to.  It was as if the 
microphone had been removed and he was seated in the living rooms of 
the American families.  He forgot the audience of friends in the room; he 
would gesture as if he were discussing crops with a farmer, or the price of 
food with a housewife, or rates of wages with a worker.  There was no 
attempt at oratory; in its place were substituted deep sincerity of tone, 
friendliness, warmth and calmness of voice.  In a word, he would 
“chat.”147 
 
Roosevelt actually verbalized this fact, telling his audience that he visualized “all those 
Americans with whom I was talking.”  He described how he saw “the workman in the mills, 
the mines, the factories; the girl behind the counter; the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing 
his spring plowing; the widows and the old men wondering about their life’s savings.” 
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These were the citizens Roosevelt addressed as he explained to them, “the great mass of the 
American people, what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives.” 148 
 Roosevelt also called forth a certain type of audience and citizenry in these “Chats,” 
one that would respond to the Great Depression with courage, confidence, and hope for a 
better future.  “Confidence and courage are the essentials of success in carrying out our 
plan,” Roosevelt proclaimed on March 12, 1933.  “You people must have faith; you must 
not be stampeded by rumors or guesses.  Let us unite in banishing fear.  We have provided 
the machinery to restore our financial system, and it is up to you to support it and make it 
work.”149  Here Roosevelt directly expressed how the individual citizen and the collective 
citizenry should respond.  They must show faith, reject rumors, and unite to banish fear.  
Only collective support for Roosevelt’s plan would ensure victory.  By invoking a specific 
response from his audience, Roosevelt provided, in Edwin Black’s terms, “a model of what 
the rhetor [Roosevelt] would have his real auditor [the individual citizen and collective 
citizenry] become.”150  They would respond in certain ways and with certain actions, actions 
which he stated would contribute to the recovery of the U.S. economic and domestic 
prosperity.   By calling forth an ideal audience in and through his “Fireside Chats,” 
Roosevelt developed a particular pattern of communication with the citizenry, one on which 
he would draw heavily upon in the pre-war “Fireside Chats.”  
 By 1937, four years after Roosevelt took office, the people of the United States still 
expressed deep concern over the state of the U.S. economy, and with good reason.  
Although employment numbers had improved and the U.S. economy was slowly 
recovering, 1937 brought a “depression within a depression” and the “first economic 
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downturn since Roosevelt had taken office.”  Stocks fell by over thirty percent and 
unemployment numbers rose to 10 million individuals, or nineteen percent of the U.S. 
workforce.  Some critics called it the “Roosevelt Recession.”151  In April 1938, a Gallup 
Poll reported that fifty-one percent of the U.S. population viewed the “current state of 
business” as a depression rather than a recession.  In the same poll, sixty percent of 
respondents said they did not feel as if they were better off than they were a year ago.
152
  In 
May, a Gallup Poll reported that when asked if they thought the United States had passed 
the “worst point in the present depression,” thirty-four percent said yes and forty-seven 
percent said no; another eighteen percent had “no opinion.”153  One year later, as the 
German threat grew more prominent in Europe, Gallup asked survey respondents to identify 
“the most important problem before the American people today.”  Almost thirty-four 
percent named “Unemployment – more jobs – more work” and the same number cited 
“Neutrality – keeping out of the European war, keeping peace” as their main concern.154  
Together, almost seventy percent of the population believed that solving domestic issues at 
home and keeping the United States out of war abroad were the greatest challenges facing 
the United States.   
 When war erupted in Europe in 1939, President Franklin D. Roosevelt knew that he 
spoke to an audience deeply concerned about their own domestic issues and 
overwhelmingly opposed to any U.S. involvement in the conflict.  Therefore, in order to 
convince them that the best way to keep the United States out of war was to support Great 
Britain, Roosevelt argued that Germany posed a direct threat to the domestic, economic, and 
social gains the nation had made under his leadership and to the future of the United States.  
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In order to protect these gains and values, Roosevelt called on his audience to become a 
supportive, unified public, a citizenry that would rally around his call for personal, 
individual sacrifice for the good of the entire nation.   
Theorizing the Citizen Addressed, Citizenry Invoked   
 
 As referenced in the first chapter, several scholars have written about the 
connection between a speaker’s intended audience and the one he/she creates or calls into 
being in his/her address.  Lisa Ede and Andrea Lunsford argue that the direct audience a 
writer/speaker addresses and the audience a writer/speaker invokes are not mutually 
exclusive.  That is, a writer/speaker may address a specific, intended audience and invoke 
an ideal audience through a particular rhetorical situation.  Ede and Lunsford argue, “It is 
the writer who, as writer and reader of his or her own text, one guided by a sense of 
purpose and by the particularities of a specific rhetorical situation, establishes the range 
of potential roles an audience may play.”155  The rhetor thus communicates with his/her 
intended audience, one existing “outside of the text,” while calling forth an audience 
“through the text” since “it is only through the text, through language, that writers [or 
rhetors] embody or give life to their conception of the reader [listener].”156  In this 
chapter, I argue that Roosevelt addressed his intended audience, the “great mass of 
American people,” in these “Fireside Chats” and, at the same time, invoked a citizenry 
united by shared values and national purpose.
157
   
In these five “Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt addressed the U.S. public, the audience 
he had cultivated throughout previous radio addresses since 1933.  “Tonight my single 
duty is to speak to the whole of America,” Roosevelt proclaimed in his “Fireside Chat” of 
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September 3, 1939.
158
  He addressed certain individuals and groups in these “Fireside 
Chats,” speaking to the “workmen in the mills, the mines, the factories,”159 members of 
Congress,
160
 business and labor leaders,
161
 and “every American family.”162  At the same 
time, Roosevelt called forth certain attitudes, beliefs, values, and courses of action from 
his audience.  “It is my resolve and yours to build up our armed defenses,” Roosevelt 
confidently asserted in his May 26, 1940, “Fireside Chat.”163  Seven months later, he 
proclaimed that the United States would be “the great arsenal of democracy” not just 
through military production, but also as the “American people” applied themselves to the 
“task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism 
and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.”164  Edwin Black explains that 
“rhetorical discourses, either singly or cumulatively in a persuasive movement, will 
imply an auditor, and that in most cases the implication will be sufficiently suggestive as 
to enable the critic to link this implied auditor to an ideology.”165  In other words, 
rhetorical texts provide clues to the rhetor’s intended audience and the course of action 
the rhetor wishes them to embrace.  In this instance, Roosevelt set forth a link between 
how his invoked audience, the “implied auditor,” would respond to the course of action, 
or “ideology,” he set forth.  For Roosevelt, the citizen addressed became the citizenry 
invoked, a unified public ready to respond to the growing German threat with a “courage 
and realism” equal to their response to the Great Depression.  This invoked citizen, as 
created by Roosevelt, reflects modern theoretical conceptions of citizenship as created 
through rhetoric.   
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 In his essay, “A Discourse Theory of Citizenship,” Robert Asen persuasively 
argues that instead of asking “what counts as citizenship, we should ask: how do people 
enact citizenship?”  Doing so allows scholars to reorient “our framework from a question 
of what to a question of how [that] usefully directs our attention from acts to action.”166  
In addition, viewing citizenship “as a mode of public engagement . . . shifts our focus 
from what constitutes citizenship to how citizenship proceeds.”167  Asen sets forth a 
theory of citizenship that stresses the importance of individual actions for the good of the 
whole, the nation.  When considering citizenship in this project and how Roosevelt 
invokes a certain type of citizen through his rhetoric, I draw upon Asen’s discourse 
theory of citizenship as a mode or “manner of doing something,” a daily, normative, 
quotidian process of expressing one’s civic engagement.168  Roosevelt conceptualized 
citizenship in a similar manner in these “Fireside Chats,” calling for personal, everyday 
acts from his audience motivated by a shared sense of civic duty and desire to keep the 
United States out of war with Germany.
169
 
 Declaring an unlimited national emergency in his “Fireside Chat” of May 27, 
1941, Roosevelt declared that the U.S. government had “the right to expect of all citizens 
that they take part in the common work of our common defense – take loyal part from 
this moment forward.”  The “common work” of “common defense” went beyond a 
mental or emotional state of his audience, however.  “I have recently set up the 
machinery for civilian defense,” Roosevelt continued.  “It will rapidly organize, locality 
by locality.  It will depend on the organized effort of men and women everywhere.  All 
will have opportunities and responsibilities to fulfill.”170  Men and women, in every state 
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across the country, were called to action, asked by their president to do specific things to 
contribute to the common defense of the nation.  Defense meant “more than merely 
fighting,” Roosevelt explained.  He asked his audience to protect the nation by 
maintaining civilian and military morale, using “every available resource,” discarding 
“rumor and distorted statement,” recognizing the “fifth columnists” for the “incendiary 
bombs” that they were.171  These actions Roosevelt called for were ones that any citizen, 
male or female, young or old, could accomplish.  As Asen notes, “democracy signifies 
something both enacted by individuals and yet realized as the creation of everyone . . . 
[d]emocracy’s heart does not beat in the halls of Congress or in the voting booth, but in 
everyday enactments of citizenship.”172  Acting individually and yet as a whole through 
these “everyday enactments of citizenship,” Roosevelt’s audience responded not only as 
the audience he addressed, but also as the audience he invoked, a citizenry unified in 
defense of their nation. 
 In the rest of this chapter, I argue that Roosevelt invoked this type of citizen and 
citizenry by (1) evoking public memory of the Great Depression; (2) identifying the 
shared moral and national values of his audience; (3) emphasizing the great importance 
of the economic and social gains made in the United States; (4) appealing to the 
“patriotism of labor” to end union strikes; (5) and equating a German victory in Great 
Britain with economic strangulation of the United States.  Speaking to an audience deeply 
concerned about the economic and social state of the country, Roosevelt focused these 
appeals on the U.S. domestic front.  In doing so, he equated the current international 
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struggle with the Great Depression, ultimately calling his audience to respond with 
“similar courage and realism.”173 
Roosevelt’s Call for Civic Duty 
Evoking Public Memory 
 
 To encourage his audience to take “full part” in the defense of the United States, 
Roosevelt reminded his audience of other times in the nation’s history when the country 
had been threatened by domestic crises and international events.
174
  On December 29, 
1940, Roosevelt reminded his audience of his first “Chat” to the U.S. public.  Having just 
announced the Lend-Lease bill in a press conference a week earlier, the president went to 
the airwaves to explain this course of action to the U.S. public.  Greeting his audience as 
“my friends,” he explained that “in the presence of a world crisis, my mind goes back 
eight years to a night in the midst of a domestic crisis . . . a time when the wheels of 
American industry were grinding to a full stop, when the whole banking system of our 
country had ceased to function.”  Recalling some of the darkest days of the Great 
Depression, Roosevelt reminded his audience of the dismal state of affairs in March 
1933. 
I had before my eyes the picture of all those Americans with whom I was 
talking  . . . the workmen in the mills, the mines, the factories; the girl 
behind the counter; the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing his spring 
plowing; the widows and the old men wondering about their life’s savings. 
 
By naming these individuals and describing their surroundings, their actions, and their 
emotions, Roosevelt brought images of suffering citizens before the eyes of his audience.  
For Quintilian, the concept of “bringing-before-the-eyes” allowed a listener to visualize 
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what the speaker was describing in the present, to feel as if he/she were “actually present 
at the affairs of which we are speaking.”175  Chaim Perelman and Lucie Olbrechts-Tyteca 
refer to this concept of presence, the ability of a speaker “to make present, by verbal 
magic alone, what is actually absent but what he considers important to his argument or, 
by making them more present, to enhance the value of some of the elements of which one 
has actually been made conscious.”176  By reminding his audience of these specific 
individuals and citizens, Roosevelt brought the presence of these workmen, shopkeepers, 
farmers, girls, widows, and old men into the immediate consciousness of those listening 
to his “Fireside Chat.”  Not only could they visualize these citizens figuratively in their 
mind’s eye, but Roosevelt’s description allowed those listening to think of individuals 
they knew personally.  In this sense, Roosevelt did not speak in generalities, but instead 
described friends, neighbors, family members, and individuals listening to his “Fireside 
Chat.”  Doing so unified his audience around shared knowledge and experience, for 
almost everyone listening to his “Fireside Chat” could visualize a particular individual 
he/she knew. 
 Roosevelt explained that his goal in 1933 was to “convey to the great mass of 
American people what the banking crisis meant to them in their daily lives.”  On this 
night eight years later, he said, “I want to do the same thing, with the same people, in this 
new crisis which faces America.  We met the issue of 1933 with courage and realism.  
We face this new crisis – this new threat to the security of our nation – with the same 
courage and realism.”177  Here Roosevelt connected his first “Fireside Chat” that 
addressed the banking crisis with his radio address of December 29, 1940, and the present 
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state of the nation.  “We met the issue of 1933,” the Great Depression, “with courage and 
realism.”  By utilizing the plural “we,” Roosevelt implied that he was united with his 
audience and that together, he and the citizenry had conquered that crisis.  In the face of 
this “new threat to the security of our nation,” Roosevelt said he wanted to “do the same 
thing, with the same people.”  Just as the U.S. public had met and conquered the Great 
Depression, Roosevelt proclaimed that “we,” the president and the U.S. public, “face this 
new crisis – this new threat to the security of our nation – with the same courage and 
realism.”  It is important to note here that Roosevelt did not qualify the action by stating 
“we will” or “we must.”  Instead, he used present tense, indicating that now, in the 
present moment, he and the citizenry already were facing this new threat exactly as they 
had during the Great Depression, “with courage and realism.”178 
 In his May 27, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” the president used his own famous words to 
remind his audience of how they had met and conquered previous crises together.  After 
declaring an unlimited national emergency and introducing his plan to use U.S. ships to 
carry supplies to Great Britain, Roosevelt declared to his audience that they must not “be 
defeated by the fear of the very danger which we are preparing to resist.”  After a long 
pause, he continued: “The only thing we have to fear is fear itself.”  By quoting the most 
famous line from his inaugural address, Roosevelt reminded the sixty-five million people 
in twenty million homes listening to his talk of the fear they had fought together during 
the Great Depression.
179
  In the face of the worst economic crisis in the history of the 
United States, he had told them not to fear.  Towards this new threat, this international 
conflict which threatened to engulf the globe, he used the same words to call forth 
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strength and resolve.  Bradford Vivian refers to the idea of repeating famous national 
words as reciting: “for commemorative purposes, the very ritual or symbolic action of 
reciting traditional texts is often more essential to maintaining the continuity of collective 
memory than conjuring new turns of phrase.”180  This is exactly what Roosevelt wished 
to do.  By reciting his exhortation to reject fear, the president not only called his audience 
to embrace courage and confidence, but he called forth “the political lessons [his 
statement] symbolize[d]      . . . more pervasively than the transcendent artistry of singular 
oratorical masterworks.”181 In just ten words, Roosevelt reminded his audience of their 
shared history, shared victory, and called the same audience to become “a united and 
determined people” who would reject fear and stand united to win the “ultimate victory” 
against Germany.
182
 
Roosevelt also recited other sacred national texts and referenced specific events in 
U.S. history in these “Fireside Chats” to move his audience towards supporting U.S. aid 
to Great Britain.  Announcing unlimited national emergency in his “Fireside Chat” of 
May 27, 1941, the president stated that “[o]ur Bunker Hill of tomorrow may be several 
thousand miles from Boston, Massachusetts,” a prediction which became a fact after the 
Japanese bombing of Pearl Harbor.
183
  At the end of the address, Roosevelt recited the 
words of those who signed the Declaration of Independence, linking his audience to “that 
little band of patriots, fighting long ago against overwhelming odds, but certain as we are 
now, of ultimate victory: ‘With firm reliance on the protection of Divine Providence, we 
mutually pledge to each other our lives, our fortunes, and our sacred honor.’”184  Here 
Roosevelt recited one of the most famous sentences from the Declaration of 
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Independence, one of the most sacred texts of U.S. public memory.  The president’s 
message was clear.  Just as that “little band of patriots” had pledged their “lives, fortunes, 
and sacred honor” to the U.S. colonial revolution, so too the citizenry must unite together 
in common defense of their nation. 
Roosevelt’s audience responded to his call for unity and individual sacrifice.  
“Dear Mr. President,” Phil Kennedy wrote after Roosevelt’s September 3, 1939, 
“Fireside Chat,” “I listened to your talk last night and thought it was wonderful . . . after 
hearing your speech, I resolved to live for my country, and live the best I can, you know 
that’s a harder job than to die for it in war.”185  Mr. Kennedy’s acknowledgment that 
Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chat” led to his resolve to “live for [his] country” demonstrates 
how Roosevelt called forth a certain type of citizen in these “Fireside Chats,” one who 
was willing to sacrifice individually for the good of the nation.  David Flanzbaum from 
Somerville, New Jersey, wrote that Roosevelt’s December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat” 
deeply moved him through its “crystal clear presentation of our situation today . . . [and] I 
feel obliged to try in a small way to convey to you the faith and hope I know the great 
masses of we Americans have placed and continue to hold in you.”  Mr. Flanzbaum 
expressed that Roosevelt’s “clear presentation” of the danger facing the United States 
brought forth “much hope and courage” to the audience, a united entity he referred to as 
“we Americans.”  He continued, “I have just passed my twenty-second birthday and am 
the holder of a low draft number.  I expect to be in service very shortly and I am proud to 
have this privilege – humbly grateful to God that I am an American.”186  Here Mr. 
Flanzbaum implicitly linked the privilege of serving his country in the military with his 
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identification as an American; as a proud citizen, he would respond to Roosevelt’s call 
for duty and sacrifice by defending the nation through military service. 
Identifying Shared Values 
 
Roosevelt also utilized national images, shared values, and symbolic texts to 
identify with his audience and invoke a citizenry resolved to take action to defend Great 
Britain.  In his September 3, 1939, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt addressed an audience 
stunned by Hitler’s swift invasion of Poland two days earlier and the immediate 
declaration of war against Germany by Great Britain and France.  “My countrymen and 
my friends,” he began, immediately establishing a connection between himself and the 
U.S. public that united them as fellow “countrymen” of the United States.187  Roosevelt 
affirmed his desire, and the desire of his audience, to remain at peace.  “In spite of 
spreading wars,” he explained, “I think that we have every right and every reason to 
maintain as a national policy the fundamental moralities, the teachings of religion (and) 
the continuation of efforts to restore peace.”  He continued, 
Most of us in the United States believe in spiritual values. Most of us, 
regardless of what church we belong to, believe in the spirit of the New 
Testament – a great teaching which opposes itself to the use of force, of 
armed force, of marching armies and falling bombs. The overwhelming 
masses of our people seek peace – peace at home, and the kind of peace in 
other lands which will not jeopardize our peace at home. We have certain 
ideas and certain ideals of national safety and we must act to preserve that 
safety today and to preserve the safety of our children in future years.
 188
 
 
 Roosevelt connected the shared desire for peace with the necessity of preserving and 
securing peace and safety for “our children in future years.”  He argued that when “peace 
has been broken anywhere, the peace of all countries everywhere is in danger.”189  As 
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such, he prepared his audience for the fact that the United States “must act” to preserve 
that peace and to “keep war from our own firesides.”190   
Roosevelt invoked feelings of patriotism and civic duty when he called for a 
buildup of military armaments in his May 26, 1940, “Fireside Chat.”  He reminded his 
audience that for “more than three centuries we Americans have been building on this 
continent a free society, a society in which the promise of the human spirit may find 
fulfillment.”  This national effort to strengthen national defenses was a continuation of  
efforts to bring the blessings of a free society, of a free and productive 
economic system, to every family in the land.  This is the promise of 
America.  It is this that we must continue to build – this that we must 
continue to defend.  It is the task of our generation, yours and mine.  But 
we build and defend not for our generation alone.  We defend the 
foundations laid down by our fathers.  We build a life for generations yet 
unborn.  We defend and we build a way of life, not for America alone, but 
for all mankind.  Ours is a high duty, a noble task.
191
 
 
Having established previously that his audience desired peace and security for their 
nation, Roosevelt argued that increasing military weapons and supplies was a way to 
preserve “the blessings of a free society” and defend the United States.  By strengthening 
the defenses of the nation through individual sacrifice and communal participation in the 
war effort, the citizenry defended “the foundations laid down by [their] fathers” and built 
“a life for generations unborn.”  Moreover, Roosevelt explained that “we,” the president 
and the citizenry, “defend and we build a way of life, not for America alone, but for all 
mankind.” 
At the beginning of his address, Roosevelt pleaded with his audience to donate 
money to the Red Cross on behalf of the “millions” who were fleeing from the advancing 
German armies across Europe.  “I speak to you of these people because each of you that 
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is listening to me tonight has a way of helping them.”  Thus, when Roosevelt called his 
audience to defend and build “a way of life . . . for all mankind,” he referred not just to 
the citizens of the United States, but to the men, women, and children in other nations 
who also longed for freedom, individual liberty, and peace.  Seven months later, when 
Roosevelt introduced his Lend-Lease bill to the U.S. public, this idea of building and 
defending a “way of life . . . for all mankind” expanded to include the citizens of Great 
Britain as the United States provided the tanks, airplanes, weapons, and supplies the 
British needed to defend their country against Germany.  For Roosevelt, aiding the 
British in their struggle against Germany was a way to fight against Nazi tyranny and 
oppression in Europe.  Ultimately, however, he argued that it could protect the United 
States from involvement in the war overseas, a goal that his audience all shared. 
 In his “Fireside Chat” of December 29, 1940, Roosevelt appealed once again to 
the U.S. public’s shared desire for peace and security. To do this he stated that the future 
peace and security of the United States was directly dependent on Great Britain.  
 The British people and their allies today are conducting an active war 
against this unholy alliance [of Germany, Italy, and Japan]. Our own 
future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our 
ability to “keep out of war” is going to be affected by that outcome.  
Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I make the direct statement to 
the American people that there is far less chance of the United States 
getting into war if we do all we can now to support the nations defending 
themselves against attack by the Axis than if we acquiesce in their defeat, 
submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait our turn to be the object of 
attack in another war later on.
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If the people of the United States wanted to avoid war with Germany, Roosevelt argued 
that they needed to do all they could now instead of waiting to be attacked later.  
Essentially, Roosevelt argued that if the U.S. public wanted to avoid war with the Axis 
 61 
 
powers, they needed to unify around his plan for sending aid to Great Britain.  “This is 
not a matter of sentiment or of controversial personal opinion,” he proclaimed.   
We must be the great arsenal of democracy.  For us this is an emergency 
as serious as war itself.  We must apply ourselves to our task with the 
same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism 
and sacrifice as we would show as if we were at war.
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Once again, Roosevelt used the “we” to unify himself with his audience and the millions 
of individuals listening to the radio address with their fellow citizens across the country.  
He called them, individually and collectively, to respond with seriousness, resolution, 
urgency, patriotism, and sacrifice—five characteristics that the majority of U.S. citizens 
shared and valued.  “I have the profound conviction,” Roosevelt said at the end of his 
address, “that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort than 
they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the implements of defense, to 
meet the threat to our democratic faith.”194  In no uncertain terms, the president laid out 
his expectations for the U.S. public.  Although the nation was not at war, Roosevelt 
invoked an audience ready to defend their “democratic faith” with all the energy, 
strength, ingenuity, and manpower they could muster “as if we were at war.”195  Through 
these “everyday enactments of citizenship,” Roosevelt’s audience would contribute to the 
defense of the United States.
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James Saunders from Annapolis, Maryland, voiced his appreciation for this 
national heritage.  “It is your fearful and solemn duty,” he wrote to the president, “to 
preserve for us against the threat of international banditry the priceless heritage that 
belongs to me and my fellow countrymen and our children, one and preserved with our 
fathers’ blood.”197  It was this priceless heritage that was being threatened by the 
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Germans.  “The nation can feel safe with your hand at the helm,” Mr. Saunders 
concluded.  Mrs. Ruth Morris of Long Beach, California, proudly claimed two sons who 
were serving in the U.S. Navy.  “I am not speaking for them,” she wrote, “but . . . we are, 
in other words, putting our sons in your care, proud and happy to know that part of us, 
our sons, are ready and willing to protect these United States, because it belongs to 
them.”  Mrs. Morris expressed pride that a “part of us,” her sons, were serving in the 
military to protect the United States from attack.  “We all know you will not send our 
sons to foreign lands,” she wrote, “but we do know that every one of us will fight to keep 
them from coming here, [b]y giving all the aid possible to Great Britain will be the one 
way of doing that.”198  For Mrs. Morris, sending aid to Great Britain was the best way to 
protect and defend the nation for herself, her sons, and future generations. 
 
Emphasizing Commitment to “The Great Social Gains”199 
 In his pre-war “Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt stressed his commitment to the social 
and economic gains made under his leadership, arguing that they were vital to the defense 
of the nation.  When Roosevelt announced his plan to strengthen the United States’ 
military reserves in his May 26, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” he cautioned that there were 
“several things we must continue to watch and safeguard, things which are just as 
important to the sound defense of a nation as physical armament itself.”200  Although an 
increase in military weapons, tanks, and airplanes would strengthen “our first line of 
defense,” Roosevelt said that “it is still clear that way down at the bottom, underlying 
them all, giving them their strength, sustenance and power, are the spirit and morale of a 
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free people.”201  To maintain this national spirit and morale, he emphasized that the 
nation  
must make sure, in all that we do, that there be no breakdown or 
cancellation of any of the great social gains which we have made in these 
past years. We have carried on an offensive on a broad front against social 
and economic inequalities and abuses which had made our society weak. 
That offensive should not now be broken down by the pincers movement 
of those who would use the present needs of physical military defense to 
destroy it.
202
 
 
After seven years of working to eliminate “social and economic inequalities and abuses” 
that weakened the United States and national unity, the president reaffirmed his 
commitment to domestic policies while building up the nation’s military reserves for 
national defense. 
Roosevelt addressed the workers in his audience, promising that there was 
“nothing in our present emergency to justify making the workers of our nation toil for 
longer hours than now limited by statute.”  Instead, the president stated that as orders for 
planes, tanks, guns, and military supplies came in, “tens of thousands of people, who are 
now unemployed, will, I believe, receive employment.”203  Moreover, no national 
emergency should “justify a lowering of the standards of employment.”  If anything, 
Roosevelt said, the increase in national production should encourage businesses to 
increase the minimum wage.  “Let us remember that the policy and the laws that provide 
for collective bargaining are still in force,” the president stated.  He declared that 
pensions, unemployment, and other gains made for workers during the New Deal should 
continue.  “There is nothing in our present emergency to justify a retreat from any of our 
social objectives – from conservation of natural resources, assistance to agriculture, 
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housing, and help to the underprivileged.”204  By emphasizing his ongoing commitment 
to the workers of the United States, Roosevelt reminded his audience that he had not 
forgotten their individual struggles and the great social gains the nation had made during 
the past seven years. 
The president also spoke to business leaders of the nation, asking them to 
participate in building up the military resources of the United States. 
We are calling on the resources, the efficiency and the ingenuity of the 
American manufacturers of war material of all kinds – airplanes and tanks 
and guns and ships, and all the hundreds of products that go into this 
material.  The Government of the United States itself manufactures few of 
the implements of war.  Private industry will continue to be the sources of 
most of this material, and private industry will have to be speeded up to 
produce it at the rate and efficiency called for by the needs of the times.
205
 
 
Roosevelt called on private businesses to mobilize their factories and workers to meet the 
military demands of the U.S. government.  “We are calling on men now engaged in 
private industry to help us in carrying out this program,” he said.  By addressing the 
businessmen in the “private industry,” Roosevelt appealed to another section of his 
audience, those citizens who possessed a specific technical or managerial skill.  Just as 
the workers of the nation would help in assembling tanks and planes on the line, the 
president also called on “patriotic Americans of proven merit and of unquestioned ability 
in their special fields” to volunteer their “training, their experience, and their capability” 
to their country.  He realized, the president said, that “private business cannot be 
expected to make all of the capital investment required for expansions of plants and 
factories and personnel which this program calls for at once.”  As such, Roosevelt 
announced that the U.S. government would provide necessary funds to enlarge factories, 
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build new plants, provide additional payroll for new workers, supply raw materials, and 
help transport finished materials. 
 By emphasizing his commitment to the “great social gains” the United States had 
made during his first two terms as president, Roosevelt invoked a citizenry prepared to 
sacrifice for the good of the nation.  He reminded the workers of past accomplishments 
made during the New Deal—such as a minimum wage, standards of employment, and 
union bargaining rights—and he assured them that these benefits would continue.  In his 
“Fireside Chat” of December 29, 1940, Roosevelt called upon the business leaders of the 
nation to assist the government in military production, using their ingenuity to provide 
“the best, speediest and most efficient mass production of which [private industry] is 
capable.”206  He confidently asserted that the entire nation, including workers and 
business leaders, was “making a great effort to produce everything that is necessary in 
this emergency – and with all possible speed.  And this great effort requires great 
sacrifice.”207  Although Roosevelt called the citizenry to actions of individual, personal 
sacrifice, he argued that these actions would allow the United States to send military 
supplies to Great Britain, the nation’s surest line of defense against Germany.  Roosevelt 
reassured his audience that aiding Britain would not lead to a breakdown in the social and 
economic gains the country had made; instead, U.S. military and economic support for 
Great Britain would ensure that these domestic gains would continue. 
Robert Weston of Schenectady, New York, wrote to the president after his 
December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat.”  After expressing his “deep appreciation” of 
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Roosevelt’s “magnificent address,” Mr. Weston thanked him for “the statement that 
labor’s rights will be protected.”  He continued, 
The test of democracy is not in the wealth of the wealthy but in the 
liberties and character of the common people.  We know that abuse by 
labor of labor’s privileges will not and must not be tolerated, but there are 
plenty of men who for selfish purposes would use the emergency as an 
excuse to destroy the social gains which you more than any other man 
have helped to win.
208
 
 
Here Mr. Weston echoed Roosevelt’s commitment to preserving the “great social gains” 
that had been achieved for the U.S. public.  He also declared that “abuse by labor of 
labor’s privileges will not and must not be tolerated,” an interesting statement coming 
from one obviously committed to working class rights.  However, Mr. Weston’s 
sentiment reflected the U.S. public’s general consensus that those employed in the plants 
and factories tasked with supplying “the great arsenal of democracy” should be 
committed to securing the national defense above all else, a consensus Roosevelt 
addressed in his May 27, 1941 “Fireside Chat.” 
Appealing to the “Patriotism of Labor” 
 
As Roosevelt sought to invoke a unified audience motivated by a shared 
commitment to keeping the United States out of war, he specifically addressed those who 
worked in the factories to produce military supplies, tanks, planes, and weaponry for U.S. 
reserves and Great Britain in his May 27, 1941, “Fireside Chat.”  The year 1941 brought 
the highest increase in labor strikes since 1919 when one out of every twelve workers 
went on strike.
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  These strikes threatened production of essential weapons for Great 
Britain, including tanks and airplanes.  In Milwaukee, workers at the Allis-Chalmers 
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plant walked out during the winter of 1940-1941 as the company prepared to fulfill a $40 
million contract building turbines for navy destroyers.  This “chilling display of the 
capacity of labor disturbances to cripple the rearmament program” worried the U.S. 
public.
210
   When asked in March 1941 whether labor union leaders were “helping the 
national defense program as much as they should,” sixty-eight percent of Gallup Poll 
respondents said no.
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  During March and April, the War Department printed weekly 
bulletins detailing the number of “man days” lost and specific items impacted by the 
strikes.  When theaters ran pictures of labor strikes across the country, audiences booed 
loudly.
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  It was to this audience—labor and business alike—that Roosevelt delivered 
the May 27, 1941, “Fireside Chat” announcing a state of unlimited national emergency.  
He argued that business and labor needed to reach an agreement because “the future of all 
free enterprise – of capital and labor alike – is at stake.”213  Although Roosevelt had 
called for national unity in previous “Chats,” his demand from labor to support his 
national policy by cooperating with business signaled a new sense of urgency in his tone 
and approach.  Workers, Roosevelt argued, were responsible for producing “articles of 
defense” that Great Britain and the United States so desperately needed.  However, to 
fully appreciate Roosevelt’s rhetorical strategy in the midst of the strikes that threatened 
defense production, it is essential to consider the advice Henry Stimson gave Roosevelt in 
the days before this “Fireside Chat.”  
 When Roosevelt and his speechwriters drafted this address, they sent a copy of 
the fourth version to Secretary of War Henry Stimson for his review.  Stimson sent the 
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draft back to the White House with his comments and edits marked in the margin. On the 
back of the last page of the speech, Stimson wrote,  
The people’s minds today are very much concerned with the labor 
situation and the strikes which are delaying defense[,] yet you do not say a 
word in the shape of an appeal to the patriotism of labor.  Such an appeal 
would do more to impress readers with the seriousness of the foreign 
danger than anything you could say.  The reader would say “It must be 
bad if he calls for sacrifice from labor” and as a matter of fact labor should 
sacrifice its internal politics today as Gompers did 23 years ago.
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Here Stimson spoke to the current political climate surrounding the strikes.  He predicted 
that if Roosevelt appealed “to the patriotism of labor,” the U.S. public, and the workers 
themselves, would realize just how grave the German threat was to the United States.  
Just a year earlier, Roosevelt had called on “the resources, the efficiency, and the 
ingenuity of the American manufacturers of war material” to lead the nation in producing 
the ships, tanks, planes, guns, and other supplies necessary to increase U.S. defenses.
215
  
In December, Roosevelt announced that this great national effort would be directed 
towards supplying Great Britain with the supplies then nation needed to defend itself 
against Germany.  Now, in this address declaring a state of unlimited national emergency, 
Stimson believed that an appeal to the workers in the plants, factories, and assembly lines 
would convince the citizenry of the situation’s severity. 
 Stimson also referenced Samuel Gompers, a prominent U.S. labor leader in the 
early twentieth century and founder of the American Federation of Labor.  During World 
War I, Gompers rallied workers and labor unions around the war effort, arguing that “this 
war is a people’s war – labor’s war.  The final outcome will be determined in the 
factories, the mills, the shops, the mines, the farms, the industries, and the transportation 
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agencies of the various countries.”216  He confidently asserted that the workers 
understood “the gravity of the situation and the responsibility that devolves upon them” 
and declared that labor would “do its part in every demand the war makes.  Our republic, 
the freedom of the world, progress, and civilization hang in the balance.  We dare not fail.  
We will win.”217  In this speech he recorded for the Nation’s Forum, Gompers positioned 
labor as the key to U.S. defense.  Because the workers had struggled “for freedom and for 
a better life,” they had a “keen appreciation of the opportunities and privileges . . . the 
free government has given them.”  This appreciation of their rights and liberties 
galvanized the labor unions to sacrifice for the good of the nation.  In the same way, in 
this second international conflict, Stimson advised Roosevelt to call on millions of 
workers to come to the aid of their nation so that their rights would be defended against 
Germany.
218
 
 Stimson’s directive became the “Labor Insert” 219 in subsequent drafts, and in the 
final version of his May 27, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt addressed the workers of 
the United States, calling on them to “play their full parts, without stint, and without 
selfishness, and without doubt that our democracy will triumphantly survive.”220  He 
acknowledged the “[v]ery great social progress” made in recent years, explaining that he 
wanted to “maintain that progress and strengthen it.”  Roosevelt continued, 
When the nation is threatened from without, however, as it is today, the 
actual production and transportation of the machinery of defense must not 
be interrupted by disputes between capital and capital, labor and labor or 
capital and labor. The future of all free enterprise – of capital and labor 
alike – is at stake.221 
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Not only did Roosevelt expect capital and labor to settle their disputes.  “The 
overwhelming majority of our citizens expect their [g]overnment to see that the tools of 
defense are built,” he said.  Here Roosevelt used “our citizens” to refer to the mass public 
who was counting on the workers to produce necessary supplies to keep them safe.  He 
connected himself to the workers, using the plural possessive “our” to give labor a sense 
of ownership and responsibility for the citizenry.  Roosevelt explained that the dispute 
between capital and labor was one that would undermine the nation’s ability to strengthen 
“our defense to the extreme limit of our national power and authority.”  Thus, “for the 
purpose of preserving the democratic safeguards of both labor and management,” the 
president indicated that the U.S. government was “determined to use all of its power to 
express the will of its people, and to prevent interference with the production of materials 
essential to our nation’s security.”222  In this speech, Roosevelt appealed to organized 
labor and the U.S. workers as a patriotic force directly responsible for the defense of the 
country.  He called on them to put the needs of the nation above their individual needs, 
invoking a unified force dedicated to defending the United States. 
J. C. Trees sent President Roosevelt a telegram the day after this “Fireside Chat.”  
“Yesterday there was room in America for Democrats and Republicans[,] liberals and 
conservatives[,] and for industrialists[,] workers[,] and farmers,” he wrote.  “Today as a 
result of your magnificent and inspiring leadership there is room only for Americans.  
You have united the country as no other person could have done . . . I am yours to 
command.”223  At the end of December 1940, twenty-six employees of the Chatham 
Manufacturing Company in Elkin, North Carolina, pledged their willingness to sacrifice 
 71 
 
for the good of the nation.  “We want you to know that we are with you all the way in 
your expressions as to the necessity of aid to Great Britain,” they began. 
Some of us who sign this letter fought in the last war in Europe; some of 
us have sons of military age; some of us are of military age, and all of us 
want peace.  But peace under an Axis dominated World would be a return 
toward the Dark Ages – a going away from the bright light of Liberty and 
Freedom which has become the heritage of all of us in our Country.  If 
fight we must, fight we will.  But now, this minute, we want to give 
Britain everything possible for her gallant defense.  Ships, guns, planes, 
supplies, ammunition and all the necessities for war.  We are willing to 
lend or give all these and more.  Forget any future payment – we will 
gladly bear our share of the burden.
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In this remarkable letter to President Roosevelt, these twenty-six factory workers 
volunteered to “bear [their] share of the burden” to protect the United States by producing 
the supplies Britain needed for “her gallant defense.” 
Equating German Victory with Economic Strangulation of the United States 
 
 In order to convince his audience that sending aid to Great Britain was the best 
way to keep the United States out of war with Germany, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
reminded the U.S. public that a German victory over Great Britain would directly impact 
U.S. business, commerce, and trade.  He contrasted the current economic and social 
freedoms U.S. citizens enjoyed with what life would become if Germany controlled all of 
Europe and began attacks on the United States.  In his December 29, 1940, “Fireside 
Chat” in which he declared that the United States must be “the great arsenal of 
democracy,” Roosevelt explained that Hitler viewed the United States and Germany as 
“two worlds that stand opposed to each other.”225  He continued, “The Nazi masters of 
Germany have made it clear that they intend not only to dominate all life and thought in 
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their own country, but also to enslave the whole of Europe, and then to use the resources 
of Europe to dominate the rest of the world.”226  For Roosevelt, Hitler’s determination to 
conquer Europe and the rest of the globe had direct economic implications. 
If Great Britain goes down, the Axis powers will control the continents of 
Europe, Asia, Africa, Australia, and the high seas – and they will be in a 
position to bring enormous military and naval resources against this 
hemisphere. It is no exaggeration to say that all of us, in all the Americas, 
would be living at the point of a gun – a gun loaded with explosive bullets, 
economic as well as military.  We should enter upon a new and terrible era 
in which the whole world, our hemisphere included, would be run by 
threats of brute force. And to survive in such a world, we would have to 
convert ourselves permanently into a militaristic power on the basis of war 
economy.
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In another poignant metaphor, Roosevelt brought the image of a gun before the eyes of 
his audience.  This gun, a representative picture of what a German victory in Great 
Britain would entail, contained explosive bullets that threatened the safety and security of 
the United States.  The threat was not just military, but economic.  Germany “would 
fasten an economic strangle-hold upon [the remaining Allied] nations.”228  German 
control of Europe and Asia would impede the United States’ ability to trade with other 
nations, a “freedom . . . essential to our economic life.”229 
 Roosevelt also argued that a German victory in Europe would also destroy U.S. 
business and obliterate social policies and programs on which many in his audience 
depended.  According to the “Nazi book of world plan,” the president detailed the 
specific ways that Germany would “strangle” the United States of America, just as they 
had other nations such as Austria and Czechoslovakia.  The “American laborer would 
have to compete with slave labor in the rest of the world.”  Policies for minimum wages 
earned and maximum hours worked would be “nonsense” since all “wages and hours 
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(would be) fixed by Hitler.”  Trade unions would become “historic relics” and “collective 
bargaining a joke.”  Set prices for farm production would be subject to “exactly what 
Hitler wanted to give.”  The “whole fabric of working life as we know it – business and 
manufacturing, mining and agriculture – would be mangled and crippled under such a 
system.”230  By enumerating a long list of the inevitable results of a victorious Germany, 
Roosevelt spoke to every member of his audience.  Every man, woman, and child was 
somehow connected to the “whole fabric of working life” in the United States, whether 
through business, labor, agriculture, mining, farming, or trade unions.  No citizen would 
be exempt from the grave economic and social consequences that a German defeat of 
Great Britain would bring. 
However, Roosevelt confidently asserted, the United States would not “accept a 
Hitler-dominated world . . . We will accept only a world consecrated to a freedom of 
speech and expression – freedom of every person to worship God in his own way – 
freedom from want – and freedom from terror.”231  These were the shared values of the 
U.S. public, ideals that reflected Roosevelt’s domestic policy initiatives and commitment 
to the economic security of the nation.  A “Hitler-dominated world” would stand in direct 
opposition to these ideals, and thus Roosevelt called his audience to unite around his plan 
for sending U.S. aid to Germany. He asked his audience, “Shall we now, with all our 
potential strength, hesitate to take every single measure necessary to maintain our 
American liberties?”  The obvious answer to this rhetorical question was no.  “As the 
President of a united and determined people,” Roosevelt declared, “Our people and our 
[g]overnment will not hesitate to meet that challenge.”232  By asserting that he spoke for a 
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people “united and determined” to defend their “American liberties,” Roosevelt invoked 
a citizenry ready to sacrifice for the nation’s defense. 
John C. Benedict wrote to the president after his May 26, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” 
expressing his view that “we must subordinate all our aims, aspirations and activities to 
this one task and dedicate our lives and fortunes to it.  For unless we can do so quickly 
and adequately we shall not be able to preserve much of anything that has value and 
meaning for us to-day.”233  The twenty-six employees from the Chatham Manufacturing 
Company in Elkin, North Carolina, also acknowledged that a German defeat of Great 
Britain would devastate the United States economically and socially.   
With Great Britain defeated, we, as a nation, can be squeezed and isolated, 
our economic life so restricted that our American standards would topple 
like ninepins – farms prices at unheard of lows – unemployment at 
unheard highs – the gains of labor so long in building up swept away in a 
moment.  These things a victorious Axis could, and would, effect in a very 
short time. 
 
Lead us, Mr. President, to strength and unity.  Keep telling us of the perils 
of this hour.  Never let us forget that the things we cherish as our rights are 
worth sacrificing for and fighting for . . . Lead us boldly, fearlessly and 
unerringly with the knowledge that we are behind you to a man in this 
crusade of righteousness.
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Calling on President Roosevelt to lead the nation to “strength and unity,” these workers 
expressed their desire to be and to become exactly what Roosevelt envisioned as an ideal 
citizenry.  They wanted to participate in a strong and unified U.S. public.  They asked the 
president to remind them of the “perils” facing their nation and of the sacred values they 
shared.  Finally, they indicated their willingness to sacrifice and fight individually and 
corporately for the “things we cherish,” namely the “bright light of Liberty and Freedom 
which has become the heritage of all of us in our Country.”235 
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Conclusion 
 
As this chapter demonstrates, President Franklin D. Roosevelt used these five 
“Fireside Chats” to invoke a unified citizenry.  Arguing that sending U.S. aid to Great 
Britain would keep the United States out of the European war, he called on his audience 
to rally around his plan so that the social and economic fabric of the United States would 
be preserved.  I argue that Roosevelt used five specific appeals to create and call forth an 
audience motivated by civic duty and willing to sacrifice individually and corporately for 
the good of the nation as a whole.  First, he evoked public memory of the Great 
Depression and other key moments in U.S. history by employing visual images and 
reciting key phrases and sacred national texts.  Second, Roosevelt identified the shared 
moral and national values of his audience, arguing that the peace and security U.S. 
citizens prized for themselves and for future generations could only be secured by Great 
Britain’s victory over Germany.  Third, the president emphasized his commitment to the 
economic and social gains achieved during his presidency, pledging that these would be 
maintained even as the nation sped up production to supply Great Britain with military 
armaments.  Fourth, Roosevelt appealed to the “patriotism of labor,” declaring that union 
leaders and U.S. workers were vital to the defense of the country and calling on them to 
place the security of their nation above factory strikes.  Finally, the president equated a 
German victory in Great Britain with economic strangulation of the United States, 
painting a dismal picture of what would happen to the economic and social fabric of the 
United States if Germany conquered Great Britain. 
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Franklin D. Roosevelt used these strategies to call forth specific actions and 
attitudes from his audience.  “It is my resolve and yours,” he said on May 26, 1940, “to 
build up our armed forces.”236  Regardless of how his audience felt about a military build-
up prior to this “Fireside Chat,” the president now declared them “resolved” to strengthen 
the defenses of the United States.  Indicating that he prayed “day and night” for “the 
restoration of peace in this mad world of ours,” he said that it was unnecessary for him to 
ask his audience to pray “in behalf of such a cause – for I know you are praying with 
me.”237  Introducing the Lend-Lease bill to the U.S. public in his “Fireside Chat” of 
December 29, 1940, Roosevelt confidently asserted that the United States had “the men – 
the skill – the wealth – and above all, the will” to “manufacture our defense material.”  
He continued, “I am confident that if and when production of consumer or luxury goods 
in certain industries requires the use of machines and raw materials that are essential for 
defense purposes, then such production must yield, and will gladly yield, to our primary 
and compelling purpose.
”238
  According to the president, production of goods deemed 
unessential to the “primary and compelling purpose” of the nation would “gladly yield” 
to make way for materials needed for the defense effort. 
Roosevelt also emphasized themes of national unity, duty, and patriotism through 
these strategies.  “We seek to keep war from our own firesides by keeping war from 
coming to the Americas,” he said.  “It is serious enough and tragic enough to every 
American family in every state in the Union to live in a world that is torn by wars on 
other Continents . . . It is our national duty to use every effort to keep those wars out of 
the Americas.
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  The president also expressed his faith in the citizenry, indicating his 
 77 
 
conviction that they would respond to his call for unity and sacrifice.  “Let me make the 
simple plea that partisanship and selfishness be adjourned; and that national unity be the 
thought that underlies all others,” he said.240  In December 1940, President Roosevelt 
spoke to his audience of the “profound conviction” he had  
that the American people are now determined to put forth a mightier effort 
than they have ever yet made to increase our production of all the 
implements of defense, to meet the threat to our democratic faith.
  
As 
President of the United States I call for that national effort. I call for it in 
the name of this nation which we love and honor and which we are 
privileged and proud to serve. I call upon our people with absolute 
confidence that our common cause will greatly succeed.
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Roosevelt directly set forth what he expected from his audience in this shared “national 
effort.”  He had the authority to do so as “President of the United States,” but also as a 
citizen.  He used the plural pronoun “we” to express that he, along with the rest of the 
citizenry, loved and honored the nation and was “privileged and proud to serve” it, 
regardless of the sacrifice.  He called upon “our people,” the people that he and his 
audience were a part of, expressing his “absolute confidence that our common cause” 
would triumph.  For Roosevelt, the United States’ attempt to keep out of the war by 
sending supplies to Great Britain would succeed primarily because the citizenry was 
united around a joint cause, a common effort. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
“THE GREAT ARSENAL OF DEMOCRACY”:  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S ARGUMENT FOR LEND-LEASE  
The British people and their allies today are conducting an active war against this unholy 
alliance. Our own future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of that fight. Our 
ability to “keep out of war” is going to be affected by that outcome . . . We must be the 
great arsenal of democracy. For us this is an emergency as serious as war itself. We must 
apply ourselves to our task with the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same 
spirit of patriotism and sacrifice as we would show were we at war.
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President Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 29, 1940 
 
“Your Excellency,” wrote James M. Saunders in a letter to President Franklin D. 
Roosevelt on the last day of 1940, 
George Washington made us a nation, Abraham Lincoln preserved the 
nation from itself—and now it is your fearful and solemn duty to preserve 
for us against the threat of international banditry the priceless heritage that 
belongs to me and my fellow countrymen and our children, won and 
preserved by our fathers’ blood.  The nation can feel safe with your hands 
at the helm . . .
243
  
 
Responding to Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chat” of December 29, 1940, Mr. Saunders 
expressed his confidence in the president’s ability to protect the nation from the threat of 
war with Germany.  Just as George Washington had led the country through its infancy 
and Abraham Lincoln had “preserved the nation” from destruction during a civil war, 
Roosevelt now had a “solemn duty” to preserve the country from this new threat to the 
“priceless heritage” of the United States of America.  The president had used similar 
language in a previous “Fireside Chat,” stating that the country had a “high duty” to 
“defend the foundations laid down by our fathers . . . [and] build a life for generations yet 
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unborn.”244  In order to preserve the “foundations” and “priceless heritage” of the nation, 
Roosevelt set forth his plan for Lend-Lease to the citizenry in December 1940. 
This chapter examines how President Franklin D. Roosevelt argued in his five 
pre-war “Fireside Chats” that sending economic and military aid to Great Britain was the 
best way to keep the United States out of war with Germany.  The previous chapter 
discussed how Roosevelt made this argument by invoking an audience united by civic 
duty and patriotism.  The third chapter of this thesis considers how Roosevelt addressed 
his audience’s fear of entanglements abroad and the pervasive isolationist sentiments of 
the U.S. public.  It also examines how Roosevelt co-opted the claims of the America First 
Committee, a prominent isolationist organization who argued that supporting Great 
Britain would lead to U.S. involvement in the war.  Instead, Roosevelt set forth his plan 
for Lend-Lease as a way to keep the country at peace and ensure Germany’s defeat. 
In the following pages, I first consider how World War I and the failure of 
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points contributed to the isolationist impulse of the U.S. 
public.  I also introduce the America First Committee and the key leaders behind the 
movement.  I then use Kenneth Burke’s theory of identification to discuss how Roosevelt 
supported his plan for sending aid to Great Britain by identifying with his audience’s 
desire to keep the nation out of war with Germany.  Although the America First 
Committee portrayed Roosevelt as a “war lord” anxious to involve the United States in 
the European conflict, Roosevelt would not allow the committee to undermine his 
identification with the U.S. public.  Instead, he reminded his audience of their shared 
values and national purpose and portrayed the Lend-Lease plan as a bill for peace.  
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Ultimately, I argue that the rhetoric of the America First Committee did not succeed 
against Roosevelt because the president was able to unify the U.S. public around the 
shared value of keeping the United States out of the European war.
245
   
Historical Context 
World War I and U.S. Disillusionment over “Entangling Alliances” 
 
 In his Pulitzer-Prize-winning history of the United States during the Great 
Depression and the Second World War, David M. Kennedy records the international 
climate at the end of the World War I.  With “the fighting momentarily ended, 
humankind could still for a fleeting season dream the dreams of hope.  Much of that hope 
was invested in the person of the American president, Woodrow Wilson.”246  Wilson had 
promised the citizenry that U.S. involvement in World War I would bring peace and 
democracy to the world.  In his “War Message” to the U.S. Congress on April 2, 1917, 
Wilson said it was “a fearful thing to lead this great peaceful people into war, into the 
most terrible and disastrous of all wars, civilization itself seeming to be in the balance.”  
However, the president proclaimed that doing “right is more precious than peace, and we 
shall fight for the things which we have always carried nearest our hearts,” namely 
democracy, freedom of expression, and “the right for those who submit to authority to 
have a voice in their own governments.”  For Wilson, this was the task to which the 
United States and its citizens must  
dedicate [their] lives and . . . fortunes, everything that we are and 
everything that we have, with the pride of those who know that the day 
has come when America is privileged to spend her blood and her might for 
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the principles that gave her birth and happiness and the peace which she 
has treasured. God helping her, she can do no other.
247
 
 
In this message justifying U.S. entry into the war in Europe, the president committed the 
nation to “many months of fiery trial and sacrifice” not just for the defense of the United 
States but so that other countries might enjoy the same liberties and freedoms citizens of 
the United States enjoyed.
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  Wilson’s decision to involve the United States in the affairs 
of other nations reflected a shift in U.S. foreign policy from George Washington’s 
caution against “permanent alliances” with other countries to the ever-expanding 
interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine. 
 In his farewell address to the nation, President George Washington warned his 
countrymen against developing “permanent alliances” with other nations.  “It is our true 
policy to steer clear of permanent alliances with any portion of the foreign world,” he 
said, although “[t]aking care always to keep ourselves by suitable establishments on a 
respectable defense posture, we may safely trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary 
emergencies.”249  Thomas Jefferson echoed Washington’s sentiments in his first 
inaugural address, calling for “peace, commerce, and honest friendship with all nations, 
entangling alliances with none.”250  Just twenty years later, following the War of 1812 
and in response to Russia’s attempt to seize portions of what became British Columbia 
and Alaska through the Ukase of 1821, President James Monroe introduced a new policy 
in his State of the Union Address on December 23, 1823.  The United States would now 
“consider any attempt [by another nation] to extend their system to any portion of this 
hemisphere as dangerous to our peace and safety.”251  In this declaration, Monroe 
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asserted the right of the United States to respond with force to attempts by a foreign 
nation to assert control over any independent nation in the Western hemisphere. 
The Monroe Doctrine continued to evolve under future U.S. presidents, with one 
of the most significant expansions coming under Theodore Roosevelt.  In his Annual 
Message to Congress on December 6, 1904, Roosevelt asserted the Monroe Doctrine as a 
justification for U.S. intervention in the economic affairs of Cuba, Venezuela, and 
Panama.  Such action was appropriate, Roosevelt argued, because the United States acted 
“in our own interest as well as in the interest of humanity at large” by defending these 
Central American nations from the threat of European colonialism.  Furthermore, 
Roosevelt set forth a policy explaining under what circumstances the United States would 
take military action. 
All that this country desires is to see the neighboring countries stable, 
orderly, and prosperous.  Any country whose people conduct themselves 
well can count on our hearty friendship.  If a nation shows that it knows 
how to act with reasonable efficiency and decency in social and political 
matters, if it keeps order and pays its obligations, it need fear no 
interference from the United States.  Chronic wrongdoing, or an 
impotence which results in a general loosening of the ties of civilized 
society, may in America, as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by 
some civilized nation, and in the Western Hemisphere the adherence of the 
United States to the Monroe Doctrine may force the United States, 
however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of such wrongdoing or impotence, to 
the exercise of an international police power . . . While they [the South 
and Central American nations] thus obey the primary laws of civilized 
society they may rest assured that they will be treated by us in a spirit of 
cordial and helpful sympathy.  We would interfere with them only in the 
last resort, and then only if it became evident that their inability or 
unwillingness to do justice at home and abroad had violated the rights of 
the United States or had invited foreign aggression to the detriment of the 
entire body of American nations.
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In this statement, Roosevelt proclaimed that the United States would exercise 
“international police power” when any foreign power violated “the rights of the United 
States” or “invited foreign aggression” against North and South American countries.  Just 
what constituted a violation of U.S. interests or by what means another nation would 
“invite foreign aggression” was unclear, and this ambiguity led to expanding 
interpretations of the doctrine by future U.S. presidents.  Several used the Roosevelt 
Corollary to justify U.S. intervention in Cuba (1906-1909), Nicaragua (1909-1910, 1912-
1925, and 1926-1933), Haiti (1915-1934), and the Dominican Republic (1916-1924).
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In his Fourth Annual Message, Theodore Roosevelt also defended the right of the 
United States to intervene in the affairs of other nations in pursuit of “the peace of 
justice.” 
The goal to set before us as a nation, the goal which should be set before 
all mankind, is the attainment of the peace of justice, of the peace which 
comes when each nation is not merely safe-guarded in its own rights, but 
scrupulously recognizes and performs its duty toward others.  Generally 
peace tells for righteousness; but if there is a conflict between the two, 
then our fealty is due first to the cause of righteousness.  Unrighteous wars 
are common, and unrighteous peace is rare; but both should be shunned.
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Just thirteen years before Woodrow Wilson’s “War Message,” President Theodore 
Roosevelt expressed the United States’ role in maintaining peace and, even more 
important, the “cause of righteousness,” throughout the world.  In 1917, Wilson used 
similar language to describe U.S. involvement in World War I. 
We desire no conquest, no dominion. We seek no indemnities for 
ourselves, no material compensation for the sacrifices we shall cheerfully 
make. We are but one of the champions of the rights of mankind. We shall 
be satisfied when those rights have been made as secure as the faith and 
the freedom of nations can make them. 
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Just because we fight without rancor and without selfish object, seeking 
nothing for ourselves but what we shall wish to share with all free peoples, 
we shall, I feel confident, conduct our operations as belligerents without 
passion and ourselves observe with proud punctilio the principles of right 
and fair play we profess to be fighting for.
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Stating that “the world must be made safe for democracy,” Wilson committed the United 
States to a war that, in the words of H.G. Wells, would end all wars.
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Eight months later, in an address to a joint session of Congress in January 1918, 
Wilson laid out “Fourteen Points” that would define “the world’s peace” at the end of the 
war.  The goal of these points was to make the world  
fit and safe to live in; and particularly that it be made safe for every peace-
loving nation which, like our own, wishes to live its own life, determine its 
own institutions, be assured of justice and fair dealing by the other peoples 
of the world as against force and selfish aggression. All the peoples of the 
world are in effect partners in this interest, and for our own part we see 
very clearly that unless justice be done to others it will not be done to 
us.
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This “just and stable peace” would require Germany to “accept a place of equality among 
the peoples of the world—the new world in which we live—rather than a place of 
mastery.”258  But Wilson’s idealistic notions of a world without conflict did not 
materialize.  Although he had “envisioned a liberal peace, a peace without victory, a 
peace that would magnanimously restore Germany to its rightful place in an open world 
of free trade and democracy,” the Versailles Treaty humiliated the Germans and forced 
them “to acknowledge sole responsibility for the outbreak of war.”259  Historian Charles 
Beard described the demoralizing impact Wilson’s failure had on the U.S. public. 
As leader of “the great crusade” in 1917-1918, President Woodrow 
Wilson had held up before the American people a noble dream of a new 
and better world.  In moving speeches and summary statements, he had 
told them that they were fighting a war for democracy, a war to end wars, 
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a war to crush German military despotism, a war to close the old era of 
secret diplomacy and imperialism, a war to establish permanent peace 
among the war-weary peoples of the earth.  But the war had scarcely come 
to a close when stark events began to dissolve the dream.  Even in the so-
called settlement at Versailles only two or three of President Wilson’s 
Fourteen Points for an ideal peace were realized.  For the American 
people, the years that followed were years of deepening disillusionment.
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In addition to major disappointment at Wilson’s failure to bring peace and democracy to 
Europe as he had promised, the U.S. public also saw World War I as a major cause of the 
Great Depression.  Historian David Kennedy described the public sentiments after the 
1929 stock market crash as “penny-pinching, isolationist, anti-European, anti-Wall 
Street.”  The U.S. public expressed “[i]ron-toothed insistence on full payment of the 
Allied war debts . . . [this] became not only a financial issue but a political and 
psychological issue as well, a totem of disgust with corrupt Europe, of regret at having 
intervened in the European war.”261  He continued, 
No people came to believe more emphatically than the Americans that the 
Great War was an unalloyed tragedy, an unpardonably costly mistake 
never to be repeated.  More than fifty thousand American doughboys had 
perished fighting on the western front, and to what avail?  So far from 
being redeemed from American intervention, Europe swiftly slid back into 
its historic vices of authoritarianism and armed rivalry, while America slid 
back into its historic attitude of isolationism.
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Of this period, Charles Beard commented that “no trend in American public opinion 
between 1919 and 1941 was more marked than a diminishing confidence in the peace 
promises of the League of Nations and a growing resolve to keep the United States out of 
the next war in Europe.”263   
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Isolationist Sentiments towards World War II 
 
When Germany invaded Poland in early September 1939, Great Britain and 
France declared war on the Nazis.  In a Gallup Poll conducted a week after the invasion, 
participants were asked if the United States should enter the war on behalf of Great 
Britain.  Ninety-two percent of respondents said no.
264
  Roosevelt speechwriter Robert 
Sherwood explained that because of World War I, public opinion on staying out of the 
war was “much more nearly unanimous and more clearly expressed than it had been in 
1914-1917.”  He continued, 
The American people were, in a way, more truly neutral in 1914 than they 
were twenty-five years later.  However, Americans in 1939 were fortified 
with the experience that the previous generation had conspicuously lacked, 
the experience of involvement in European war, and they wanted no more 
of it.  Their impulse to let “Europe stew in its own juice” was a very 
powerful one and an entirely understandable one. . . Thus, isolationist 
sentiment in 1939 was not limited to Americans of German birth or 
descent, or those who loved German music and admired German science 
and industry, or to those who were pure pacifists: it was representative of 
the entire American people save for the diminutive minority of those who 
believed that a victory for Hitler would put the security of our own 
constitutional democracy in deadly peril.
265
 
 
The citizenry expressed these sentiments to President Roosevelt in their letters following 
his “Fireside Chats.”  After the president’s September 3, 1939, radio address, Dr. 
Frederick Taylor of High Point, North Carolina, wrote that he had served as a medic 
during World War I in France.  “I believed then, mistakenly, that it was a war to end war 
and a war to make the world safe for democracy . . . Now I know there is no such thing, 
and we all know it.”  He applauded the president for his commitment to keeping the 
United States out of war, thanking him for his “resolve that millions of our young men 
will not be condemned to death because of selfish Old World diplomacy.”266  Mrs. J. A. 
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Ringis from Detroit, Michigan, explained that her husband served in World War I.  “My 
hubby was in the last War, he is only 41 now and I wrote you once before telling you that 
I’d rather shoot him myself than let him go to War and I mean it.”267  Catherine        
McD. Larkin of New York referenced President Wilson and the previous international 
conflict.  “We were deceived before within living memory by a Democratic President, 
who was more English than American.  Let us not be betrayed again . . . We are not an 
English colony . . . We are Americans only, first and last.”268 
 President Roosevelt was eager to keep the United States out of the European war, 
but he also possessed a realistic picture of the threat Germany posed to the United States.  
In his September 3, 1939, “Fireside Chat,” he cautioned his audience that “passionately 
though we may desire detachment, we are forced to realize that every word that comes 
through the air, every ship that sails the sea, every battle that is fought does affect the 
American future.”269  Reflecting on this particular radio address, speechwriter Samuel 
Rosenman commented that in the president’s “first speech of the war, as part of his task 
of public enlightenment, he pointed out two hard facts.  Both are accepted as obvious 
today; in 1939 they were not.”  The first was that the United States “could not shrug off 
the European War as none of our business.”  Rosenman called the second point “more 
subtle.”270  Roosevelt said that the nation would “remain a neutral nation,” but he 
specifically stated that he could not ask “every American [to] remain neutral in thought as 
well.  Even a neutral has a right to take account of facts.  Even a neutral cannot be asked 
to close his mind or close his conscience.”271  Rosenman explained that although “the 
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original draft of this speech was prepared in the State Department, this frank admission of 
unneutrality was Roosevelt’s own insertion.”272 
 Roosevelt also attempted to explain to his audience that Europe and Asia were 
actually much closer to the United States than the vast majority of the U.S. public 
realized.  In his December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” the president explained that the 
“broad expanse of the Atlantic and of the Pacific” was not enough to keep Germany from 
attacking the United States.  He referred to “one point between Africa and Brazil [where] 
the distance [was] less from Washington than it [was] from Washington to Denver, 
Colorado – five hours for the latest type of bomber. And at the North end of the Pacific 
Ocean America and Asia almost touch each other.”  Even today, he continued, “we have 
planes that could fly from the British Isles to New England and back again without 
refueling.”273  Here Roosevelt shattered assumptions with facts about how the world had 
been changed by technology and by specific geographic facts.   The United States was 
not, as many of the U.S. public believed, removed and isolated from the rest of the world.  
If Germany defeated Great Britain, the Nazi Luftwaffe aircraft responsible for the 
bombing and destruction of London could fly to the United States to carry out similar 
attacks.  
Roosevelt’s unrivaled understanding of geography allowed him to communicate 
these facts to the U.S. public.  “No one could equal the President in making geography 
clear,” Rosenman wrote, and in his December 29, 1940, address, Roosevelt “showed how 
the Nazis could step from base to base right up to our borders.”   
He always dictated such passages himself, and we used to marvel that he 
was usually able to do it without even looking at a map.  Sometimes, after 
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he had finished, he would pull down several of the roller maps in the back 
of his desk and check on his dictations.  I do not remember that he ever 
had to make any serious corrections.
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Roosevelt’s vast knowledge of world geography came from his boyhood trips to Europe 
with his parents and his own love of geography, history, and his favorite hobby, stamp 
collecting.   
Moreover, Roosevelt’s service as Assistant Secretary of the Navy under President 
Woodrow Wilson gave him a deeper understanding of just how important maintaining 
“freedom of the seas” was to national defense.275  Reflecting on the U.S. public’s belief 
that the oceans would separate the United States from the troubles in Europe, Rosenman 
wrote,  
It is difficult to put ourselves back in the atmosphere of 1940 when so 
many people really believed—and did not hesitate to say so—that we were 
fully protected by the Atlantic and Pacific oceans; that with our natural 
resources, we could get along very well by ourselves even if all Europe 
fell; and that with our great strength Hitler and the Japanese would never 
dare attack us.  Those who are now too young to have lived in maturity 
through those days will find it hard to realize how startling some of 
Roosevelt’s statements sounded to a great many American people in 1940 
. . . Roosevelt’s course was bold leadership then; but necessary leadership 
to awaken the American people to the danger abroad and to prepare them 
to meet it, even though it was still three thousand miles away.
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Thus the attitude of the citizenry towards Great Britain, France, and the European conflict 
was that of “a very interested spectator,” a “sympathetic aloofness.”  Because the war 
took place on the other side of the world, most citizens believed it did not concern them.  
“It was distressingly clear,” Rosenman wrote, that “the process of making the American 
people realize what an Axis victory would mean to them was not going to be an easy one 
or a short one.  The years 1940 and 1941 were to provide the ultimate test of the ability of 
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Roosevelt to educate the American people before Pearl Harbor.”277  This was the 
challenge facing Roosevelt as the German advance across Europe intensified.  At home, 
however, the president struggled not just against overwhelming isolationist sentiments of 
the U.S. public but the growing popularity of the America First Committee.
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The America First Committee 
 
The America First Committee (AFC) was established in September 1940 by a 
group of U.S. politicians, businessmen, public intellectuals, newspaper owners, and 
several former military officials.
279
  Prominent members of the AFC included aviator 
Charles Lindbergh, newspaper magnate William Hearst, prominent historian Charles 
Beard, U.S. Senators Burton Wheeler (R-MT), Henry Cabot Lodge (R-MA), Richard 
LaFollette (Progressive-WI), Gerald P. Nye (R-ND), and U.S. Representative Hamilton 
Fish (R-NY).
280
  In the fifteen months of the committee’s existence, the AFC attracted 
twenty U.S. senators and thirty-six U.S. representatives to speak on its behalf.
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Conservative estimates place total membership of America First at almost 800,000, but 
the committee itself estimated that 1.2 million citizens joined its ranks.  Between 
September 1940 and December 1941, the AFC held two hundred and nineteen rallies in 
one hundred and twenty-six cities throughout thirty-two states.
282
  A New York Times 
article published the remarks historian Charles Beard made to the committee defining the 
goals of the organization: 
The party of non-intervention represented by the America First Committee 
includes no “Appeasers,” no “ostrich isolationists,” no foreigners of any 
nationality in letter or spirit, and no pacifists.  It believes that the foreign 
policy of the United States should be directed to the preservation of the 
peace and security of this nation in its continental zone of interests; that 
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the United States should not resort to any more measures verging in the 
direction of war outside its continental zone of interests; that measures 
should be adopted for the adequate defense of this continental zone of 
interests.
283
 
 
In language relying on the principles of the Monroe Doctrine of 1823, Beard argued that 
the United States should not take any action “outside its continental zone of interests.”  
For Beard and the America First Committee, any U.S. efforts to support Great Britain or 
France would be a repetition of U.S. involvement in World War I twenty years earlier.  
“We entered a war that was going to make the world safe for democracy and end all need 
for war in the future,” Charles Lindbergh reminded those gathered at an America First 
rally in 1941.  “We do not accept the claim that . . . our way of life can be spread around 
the world by force . . . you and I in a new generation are faced with this choice again.”284   
Beard also rejected the claim that members of the AFC were “ostrich 
isolationists,” a trope used to describe individuals who wanted to ignore the events in 
Germany.  Labeling these isolationists “ostrich” alluded to the popular belief that 
ostriches stick their heads in the sand when afraid.  Secretary of the Navy William Knox 
used this image to describe those who disapproved of the Lend-Lease policy: “[I]t is 
[time] for us to oppose the aggressor [Germany] with force, and either scare him off or 
defeat them . . . We cannot half fight this battle,” he declared. “This is the time for 
realism.  We must face what is before us, and not adopt ostrich-like tactics.”285  Knox and 
others portrayed isolationists and the AFC as individuals afraid to face the facts.  
Roosevelt used similar language when he told the U.S. public that they could not escape 
the realities of the international situation by “pulling the covers over [their] heads” in 
fear.
286
  The America First Committee argued that they did not ignore facts.  Instead, they 
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called for the United States to abstain from any actions that could lead to war with 
Germany. 
Although the committee was formed officially in September 1940, the AFC did 
not make a public statement on Roosevelt’s transfer of thirty U.S. destroyers to Great 
Britain in exchange for U.S. rights to British military bases until December 1940.
287
  In 
fact, the destroyer-for-bases deal was released to the press on September 3, the day before 
the organization announced its formation to the U.S. public.
288
   However, many 
isolationist members of Congress accused Roosevelt of assuming dictatorial powers 
because he had transferred the destroyers to Great Britain through an executive order, 
acting without congressional authorization.  U.S. Representative Oscar Youngdahl (R-
MN) stated that he considered Roosevelt’s act “a serious usurpation of congressional 
power and one of the most serious threats to our democracy for that reason.”289  U.S. 
Senator D. Worth Clark (D-ID), called it “one of the latest steps on the road to inevitable 
war.”290  Far from keeping the nation out of the European war, U.S. Representative 
Hamilton Fish (R-NY) declared that “Hitler would be perfectly within the law to declare 
war on us tomorrow” as a result of Roosevelt’s decision.291  Between September 1940 
and December 1941, the committee directly opposed President Roosevelt’s foreign policy 
initiatives to repeal measures of the Neutrality Act, U.S. House Resolution 1776 (the 
Lend-Lease Bill), and U.S. navy patrols in the Atlantic Ocean.  They argued that Great 
Britain could never withstand the German attacks and that sending U.S. aid to the British 
would ultimately lead to U.S. involvement in the war. 
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 Commenting on the America First Committee in his memoirs, Samuel Rosenman 
reflected his opinion of the organization and that of the Roosevelt administration.  This 
“minority of the American people” opposed to Roosevelt’s plan for sending aid to Great 
Britain and strengthening U.S. defenses included  
the defeatists who preached that Hitler was invincible and could not be 
beaten.  It included the appeasers who thought that the best way to get 
along in the world was to appease Hitler.  It included some businessmen 
and financiers who urged that Americans could do business with Hitler.  It 
included a small number of conscientious but misguided American 
citizens who thought that the way of peace was to put their heads in the 
sand and refuse to look at the storms abroad.  It included all of the 
bundists, fascists and – before the war between Russia and Germany – all 
the subversive Communists.  It also included all the group in the United 
States committed to racial intolerance and bigotry.  This minority urged 
that the thing for the United States to do was to insist upon a negotiated 
peace, and thereafter to try and get along, in a business and in a diplomatic 
way, as well as possible, albeit humbly, with Hitler.  For, according to 
them, Great Britain and the rest of the world were as good as 
conquered.
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To Roosevelt, the America First Committee opposed the very things that he argued would 
keep the United States out of war in Europe. 
The president and members of his administration also took elements of the AFC 
attacks personally, particularly those made by Charles Lindbergh.  Between 1936 and 
1939, Lindbergh made several trips to Germany at the invitation of the German 
government.  During one such visit in 1937, the German Air Ministry showed Lindbergh 
production reports which claimed that the nation was producing 800 airplanes a month, 
with 10,000 already built and air-ready.
293
  Although these statistics were later disproved 
as a gross exaggeration, at the time they seemed accurate and contributed to the America 
First Committee’s claim that Great Britain stood no chance against the mighty German 
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Luftwaffe.  After returning to the United States in 1939, Lindbergh began to oppose the 
president’s policies publicly.  On May 18, 1940, Lindbergh delivered a nationwide radio 
address in which he accused the Roosevelt administration of creating “defense hysteria” 
and argued that the nation was not threatened by a foreign invasion unless “American 
people bring it on through their own quarreling and meddling with affairs abroad.”294  
The day after Lindbergh’s speech, Roosevelt declared to Henry Morgenthau: “If I should 
die tomorrow, I want you to know this.  I am convinced that Lindbergh is a Nazi.”295 
 In a press conference on April 25, 1941, without mentioning his name, Roosevelt 
implicitly compared Lindbergh to the appeasers at Valley Forge who “pleaded with 
Washington to quit, because he ‘couldn’t win’” and the Copperheads during the Civil 
War who told Lincoln to make peace with the Confederates.
296
  Two days later, 
Lindbergh announced that he was resigning from the Army Air Corps because his 
“President and superior officer” had questioned his “loyalty,” “character,” and 
“motives.”297  On May 2, Roosevelt advisor Harry Hopkins received a letter from Herbert 
Swope, a New York journalist and friend of the president.  Swope had composed a draft 
someone in the administration might send to Lindbergh responding to his resignation.  
Hopkins read the draft and passed it along to Press Secretary Stephen Early.  “Dear 
Steve,” Hopkins wrote, “It seems to be a good idea, unless it is too late, but I have an idea 
that this Lindbergh thing is going to crop up again and somebody might have an 
opportunity to write a letter somewhat like this.”298  Swope’s letter, considered a “good 
idea” by one of Roosevelt’s closest advisors and personal friends, reveals why the 
president and members of his administration viewed Charles Lindbergh as such a threat.   
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“Dear Mr. Lindbergh,” the letter began, with “Mr.” heavily underlined in pencil, 
indicating Lindbergh’s demotion from Colonel to an ordinary citizen, 
 . . . I point out that the public interest would have been better served had 
you resigned several months ago.  Since that time the declared and defined 
policy of the government, binding upon its Commander-in-Chief and upon 
all the members of the active and reserve establishment, has been the 
execution of the Lend-Lease Bill. 
 
To that you stand opposed.  Against it you have fought and are fighting.  
You have preached a defeatism that is as dangerous as it is untrue.  You 
have been bitterly critical of your government and scornful of Great 
Britain and other countries the United States is seeking to aid.  But you 
have not uttered a single word of criticism of the Nazis from the time you 
received your first high decoration at the order of the Nazi Fuehrer and 
from the hands of his second in command. 
 
It is obvious that such an attitude as yours cannot be countenanced within 
the Service, although it is unquestionably your right as a private citizen. 
 
This Department expects every man holding a Commission to give 
unswerving loyalty to his country, to his flag and to his Commander-in-
Chief.  Since you confessed yourself incapable of so doing, your 
resignation was accepted to take effect immediately.
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According to Swope’s draft, Lindbergh’s direct opposition to the Lend-Lease Bill, the 
“declared and defined policy of the government,” positioned him as fighting against the 
Roosevelt administration and his cries of “defeatism” were both “untrue” and ultimately 
“dangerous” to the morale of the nation.  Although never released to the public, the tone 
and content of this letter illumines how the Roosevelt administration viewed vocal critics 
of Lend-Lease. 
 Despite his personal aversion to Lindbergh and the claims of the America First 
Committee, however, Roosevelt never mentioned the aviator or the organization by name 
in his “Fireside Chats.”   Doing so would have acknowledged their importance and given 
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the AFC equal status within the president’s speech.  Ever the master rhetorician, 
Roosevelt would not allow the committee to become a recognized and reputable 
opposition that might undermine his identification with the U.S. public.  Instead, he co-
opted their anti-war views by arguing that sending U.S. aid to Great Britain was the best 
way to “keep war from our own firesides.”300   
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Argument for Lend-Lease 
 
President Roosevelt introduced his Lend-Lease plan to the public through a press 
conference and a “Fireside Chat” in December 1940.  This plan, which was designed to 
allow the United States to send military and economic aid to Great Britain without 
repealing the Neutrality Laws, was a daring policy between isolationism and declaring 
war on Germany.  Roosevelt explained the plan through a homely simile that shrank his 
bold move to a familiar exchange between people living in the same neighborhood.  He 
compared lending military supplies to Great Britain to lending a hose to one’s neighbor if 
his house were on fire.
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If he can take my garden hose and connect it up with his hydrant, I may 
help him to put out his fire.  Now, what do I do?  I don’t say to him before 
that operation, “Neighbor, my garden hose cost me $15; you have to pay 
me $15 for it.”  What is the transaction that goes on?  I don’t want $15—I 
want my garden hose back after the fire is over. All right.  If it goes 
through the fire all right, intact, without any damage to it, he gives it back 
to me and thanks me very much for the use of it. But suppose it gets 
smashed up—holes in it—during the fire; we don’t have to have too much 
formality about it, but I say to him, “I was glad to lend you that hose; I see 
I can’t use it any more, it’s all smashed up.” He says, “How many feet of 
it were there?”  I tell him, “There were 150 feet of it.”  He says, “All right, 
I will replace it.”  Now, if I get a nice garden hose back, I am in pretty 
good shape.
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Roosevelt described the United States’ lending of valuable military weapons as a simple 
trade between friends.  In doing so, the president allowed his audience to visualize the 
exchange as one they might make with their next door neighbor.  Roosevelt simplified his 
plan by explaining a complicated and potentially confusing congressional policy in terms 
to which any member of his audience could relate.  Implicit in this comparison was that 
any citizen would gladly lend a hose to a neighbor not just out of good will, but also out 
of self-preservation because a house on fire threatens nearby structures.  By lending one’s 
neighbor a hose to put out a fire, the lender protects his/her own home and family.
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Two weeks later in his December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt made this 
linkage explicit:   
Our future security is greatly dependent on the outcome of [Great Britain’s 
fight against Germany].  Our ability to “keep out of war” is going to be 
affected by that outcome.  Thinking in terms of today and tomorrow, I 
make the direct statement to the American people that there is far less 
chance of the United States getting into war if we do all we can now to 
support the nations defending themselves against attack by the Axis than if 
we acquiesce in their defeat, submit tamely to an Axis victory, and wait 
our turn to be the object of attack in another war later on.
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The best way to avoid war with Germany, Roosevelt argued, was to contribute to the 
defense of Great Britain.  He explained that lending U.S. destroyers, tanks, guns, and 
munitions to Great Britain would enable the British to defend their country and, 
therefore, forestall need for the United States to defend itself militarily. 
The people of Europe who are defending themselves do not ask us to do 
their fighting.  They ask us for the implements of war, the planes, the 
tanks, the guns, the freighters which will enable them to fight for their 
liberty and for our security.  Emphatically we must get these weapons to 
them, get them to them in sufficient volume and quickly enough, so that 
we and our children will be saved the agony and suffering of war which 
others have had to endure. 
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Here Roosevelt addressed those in his audience who argued that sending military 
weapons and aid to Great Britain meant that the United States had entered the war against 
Germany.  Roosevelt insisted on a more subtle distinction.  The British did not ask the 
United States “to do their fighting.”  Instead, the supplies the United States lent them 
would “enable them to fight for their liberty and for our security.” “Our national policy is 
not directed toward war,” Roosevelt stated explicitly.  “Its sole purpose is to keep war 
away from our country and away from our people.”  He called any rumors of “sending an 
American Expeditionary Force outside our own borders” a “deliberate untruth.”  The 
United States, Roosevelt declared, “must be the great arsenal of democracy,” supplier of 
equipment and supplies rather than an army or police force.
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Roosevelt supported his plan for sending aid to Great Britain in this “Fireside 
Chat” and others by identifying with his audience’s desire to keep the nation out of war 
with Germany.  In A Rhetoric of Motives, Kenneth Burke describes how a speaker uses 
identification to move his/her audience from one social or political position to another.  
Identification and persuasion are linked inextricably, Burke says, because the speaker 
persuades his/her audience by “causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker’s 
interests; and the speaker draws on the identification of interests to establish rapport 
between himself/herself and his/her audience.”306  These shared “interests” function as 
“the means of persuasion available for any given situation,” because “the ideas are so 
related that they have in them, either explicitly or implicitly, inducements to some social 
and political choices rather than others.”307  For Burke, identification is the process by 
which a speaker persuades his/her audience to identify with his/her interests.  When the 
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speaker and his/her audience individually identify with “common sensations, concepts, 
images, ideas, and attitudes,” these shared elements make them “consubstantial” with 
each other.
308
  In what follows, I consider how Roosevelt used identification to convince 
his audience of the importance of sending aid to Great Britain in three specific ways: (1) 
by reassuring the citizenry that he shared their aversion to entering the war; (2) appealing 
to their concern for national security; (3) and portraying Lend-Lease as a policy to 
promote peace.  I examine each of Roosevelt’s rhetorical strategies and discuss how the 
America First Committee attempted to undermine the president’s position and overall 
identification with the U.S. public through their rhetoric.
309
   
Unifying the U.S. Public through Identification with Them 
 
In these pre-war “Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt unified the citizenry through his 
identification with their beliefs and attitudes.  The president encouraged his audience to 
identify with him through their shared goal of keeping the nation out of war.  Roosevelt 
used this shared value “to establish rapport between himself and his audience,” the U.S. 
public.  By arguing that sending aid to Great Britain was the best way to achieve their 
shared goal—to keep the nation out of war—Roosevelt used these shared “interests” as 
“the means of persuasion” to convince his audience.310  Because Lend-Lease would 
provide Great Britain with the military and economic resources it needed to defend itself 
against Germany, the U.S. public had every incentive to support the plan because it 
supported their shared “interest” of keeping out of the European war. 
By 1939, Roosevelt had established the “Fireside Chat” as a direct method to 
communicate with the U.S. public, and these radio addresses had become a source of 
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national unity and identification during Roosevelt’s presidency.  As noted in chapter one, 
the president saw these “Fireside Chats” as a way to communicate directly and candidly 
with the U.S. public.  Historian James MacGregor Burns argues that the “Fireside Chats” 
were Roosevelt’s “most important link with the people” and describes some of the ways 
in which his delivery of them facilitated their linkage: 
Read in cold newspaper print the next day, these talks seemed somewhat 
stilted and banal.  Heard in the parlor, they were fresh, intimate, moving.  
The radio chats were effective largely because Roosevelt threw himself 
into the role of a father talking with his great family.  He made a conscious 
effort to visualize the people he was talking to.  He forgot the microphone; 
as he talked, “head would nod and his hands would move in simple, 
natural, comfortable gestures,” [Secretary of Labor Frances] Perkins 
noted.  “His face would smile and light up as though he were actually 
sitting on the front porch or parlor with them.”  And his listeners would 
nod and smile and laugh with him.
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Unlike his addresses to the U.S. Congress or speeches to specific audiences across the 
country, Roosevelt used the “Fireside Chats” to indicate his intention to speak directly 
with, and not just to, the U.S. public.  As such, the nature and tone of these radio 
addresses supported Roosevelt’s attempt to identify with the shared values of the 
citizenry. 
Roosevelt also used images of family to identify with and thus unify his audience.  
In his December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt called on his audience to do away 
with “fears and illusions. On this Sabbath evening, in our homes in the midst of our 
American families, let us calmly consider what we have done and what we must do.”312  
His reference to “our American families” referred not only to the individual family units 
gathered around their radios, but to the collective “American family” listening to the 
comforting voice of their national “father.”  By speaking in this paternal voice, Roosevelt 
 101 
 
also identified members of the audience to each other and with each other.  They were 
not just individuals or families listening to their president over the radio, but members of 
a national family joined together in fighting to protect and preserve their shared “way of 
life.”313 
When Roosevelt addressed the U.S. public hours after Great Britain and France 
declared war on Germany in his September 3, 1939, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt admitted 
that he did know what would happen in Europe: 
I myself cannot and do not prophesy the course of the events abroad – and 
the reason is that because I have of necessity such a complete picture of 
what is going on in every part of the world, that I do not dare do so.  And 
the other reason is that I think it is honest for me to be honest with the 
people of the United States.
314
 
 
Through this honest and transparent admission, Roosevelt communicated that he, even as 
President of the United States, could not predict the turn of events on the international 
scene.  However, he encouraged his audience to unite around things that were certain, 
and specifically the values they shared as a citizenry.  “Some things we do know.  Most 
of us in the United States believe in spiritual values . . . The overwhelming masses of our 
people seek peace – peace at home, and the kind of peace in other lands which will not 
jeopardize our peace at home.”  Roosevelt expressed the U.S. public’s shared desire for 
peace and called his audience to rally around these “certain ideas and certain ideals of 
national safety.”315 
Whereas President Roosevelt spoke as the national leader, commander in chief, 
and “father talking with his great family,” the America First Committee, a “divergent 
many,” struggled to present a clear, unified message to the citizenry.316  General Robert 
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E. Wood wrote that “[v]irtually the only point on which there was complete agreement 
was that the United States should not enter the European War.”317  Another member 
commented that the AFC was characterized by negativity.  “To me, it is incongruous to be 
anti-anything.  Instead, we must be for something.  We have fought sham battles to a 
point where the people have identified us as anti-Lend-Lease, anti-Neutrality, and anti-
Semitic.”318  Because the AFC appeared to be “anti-everything,” the public was drawn to 
the positive, proactive policies that Roosevelt proposed.   
The America First Committee attempted to subvert Roosevelt’s image as a 
candid, caring friend by charging that Roosevelt was deceitful in his speeches and 
motivated by a lust for power.  In a radio address broadcast on CBS entitled 
“Americanism vs. Internationalism,” U.S. Representative Hamilton Fish (R-NY) warned 
that no American “should underestimate the power and influence of President Roosevelt 
and his skill in the use of mass propaganda, emotionalism, and war hysteria.”319  Philip 
LaFollette, the former governor of Wisconsin and brother of U.S. Senator Robert 
LaFollette, accused the president of using “cunning” and “deceitful phrases.”320  Charles 
Lindbergh called Roosevelt “glib, hypocritical, and deceitful.”321  By labeling the 
president as someone who could not be trusted, these members of the America First 
Committee attempted to undermine his credibility and thus encourage the U.S. public to 
reject his plan for Lend-Lease.  Lindbergh attacked Roosevelt directly in September 
1941, suggesting that he was a “witch doctor” who had seduced the U.S. public to 
swallow the “deadly pills of war.”322  The president was more concerned with “power” 
than with “freedom,” a value which should characterize a democratic government.  
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“Power and more power for a power-mad Administration is the watchword of the day.  
Behind a false cloak of [p]atriotism, they clip the wings of the American Eagle to feather 
their own nests,” declared Robert F. Jones in a radio address to the nation in August 
1941.
323
   
This charge that Roosevelt’s “power-mad Administration . . . clip[ped] the wings 
of the American Eagle to feather their own nests” was a direct quote from Roosevelt’s 
January 6, 1941, State of the Union Address.  However, Roosevelt had used the image to 
describe those who urged the United States and Great Britain to make peace with 
Germany. 
No realistic American can expect from a dictator’s peace international 
generosity, or return of true independence, or world disarmament, or 
freedom of expression, or freedom of religion – or even good business.  
Such a peace would bring no security for us or for our neighbors.  Those 
who would give up essential liberty to purchase a little temporary safety 
deserve neither liberty nor safety. 
 
As a nation, we may take heart in the fact that we are soft-hearted; but we 
cannot afford to be soft-headed.  We must always be wary of those who 
with sounding brass and tinkling symbol preach the ‘ism’ of appeasement.  
We must especially beware of that small group of selfish men who would 
clip the wings of the American eagle in order to feather their own 
nests.”324 
 
According to speechwriter Samuel Rosenman, this phrase was meant to describe the 
“appeasers who wanted to do business with Hitler at the expense of American 
security.”325  These appeasers were the America First Committee.  Borrowing this clever 
phrase from Roosevelt himself, the AFC implied that the president wanted to weaken the 
symbol of U.S. democracy, the American eagle, by assuming unconstitutional powers 
and leading the nation into war. 
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The America First Committee also attempted to reawaken fears of dictatorship by 
charging that passage of Lend-Lease would give President Roosevelt “a greater 
independent power than was ever enjoyed by any war lord, anywhere, anytime.”326  In an 
attempt to defeat the Lend-Lease Bill in the House and Senate, the America First 
Committee asked all local chapters to send telegrams to their congressional 
representatives in protest.  They sent approved language to these chapters, asking that 
telegrams include statements such as “reject the dictatorship bill,” “democracy must not 
be compromised,” and “I don’t want to go to war.  Kill the dictatorship bill.  No 
compromise” (italics original).327 By charging that the Lend-Lease bill would create a 
dictatorship and threaten democracy, the America First Committee attempted to 
undermine Roosevelt’s leadership and scuttle his efforts to send aid to Great Britain. 
Appealing to Their Concern for National Security 
 
In his five pre-war “Fireside Chats,” President Franklin D. Roosevelt sought to 
identify with the citizenry by reaffirming his resolve to defend the United States against 
the German threat.  The previous chapter discussed how Roosevelt used these shared 
values to invoke an audience unified by civic duty and patriotism.  The president used 
this same strategy to rally the U.S public around his plan for Lend-Lease.  In his 
September 3, 1939, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt reminded his audience that he shared their 
hatred of war.  “I hope the United States will keep out of this war,” he said.  “I believe 
that it will.  And I give you assurance and reassurance that every effort of your 
[g]overnment will be directed toward that end.  As long as it remains within my power to 
prevent,” he promised, “there will be no blackout of peace in the United States.”328  
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Roosevelt alluded to the government-imposed blackouts in Great Britain and the 
hundreds of German air bombers flying overhead.  Just as the swarming Nazi Luftwaffe 
brought terror to the skies of London and forced the British to extinguish their lights, 
Roosevelt acknowledged that the U.S. public feared that the European war would force 
them to smother their desire for peace and safety.  Under his watch, he promised to do all 
he could to keep the nation at peace.  One year later, Roosevelt presented Lend-Lease as 
the best way to accomplish this goal. 
Introducing the Lend-Lease plan to the public in his “Fireside Chat” of December 
29, 1940, Roosevelt said the policy was designed to “keep you now, and your children 
later, and your grandchildren much later, out of a last-ditch war for the preservation of 
American independence and all of the things that American independence means to you 
and to me and to ours.”329  As president, Roosevelt stated that he had a responsibility to 
keep the nation out of a “last-ditch war.”  Through careful and deliberate planning, the 
nation could preserve “American independence” by sending aid to Great Britain; 
immediate action now could prevent formal, military involvement in the European war 
later.  Roosevelt also emphasized that the United States had a duty to “build and defend” 
the “promise of America” for future generations and for the world.  “We build a way of 
life, not for America alone, but for all mankind.  Ours is a high duty, a noble task.”330  
The “promise of America” and this “way of life” reflected the idea that the United States 
had a special mission in the world.  “We have certain ideas and certain ideals of national 
safety and we must act to preserve that safety today and to preserve the safety of our 
children in future years.”  This desire for national safety was “bound up with the safety of 
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the Western Hemisphere and of the seas adjacent thereto.”331  Thus, in order to defend the 
“way of life” that Roosevelt and his audience shared, the president argued that sending 
aid to Great Britain was the surest way to protect it. 
Roosevelt also portrayed Lend-Lease as “battle” defending the very foundations 
and traditions of the United States, a struggle that each and every member of the U.S. 
public could take part.  In 1941, the U.S. Government Printing Office published a fifty-
four page booklet entitled “The Battle of 1776: Statements on the Lend-Lease Bill by the 
President and the Secretaries of State, War and Navy.”  The booklet contained the printed 
text of Roosevelt’s December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” his January 6, 1941, “State of 
the Union Address” (also known as the “Four Freedoms” speech), and statements made 
by Secretaries Stimson, Hull, and Knox.  The last few pages of the booklet contained the 
original text of H.R. 1776, an act “to promote the defense of the United States,” 
according to the introductory remarks.  The title, “The Battle of 1776,” was a clear 
reference to the Revolutionary War and the U.S. struggle for freedom from British 
tyranny.  Interestingly enough, however, this new “Battle of [H.R.] 1776” was another 
struggle against tyranny through sending military and economic aid to Great Britain, the 
very nation the United States had fought in the Revolutionary War.
332
  Now, Roosevelt 
reminded his audience, the British were friends and “Great Britain and the British Empire 
are today the spearhead of resistance to world conquest.  And they are putting up a fight 
which will live forever in the story of human gallantry.”333  The citizenry could 
participate in this “battle” by supporting Lend-Lease, for such action would enable the 
British to ward off the German assault on freedom and individual liberty worldwide. 
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 Where Roosevelt portrayed Lend-Lease as a way to keep the United States out of 
war with Germany and save the citizenry from “the agony and suffering of war which 
others have had to endure,” the America First Committee maintained that the country 
should adhere to founding principles and remain free from European entanglements.
334
  
To justify non-intervention, the AFC also referred to the nation’s past, echoing the words 
of George Washington to avoid “permanent alliances” with other nations and Thomas 
Jefferson’s warning to maintain “entangling alliances with none.”335  The America First 
Committee argued that the United States of America had a destiny to fulfill, to preserve 
the “American way.”336  The nation could only fulfill its destiny by remaining outside the 
European conflict.   
Echoing John Winthrop’s ideal of the United States as a shining “city on a hill,” 
America First speaker Wilbur Helm explained that if the United States avoided 
entanglement, it would stand as an example to the world after the Europeans had 
exhausted themselves in the war.  In language strikingly similar to John Winthrop’s 
“Model of Christian Charity” in which Winthrop cautioned his audience that the 
Massachusetts Bay Colony would be like a “city on a hill” to the rest of the world, the 
America First Committee characterized the United States as a beacon of hope to the 
suffering peoples of Europe.
337
   
When, across the sea, the warring countries have finally bombed each 
other’s cities, when they have destroyed their churches, when they have 
crushed to ashes their great works of art, when they have destroyed their 
institutions of learning, when their factories have been leveled to the 
ground, finally out of the anguish of it all surely there will come a time 
when the starving people of the conquered lands and the distressed, weary, 
war-torn and burdened people of the victors as well will cry out: “Isn’t 
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there a land somewhere on earth where the people’s wishes will be 
respected and observed?” 
 
. . . And if America is still solvent, we can send the word back across the 
ocean that we are ready to feed and to clothe and to rebuild the homes of 
the distressed people of the world.  That is America’s destiny.338 
 
To achieve this status, the America First Committee argued, the United States had to 
maintain its “purity.”  U.S. Representative Martin Dies (D-TX) argued that  
Americans have evolved an economic and political system far superior to 
the best that Europe has to offer.  Under our system we have grown and 
prospered beyond the dreams of our founders.  The American way, not the 
European way, promises steady advancement toward the more abundant 
life.  The moment we abandon the principles of Americanism in favor of 
the totalitarian ideologies of Europe, that moment we begin the downward 
course toward the kind of dictatorships which have plagued Europeans for 
centuries.
339
 
 
To maintain the superiority of “the American way,” the AFC proclaimed that the nation 
needed to commit itself to isolationism.  By keeping the country out of the European war, 
the United States would retain the qualities that made it a beacon for the world. 
 The America First Committee’s rhetoric was undermined, however, because 
Roosevelt argued that by sending aid to Great Britain, the United States would be 
defending its “way of life” from the threat of German attack and invasion.  Roosevelt 
cited the Monroe Doctrine in his December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” arguing that the 
policy was “a measure of defense in the face of a threat against this hemisphere by an 
alliance in Continental Europe.”340  Lend-Lease was not an example of what Jefferson 
and Washington called “entangling” or “permanent alliances.” Instead, it was a step to 
ensure the safety and security of the United States and keep the nation out of the 
entanglements of the European war. 
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H.R. 1776: A Policy to Promote Peace 
 
Keenly aware that his audience wanted to remain out of the European war at all 
costs, Roosevelt depicted Lend-Lease as the surest way to keep the nation at peace.  In 
his December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt acknowledged that there was “risk in 
any course we may take,” but argued that “the course that I advocate [Lend-Lease] 
involves the least risk now and the greatest hope for world peace in the future.”341  
However, the president emphasized that securing this peace could not be accomplished 
by ignoring the German threat to the United States or settling for a “negotiated peace” 
with the Nazis.  In May of 1940, he had acknowledged the fears of those U.S. citizens 
who hoped that if they ignored the events of Europe, the United States would not be 
threatened. 
There are many among us who in the past closed their eyes to events 
abroad – because they believed in utter good faith what some of their 
fellow Americans told them – that what was taking place in Europe was 
none of our business; that no matter what happened over there, the United 
States could always pursue its peaceful and unique course in the world. 
 
There are many among us who closed their eyes, from lack of interest or 
lack of knowledge; honestly and sincerely thinking that the many 
hundreds of miles of salt water made the American Hemisphere so remote 
that the people of North and Central and South America could go on living 
in the midst of their vast resources without reference to, or danger from, 
other Continents of the world.
342
 
 
According to Roosevelt, these citizens had “closed their eyes” to the reality of world 
geography.  He recognized that they had “closed their eyes” in “utter good faith,” trusting 
the opinions of others or “honestly and sincerely” because of a “lack of interest or lack of 
knowledge.”  There were also “a few” partisans opposed to all his policies. 
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[T]here are a few among us who have deliberately and consciously closed 
their eyes because they were determined to be opposed to their 
government, its foreign policy and every other policy, to be partisan, and 
to believe that anything that the [g]overnment did was wholly wrong.
343
 
 
The president’s tone became more stern when addressing these opponents whose views 
he refuted by recalling recent events: “To those who have closed their eyes for any of 
these reasons,” he said, the Nazi attacks on Norway, Holland, Belgium, Luxembourg, and 
France during the spring months of 1940 brought “the shattering of many illusions.  They 
have lost the illusion that we are remote and isolated and, therefore, secure against the 
dangers from which no other land is free.”344  Roosevelt argued that the frightening 
German assault on European nations, including countries friendly with the United States, 
should awaken the U.S. public to the grave dangers facing the Western hemisphere.  
Even those who had opposed Roosevelt’s leadership had to open their eyes to the reality 
of the German threat. 
Roosevelt wholeheartedly rejected any possibility of a “negotiated peace” with 
Germany.  Those who believed that “we can save our own skins by shutting our eyes to 
the fate of other nations” or that “we can and should become the friends and even the 
partners of the Axis powers” Roosevelt called “American appeasers.”  They ignored 
the warning to be found in the fate of Austria, Czechoslovakia, Poland, 
Norway, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark and France. They tell you 
that the Axis powers are going to win anyway; that all of this bloodshed in 
the world could be saved, that the United States might just as well throw 
its influence into the scale of a dictated peace, and get the best out of it 
that we can. 
They call it a “negotiated peace.” Nonsense! Is it a negotiated peace if a 
gang of outlaws surrounds your community and on threat of extermination 
makes you pay tribute to save your own skins? 
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Such a dictated peace would be no peace at all. It would be only another 
armistice, leading to the most gigantic armament race and the most 
devastating trade wars in all history. And in these contests the Americas 
would offer the only real resistance to the Axis powers.
345
 
Any negotiation with Hitler, a dictator set on conquering Europe and, eventually, the 
Western Hemisphere, would undermine the security of the United States and repeat the 
history of the First World War.  Describing the Nazi powers as a “gang of outlaws,” 
Roosevelt alluded to the United States as a pioneering “community.”  The U.S. public 
frequently thought of themselves as pioneers, pushing past the established boundaries of 
the United States to harness the “Wild West.”  This image of the Germans as “outlaws” 
also resonated with the audience since the genre of Western motion pictures became 
popular in the late 1930s.  As any viewer of a Western movie knows, outlaws do not 
negotiate, and if they do, they do so under false pretenses.  Therefore, when Roosevelt 
used this imagery to describe Nazi Germany, the idea of negotiating with outlaws seemed 
ridiculous and a successful “negotiated peace” absurd. 
Roosevelt also argued that those who called for a “negotiated peace” were 
willfully ignorant.   
The experience of the past two years has proven beyond doubt that no 
nation can appease the Nazis. No man can tame a tiger into a kitten by 
stroking it. There can be no appeasement with ruthlessness. There can be 
no reasoning with an incendiary bomb. We know now that a nation can 
have peace with the Nazis only at the price of total surrender.
346
 
 
Roosevelt’s vivid imagery captured the threat posed by the Nazis and made appeasers 
appear to be naive children.  This image was twofold.  First, the president portrayed 
isolationists as oblivious to the reality of the situation; Germany was not a kitten easily 
tamed.  Second, Roosevelt reminded his audience that Germany waited for an 
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opportunity to pounce on its prey.  By attempting to tame, appease, or reason with the 
Nazis, the United States put itself in grave danger.  Instead, Roosevelt argued that the 
United States should do all it could to help Great Britain prevail in its fight against 
Germany. 
The America First Committee argued that Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease proposal 
would lead the nation into war and instead called for Great Britain to negotiate with the 
Germans.  At a rally in Chicago in April 1941, Senator Burton K. Wheeler (D-MT) 
charged that Roosevelt had “destroyed the chance” for peace in Europe.347  To counteract 
that, Wheeler called for “public petitions” to the Pope and to “Protestant leaders 
everywhere” demanding “that humanity lay down the sword of brutality and assume its 
ways of peace and happiness.” According to a report in the New York Times, Wheeler’s 
remarks were “punctuated by shouts of ‘Down with Britain!’”348  In July 1941, General 
Robert Wood, the chairman of the America First Committee, advocated that Britain 
should make peace with Hitler.  The committee was “unalterably opposed” to the United 
States joining the war on the side of the British, and they “advise[d] England to make a 
negotiated peace” with Germany.349 
Hoping to appeal to the U.S. public’s desire to stay out of the European conflict, 
the AFC characterized Lend-Lease in dire terms as a stark choice between war and peace.  
Chicago lawyer and America First Committee board member Clay Judson expressed this 
either-or choice, writing that “the question is between war and peace, and all other 
arguments are of importance only as they relate to that important issue.”350  Several 
members of the U.S. Congress who also spoke on behalf of the America First Committee 
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shared this view.
351
  U.S. Representative James O’Connor (D-MT) said he could not and 
would not “by my vote pass a bill that, to me, ignores the will of the American people . . . 
to keep us out of this war[, a bill] that puts this nation on the brink of disaster such as was 
never known.”352  U.S. Representative Gerald Landis (R-IN) described the situation as a 
slippery slope leading inevitably to war.  “We are being edged into the war without the 
masses’ knowledge.  The course we are pursuing is bound to involve us in war.  If we aid 
Britain short of war and beyond the limits of the Neutrality Act, it ultimately means 
war.”353  In a radio address to the nation, Philip LaFollette declared that Roosevelt’s plan 
for Lend-Lease was a “clear, emphatic, unequivocal statement that we will make and 
deliver weapons of war in sufficient quantity to insure an overwhelming British victory.  
That means war.”354 
In an address delivered at the Neutrality Conference of the America First Chapter 
Chairmen and Delegates in Washington, Philip LaFollette emphasized the choice to send 
aid to Great Britain as a choice between war and peace.  
It is no longer a question of the Republic Party and the Democratic Party.  
Today the alignment is between the War Party and the American Party.  
The War Party maintains that American freedom is to be won or lost on 
the battlefields of Europe, Asia, and Africa.  The American party 
maintains that the future welfare and happiness of our people will not be 
determined by the defeat or victory of any nation anywhere on earth, but 
by what we—we in America—do to protect and extend freedom and 
security of our people here.
355
 
 
Roosevelt led the “War Party”; the America First Committee represented the “American 
Party.”  Any support for Roosevelt or his policies, therefore, became, support for entry 
into the European war.  Despite the committee’s attempts to label Roosevelt and his 
policies as leading to war, the U.S. public did not agree. 
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In September 1941, when asked if the United States should enter the war against 
Germany, eighty-seven percent of respondents said no.  In the same poll, however, 
participants were asked if they agreed or disagreed with “Lindbergh’s viewpoint on aid to 
Britain and foreign policy.”  Fourteen percent said they agreed and sixty-four percent said 
they disagreed.  The poll also posed the following question: “President Roosevelt says 
that if the United States is to be a free and democratic country, the Nazi government in 
Germany must be destroyed.  Do you agree, or disagree?”  Seventy-four percent of 
respondents expressed their support for Roosevelt’s statement. 356  The freedom and 
democracy of the United States ultimately depended on Germany’s defeat; thus, the 
nation needed to do everything it could to help Great Britain prevail against the Nazi 
attacks. 
Conclusion 
 
 In his December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat” announcing Lend-Lease to the U.S. 
public, Roosevelt reminded his audience of the danger to the United States posed by 
Germany.  Although the United States did not seek war with the Nazis, Germany 
believed that U.S. democracy was a threat to their system of government.  Roosevelt 
quoted the recent words of Adolf Hitler: “It was only three weeks ago their leader stated 
this: ‘There are two worlds that stand opposed to each other . . . [w]ith this world we 
cannot ever reconcile ourselves.”  Roosevelt commented, “In other words, the Axis not 
merely admits but the Axis proclaims that there can be no ultimate peace between their 
philosophy of government and our philosophy of government.”357  Because Nazi 
Germany was the enemy of the United States, Roosevelt argued that any debates over 
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isolationism or interventionism should be abandoned.  Instead, all national energy and 
focus should be directed to ensuring that the nation remained out of the European war.   
 “Frankly and definitely there is danger ahead,” he said, “danger against which we 
must prepare. But we well know that we cannot escape danger, or the fear of danger, by 
crawling into bed and pulling the covers over our heads.”  Once again, Roosevelt used a 
familiar image to characterize his opponents as children who believed that if you hid, the 
boogey man would go away.  Not only did this action connote fear and dismay, but it 
characterized isolationists (and thus, the America First Committee), as ignorant and 
unwilling to face facts.  Instead, Roosevelt called the citizenry to replace their fear with 
mature realism and rally around his Lend-Lease proposal.  He asked them to identify with 
the realists, with those who accurately assessed world events and took steps to promote 
the overall safety and security of the nation.  “Let not the defeatists tell us that it is too 
late. It will never be earlier. Tomorrow will be later than today.”358  The time for action 
was now.  
After the president’s December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” Mrs. Dorothy M. 
Kuehnl of Monrovia, California, wrote that if “England is willing to do the dying and 
suffering to save our civilization the least we can do is give her all possible aid.  We 
cannot afford to let her fall.”359  Dr. C. F. DeGaris from Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, 
thanked Roosevelt for identifying, “as any clear-sighted person must identify, England’s 
defense with our own.”360  Two days after Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chat,” Gallup conducted 
a poll and asked respondents if they had listened to the address.  Seventy-six percent of 
those polled reported that they had either listened to it or read about it in the newspaper.  
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When asked if they agreed or disagreed with the “views [Roosevelt] expressed,” seventy-
nine percent said they agreed.
361
 
 In these pre-war “Fireside Chats,” Franklin D. Roosevelt shaped a scene in which 
the only way to avoid war with Germany was to send aid to Great Britain.  He identified 
with his audience’s desire to remain at peace and presented the Lend-Lease Bill as 
designed to avoid war.  When Roosevelt argued that sending military and economic aid 
to Great Britain would allow the British to keep fighting for “their liberty and our 
security,” he identified the objectives of the Lend-Lease plan with the shared values of 
his audience, namely, to keep their families and their nation safe and secure.  This 
allowed Roosevelt’s audience to unify around his plan.  He called forth a citizenry ready 
to show the “same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism 
and sacrifice as [they] would show as if” the United States were at war because they 
realized that the future of their country and that of Great Britain were mutually 
dependent.
362
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
“ON MAINTAINING FREEDOM OF THE SEAS”:  
FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT’S SHIFT TO WAR RHETORIC  
 
The American people have faced other grave crises in their history – with American 
courage, with American resolution.  They will do no less today.  They know the 
actualities of the attacks upon us.  They know the necessities of a bold defense against 
these attacks.  They know that the times call for clear heads and fearless hearts.  And with 
that inner strength that comes to a free people conscious of their duty, conscious of the 
righteousness of what they do, they will – with Divine help and guidance – stand their 
ground against this latest assault upon their democracy, their sovereignty, and their 
freedom.
363
 
 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, September 11, 1941 
 
 The Roosevelt family estate, Springwood, sits atop a hill overlooking the Hudson 
River in upstate New York.  It was here that Franklin D. Roosevelt was born, spent his 
boyhood, and lived with his mother Sara, his wife Eleanor, and his children until moving 
to the White House in 1933.  During his presidency, Roosevelt would return to Hyde 
Park for long weekends and brought many foreign dignitaries to visit, including Prime 
Minister Winston Churchill and the King and Queen of England.  Lining the entryway 
walls of this majestic house are prints, photographs, and paintings of U.S. ships that 
Roosevelt collected from 1910 until his death in 1945.  The entire collection consists of 
over 6,000 images that illustrate the history of the U.S. Navy from the Revolutionary War 
through World War II.
364
  Samuel Rosenman wrote of how Roosevelt “developed great 
love of the sea” at an early age. 
At Campobello [the Roosevelt summer home in New Brunswick, Canada], 
he became an expert sailor, managing with great skill the tides and 
turbulent currents of Passamaquoddy.  There are few sports that train a 
man to rigid discipline better than handling a boat in difficult waters in 
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summer fogs.  His love of the sea led him to learn as much as he could 
about it, and what it meant in the life of a nation.  His favorite book at an 
early age was Mahan’s History of Sea Power.365 
 
It was Roosevelt’s “love of the sea and his expertise with ships . . . [that] made Roosevelt 
so eager to accept the opportunity later in life of becoming Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy [under President Woodrow Wilson].”366   
In 1917, when Assistant Secretary of the Navy Franklin D. Roosevelt asked 
Wilson to authorize steps to prepare the U.S. Navy for war, Wilson denied the request.  “I 
will tell you something I cannot tell the public,” Wilson explained to Roosevelt.  “I do 
not want . . . the United States to do anything . . . by way of war preparations, that would 
allow the definitive historian in later days to say that the United States had committed an 
unfriendly act against the central powers.”367  Anxious to preserve a public stance of 
neutrality, Wilson hesitated when, in Roosevelt’s estimation, he should have acted to 
equip the U.S.  Navy for war.  Twenty-four years later, Roosevelt faced a similar 
decision.  During the “similar lonely travail through which Roosevelt was to pass in the 
summer and fall of 1941, seemingly trying to make up his mind about exactly what to 
do,” Rosenman wrote,  Roosevelt “remembered both these statements by Wilson.”   
One he followed; one he did not.  He, too, would refuse to go “faster than 
the great mass of our people would permit.”  However, he was not worried 
by any latter-day historian’s definitive assessment of hostile preparations.  
Where he felt he had the power, he would make them.  Furthermore, his 
idea of “attack” by a submarine was quite different from Wilson’s.  
Roosevelt, as President, maintained that the very presence of an enemy 
submarine in American waters was an attack even before it fired a 
torpedo.
368
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Ever conscious of public opinion, Roosevelt treaded carefully when he thought the 
citizenry was not ready to take the next step against Germany.  However, when he 
believed he “had the power” from the U.S. public to take certain steps, he would. 
As the previous chapters have demonstrated, President Franklin D. Roosevelt 
used his pre-war “Fireside Chats” to invoke a citizenry united around his plan for sending 
aid to Great Britain by persuading them that this military and economic assistance was 
the best way to keep the United States out of the European war.  I have specifically 
addressed Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats” that discussed the European War and the United 
States’ proclamation of neutrality in the conflict (September 3, 1941), the country’s 
national defense and specific steps to increase military weapons and supplies (May 26, 
1940), the introduction of Lend-Lease and how that legislation would defend the national 
security of the United States (December 29, 1941), and Roosevelt’s proclamation of 
unlimited national emergency in May 1941 (May 27, 1941).  What has not been 
discussed is Roosevelt’s final pre-war “Fireside Chat” of September 11, 1941.   
Where the previous four “Fireside Chats” proclaimed U.S. neutrality in the 
European war and detailed Roosevelt’s plans to increase U.S. military reserves and send 
aid to Great Britain, his “Fireside Chat” of September 11, 1941, justified U.S. military 
action against Nazi Germany.  Steps to increase the United States’ safety and security, 
such as transferring U.S. destroyers to Britain in 1940, authorizing U.S. military and 
economic aid to Great Britain through the Lend-Lease bill, and stationing U.S. military 
personnel in Iceland and Great Britain had not involved direct U.S. military force against 
Germany.  Instead, Roosevelt argued that by aiding Great Britain, the United States 
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would increase its own security and keep the nation out of war with Germany.  However, 
in this “Fireside Chat” of September 11, 1941, the president assumed the powers of 
commander in chief and authorized the U.S. Navy and Army to fire upon any German or 
Italian ship, submarine, or airplane it encountered in the Atlantic Ocean.  In doing so, 
Roosevelt adopted the stylistic elements of presidential war rhetoric in his final pre-war 
“Fireside Chat” to the U.S. public. 
In their study of genres of presidential rhetoric, Karlyn Kohrs Campbell and 
Kathleen Hall Jamieson describe five components of war rhetoric.   
 [P]residential war rhetoric throughout U.S. history manifests five pivotal 
characteristics: (1) every element in it proclaims that the momentous 
decision to resort force is deliberate, the product of thoughtful 
consideration; (2) forceful intervention is justified through a chronicle or 
narrative from which argumentative claims are drawn; (3) the audience is 
exhorted to unanimity of purpose and total commitment; (4) the rhetoric 
not only justifies the use of force, but also seeks to legitimize presidential 
assumption of the extraordinary powers of commander in chief; and, as a 
function of these other characteristics, (5) strategic misrepresentations 
play an unusually significant role in its appeals.
369
 
 
Franklin D. Roosevelt’s September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat” contains each of these five 
elements.  In this chapter, I draw on Campbell and Jameison’s framework for what 
constitutes presidential war rhetoric to examine how Roosevelt justified U.S. military 
action against Germany.  In what follows, I first describe the historical context behind 
this address and attempt to explain why Roosevelt chose to misrepresent the facts 
surrounding the U.S.S. Greer incident.  I then conduct a rhetorical analysis of 
Roosevelt’s September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” specifically considering how Campbell 
and Jamieson’s five components of war rhetoric function in the president’s last “Fireside 
Chat” to the nation before the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941. 
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The U.S.S. Greer Incident: Historical Context 
 
In the first chapter of this project, I discussed the historical details surrounding the 
U.S.S. Greer incident and how Roosevelt cleverly manipulated and strategically 
eliminated important facts in his September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat.”370  The archival 
materials related to this particular radio address demonstrate a clear preoccupation with 
such facts, particularly in the papers of Samuel Rosenman, one of Roosevelt’s advisors 
and chief speechwriters.  The first item in Rosenman’s file on this “Fireside Chat” is an 
article from the New York Times of September 7, 1941.  The headline reads, “Accuse 
President; Germans Say He Seeks War Provocation in War Blockade Zone; Give Details 
of Fight; and Assert Submarine Did Not Know the Identity of the Ship ‘Attacking’ and 
‘Pursuing’ It.”  Rosenman marked several key points of the article in pen, specifically a 
portion of the official German statement on the incident which read, “Roosevelt thereby 
is endeavoring with all the means at his disposal to provoke incidents for the purpose of 
baiting the American people into the war.”371  In a separate New York Times article taped 
to the first, Rosenman marked a passage concerning the U.S. and British response to the 
situation:  
American and English news service issued an item according to which, on 
the morning of September 4, in the course of an encounter between the 
American destroyer and a German U-boat, the destroyer was attacked by a 
U-boat.  The torpedoes, it was said, missed their mark.  The destroyer then 
pursued the U-boat, counter-attacking with depth charges.
372
 
 
Rosenman’s obvious interest in the differing accounts of the U.S.S. Greer reflects the 
active public debate over the incident and what it meant for the future of U.S. foreign 
policy and involvement in the European war. 
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The New York Times first reported the story on September 5, 1941.  “Submarine 
Attacks U.S. Destroyer Greer,” the front page headline read.373  News of the U.S.S. Greer 
incident received front page coverage in the New York Times for six successive days 
following announcement of the clash at sea.
374
  The White House announced that 
Roosevelt planned to make a speech of “major importance” on the incident on Monday, 
September 8, one of “world significance,” wrote the New York Times.375  However, the 
president’s beloved mother, Sara Delano Roosevelt, died unexpectedly on Sunday, 
September 7, requiring the radio address to be postponed until September 11, 1941.  The 
public debate around the U.S.S. Greer and Roosevelt’s policy on maintaining safety in 
international waters continued to swirl as the nation awaited the president’s “Fireside 
Chat” on Thursday night.  On September 10, the New York Times commented that “[t]he 
issue of the freedom of the seas and the relation of the United States and Germany to it 
have become a paramount question” facing the United States.  It reported the sinkings of 
the U.S.S. Steel Seafarer and the S. S. Sessa.  “These events,” the editorial continued, 
“coupled with the attack on the destroyer Greer, are expected to provide material of the 
greatest significance for the President’s speech tomorrow night.”376 
It is clear that Roosevelt and his speechwriters considered the address of utmost 
importance as well.  Secretary of State Cordell Hull, in a “stern and even aggressive 
mood” over the situation, “waxed so indignant about the situation that the President asked 
him to put it all in writing for [the] White House address.”377  The draft that Hull 
composed now sits in the speechwriting files of Samuel Rosenman.  Three pages of terse 
and forceful prose, Hull’s handwritten note of “Most urgent” is scribbled in red pencil 
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along the top.  The secretary of state consolidated the events surrounding the U.S.S. 
Greer incident into three sentences. “The Navy reports that on the morning of September 
fourth the United States destroyer Greer was proceeding in full daylight toward Iceland.  
She was carrying American mail, and was flying an American flag.  A German 
submarine attacked her by firing a number of torpedoes which missed their mark.”378  
Although Rosenman and other speechwriters would provide more information 
surrounding the aftermath of the interaction between the U.S. destroyer and the German 
submarine for the final draft, Roosevelt’s September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat” began 
with Hull’s description almost word for word.379 
One more insight can be gleaned from Rosenman’s files on this address.  
Although there are several Navy telegrams that report the attacks on the S. S. Sessa and 
the U.S.S. Steel Seafarer, there is no official naval documentation of the events 
surrounding the U.S.S. Greer in the speechwriting files.
380
  What does exist, however, is 
Roosevelt’s obvious fury over those who charged that the United States was responsible 
for firing the first shot at the German submarine.  Two draft inserts reflect this fury.  The 
first was intended as an insert after Roosevelt described the sinkings of other U.S. ships. 
To revert for a moment to the U.S.S. Greer, I am informed that an 
American organization, widely applauded and encouraged in the 
government controlled press of Germany and Italy which would have 
American citizens believe that Hitler’s Government does not wish to 
attack American ships or American shipping – and that, therefore, the 
Hitler Government assertion that the U.S.S. Greer fired first must be 
believed.  It is more than a matter of interest – it is a matter which 
Americans should always remember – that the responsible leaders of this 
organization are deliberately telling their fellow citizens that the reports 
made by the officers of the U.S.S. Greer are false and of no account. 
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At the top of this page, next to this specific paragraph, “America first” is scrawled in 
Roosevelt’s own handwriting.  Next to that remark, Rosenman’s more careful script 
explains, “Dictated by FDR but not used.”381  The second insert deals specifically with 
German accusations that the United States Navy, and more specifically Roosevelt, had 
lied about the U.S.S. Greer incident. 
I am not going to talk again this time about the inherent wickedness of the 
German leadership.  I am not going to use invective against German 
leaders.  I am not greatly worried or concerned when each day that passes 
I read the rather hysterical names which they give to me personally and to 
the United States as a whole in their daily press, and I assume that the 
German leaders are not deeply concerned by what we Americans say or 
publish about them.  We cannot bring about the downfall of Nazism by the 
use of long-range invective.
382
 
 
Although neither of these two inserts were used in the final version of the September 11, 
1941, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt clearly wanted to blame the America First Committee 
and the Germans for their accusations, accusations which in this case were true.
383
   
 Roosevelt’s decision to amplify and misrepresent the events surrounding the 
U.S.S. Greer’s encounter with the German submarine was a curious one, particularly 
because there were several other instances in which German submarines did in fact fire 
upon and sink U.S. ships.  Roosevelt used three specific examples of such action in his 
“Fireside Chat”: the U.S. merchant ship Robin Moor, sunk in May 1941; the U.S.-owned 
ship operating under the Panamanian flag, the S. S. Sessa, torpedoed on August 17, 1941; 
and the U.S. navy ship Steel Seafarer sunk on September 6, 1941.
384
  However, in the 
September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt argued that the supposedly unprovoked 
German firing on the U.S.S. Greer indicated Hitler’s desire to “get control of the seas.”385  
As a result, the president’s “Chat” called for two specific shifts in U.S. foreign policy.  
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The first was Roosevelt’s announcement that U.S. ships would begin convoying military 
supplies to Great Britain.  The second was what came to be known as the “shoot on sight” 
policy, whereby Roosevelt ordered the U.S. Army and Navy to shoot any Italian or 
German submarines they encountered.
386
 
For just over two years, since his “Fireside Chat” of September 3, 1939, 
Roosevelt had warned the citizenry of the imminent threat Germany posed to the United 
States.  Deeply conscious of the U.S. public’s overwhelming desire for economic security 
and the pervasive isolationist sentiments throughout the country, Roosevelt had 
proceeded with caution.  “My problem,” the president wrote on December 14, 1939, “is 
to get the American people to think of conceivable consequences without scaring the 
American people into thinking that they are going to be dragged into this war.”387  In 
August 1941, Roosevelt met British Prime Minister Winston Churchill for the first time 
as President of the United States.  This meeting brought the president closer to 
committing the United States to just such a war, for at this meeting, Roosevelt promised 
British Prime Minister Winston Churchill that the United States would help transport 
convoys to Great Britain.  According to historian Doris Kearns Goodwin, “[h]e had 
committed the United States to convoys at the Atlantic Conference, but he had not yet 
revealed the new policy to the American people.  A submarine attack on the U.S.S. Greer 
gave him the incident he needed to mobilize public support for convoys.”388  According 
to Churchill’s report to his cabinet following this Atlantic summit, Roosevelt “said he 
would wage war, but not declare it, that he would become more and more provocative . . . 
Everything was to be done to force an ‘incident.’”  In fact, Churchill continued, 
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Roosevelt “made it clear that he would look for an ‘incident’ which would justify him in 
opening hostilities.”389  James MacGregor Burns describes the U.S.S. Greer encounter 
with the German submarine as the “incident” Roosevelt had been waiting for.  “It was not 
much of an incident, since the Greer had sought out the submarine . . . [b]ut shots had 
been fired in anger, and Roosevelt felt that here was his chance to dramatize the Nazi 
menace that he had long been picturing.”390 
Roosevelt was conscious of his ability to shift public opinion and saw in the 
U.S.S. Greer incident an opportunity to test the moods and attitudes of the citizenry.  
How would they respond to news that Germany had attacked a U.S. warship?  What 
would they demand in return?  Would they pressure the U.S. Congress to repeal the 
neutrality laws so that U.S. merchant ships could protect themselves?  Would they 
support U.S. convoying of military supplies and weapons to Britain?  Would they accept 
Roosevelt’s argument that maintaining “freedom of the seas” was essential to national 
defense?  Roosevelt took a gamble in this September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” a gamble 
which he eventually won.  Even though the America First Committee called for a 
congressional investigation into the events surrounding the Greer incident, investigations 
that revealed Roosevelt’s dishonesty in the matter, public opinion had already shifted to 
Roosevelt’s side. 
At the same time, Roosevelt’s choice to misrepresent the facts in this “Fireside 
Chat” demonstrated his desire to “force an incident” with the Germans.391  On September 
5, 1941, Roosevelt sent Churchill a telegram that indicated how the events surrounding 
the U.S.S. Greer related to future U.S. foreign policy towards the war. 
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At any rate I can now assure you that we can provide transports for 20,000       
men . . . For your private and very confidential information I am planning 
to make a radio address Monday night relative to the attack on our 
destroyer and to make perfectly clear the action we intend to take in the 
Atlantic.
392
 
 
Churchill wired back that “all were awaiting his speech with profound interest.”393  Given 
Roosevelt’s promise to become “more and more provocative” towards the Germans, this 
telegram demonstrates that Roosevelt viewed the U.S.S. Greer incident as a way to shift 
U.S. policy in the Atlantic.  James MacGregor Burns argues that in Roosevelt’s 
September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” the president was  
in effect declaring naval war on Germany, in response to the war of 
aggression he believed Germany was waging against his nation.  The 
Atlantic cold war was over; now it was a hot war, limited only by 
America’s neutrality laws and by Hitler’s restraints on his submarine fleet.  
It was war nonetheless, and Roosevelt proceeded to act in those terms.
394
 
 
Germany viewed Roosevelt’s speech as an act of war as well.  Admiral Erich Raeder, the 
German naval chief, told Hitler, “There is no longer any difference between British and 
American ships.”395  The war in the Atlantic had begun.  
 “On Maintaining Freedom of the Seas” as War Rhetoric 
Narrative Justification 
 
According to Campbell and Jamieson, war rhetoric justifies “forceful intervention 
. . . through a chronicle or narrative from which argumentative claims are drawn.”396  
Roosevelt structured this “Fireside Chat” as a narrative description of the events that had 
made this address necessary.  He detailed the German torpedoing of the S.S. Sessa, an 
“American-owned ship operating under the flag of our sister Republic of Panama,” the 
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bombing and sinking of the U.S. merchant ship U.S.S. Steel Seafarer, and the torpedoing 
of another U.S. merchant ship, the U.S.S. Robin Moor.  The president declared it 
“unworthy of a great nation to exaggerate an isolated incident, or to become inflamed by 
some one act of violence.”  However, Roosevelt argued, this was not just one act, but a 
pattern of German aggression against the United States.  “It would be inexcusable folly to 
minimize such incidents in the face of evidence which makes it clear that the incident is 
not isolated, but is part of a general plan.”  Because Roosevelt believed the Nazis were 
advancing a war against the United States in the Atlantic, he declared that these sinkings 
were not isolated incidents.  Instead, they were part of Hitler’s master plan.  “The 
important truth is that these acts of international lawlessness are a manifestation of a 
design . . . It is the Nazi design to abolish the freedom of the seas, and to acquire absolute 
control and domination of these seas for themselves.”397 
 Roosevelt also connected his goal of keeping the Atlantic Ocean as “a free and 
friendly highway” as one that had justified U.S. military action throughout the nation’s 
history.  “Generation after generation,” he said, “America has battled for the general 
policy of the freedom of the seas . . . That has been our policy, proved time and again, in 
all of our history.”  He reminded his audience that “[t]his situation is not new.  The 
second [p]resident of the United States, John Adams, ordered the United States Navy to 
clean out European privateers and European ships of war which were infesting the 
Caribbean and South American waters, destroying American commerce.”  Thomas 
Jefferson, angered by the Barbary pirates from Algiers, Tunis, Morocco, and Tripoli who 
regularly attacked U.S. merchant ships, “ordered the United States Navy to end the 
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attacks being made upon American and other ships by the corsairs of the nations of North 
Africa.” 398  Roosevelt used the military decisions of both Adams and Jefferson to justify 
his decision to maintain the “freedom of the seas” through U.S. military action against 
Germany.  As president, Roosevelt had a “historic,” “clear,” and “inescapable” duty to 
defend the United States against Nazi acts of aggression.
399
    
Deliberate, Thoughtful Action 
 
Presidential war rhetoric also “proclaims that the momentous decision to resort 
force is deliberate, the product of thoughtful consideration.”400  Roosevelt declared that in 
spite of German sinkings of U.S. ships in the Atlantic, neither he nor the U.S. public were 
“becoming hysterical or losing our sense of proportion.”  Although he stated that “we 
Americans” were “keeping our feet on the ground” and not overacting to the situation, 
Roosevelt was concerned particularly with ensuring that the public did not view his 
action as one motivated by hysteria or panic.  Instead, his response to the U.S.S. Greer 
incident and other sinkings was proportional, justified, and careful.  Throughout his 
narrative description, Roosevelt continually emphasized that German attacks on U.S. 
ships demonstrated their desire to take control of the Atlantic.  “It is now clear that Hitler 
has begun his campaign to control the seas by ruthless force and by wiping out every 
vestige of international, every vestige of humanity.”401  Because “the attack on the 
Greer” was “one determined step towards creating a permanent world system based on 
force, on terror[,] and on murder,” Roosevelt declared that he had a clear duty and 
responsibility to respond to this threat as president of the United States.
402
 
 130 
 
 He reminded the U.S. public that the country had “sought no shooting war with 
Hitler.  We do not seek it now.”  The United States did not want to be at war with 
Germany, Roosevelt said.  “But neither do we want peace so much, that we are willing to 
pay for it by permitting him to attack our naval and merchant ships while they are on 
legitimate business.”   
[W]hen you see a rattlesnake poised to strike, you do not wait until he has 
struck before you crush him.  These Nazi submarines and raiders are the 
rattlesnakes of the Atlantic.  They are a menace to the free pathways of the 
high seas.  They are a challenge to our own sovereignty.  They hammer at 
our most precious rights when they attack ships of the American flag – 
symbols of our independence, our freedom, our very life. 
 
Germany stood as a direct threat to the shared values of the U.S. public.  By attacking 
“ships of the American flag,” Roosevelt said that the Nazis also attacked “symbols of our 
independence, our freedom, our very life.”  Now, the president proclaimed, was “the time 
for prevention of attack.”403 
He then explained the orders he had given to the U.S. Army and Navy.  First, he 
defined what he considered an “attack” by Germany: “If [German] submarines or raiders 
attack in distant waters, they can attack equally well within sight of our own shores.  
Their very presence in any waters which America deems vital to its defense constitutes an 
attack.”  Going forward, Roosevelt declared, U.S. naval vessels and airplanes would “no 
longer wait until Axis submarines lurking under the water, or Axis raiders on the surface 
of the sea, strike their deadly blow – first.”  These ships and planes now had the duty to 
“protect all merchant ships – not only American ships but ships of any flag – engaged in 
commerce in our defense waters.”  Going forward, any German or Italian vessels would 
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“enter the waters, the protection of which is necessary for American defense . . . at their 
own peril.”404 
In this “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt explained to the U.S. public why he thought 
this action, the “shoot on sight” policy, was essential to the defense of the United States.  
First, because the safety and security of Great Britain depended on U.S. supplies and 
weaponry, the United States needed to ensure that these supplies and weapons would 
reach the British without being attacked or sunk by German submarines.  Second, 
Roosevelt argued that the oceans surrounding the United States were vital to the defense 
of the nation. This new policy, Roosevelt said, was “the only step possible” to “keep tight 
the wall of defense which we are pledged to maintain around this Western Hemisphere.”  
As president, he had “no illusions about the gravity of this step.  I have not taken it 
hurriedly or lightly.  It is the result of months and months of constant thought and anxiety 
and prayer.  In the protection of your nation and mine[,] it cannot be avoided.”  Through 
his narrative description of events and his careful, logical explanation of why defending 
the Atlantic Ocean was essential to defending the United States, Roosevelt prepared the 
nation for war.  He also justified his actions so that the U.S. public could rally around his 
plan, united by the common cause of protecting their country and shared values. 
Citizens Invoked to National Purpose 
 
A third characteristic of presidential war rhetoric is that it exhorts the audience “to 
unanimity of purpose and total commitment” to the cause the president describes.405  
Roosevelt demonstrated his ability to invoke or call forth an audience united around his 
plan and devoted to the overall good of the United States in his four other pre-war 
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“Fireside Chats.”406  The president did this once again in his September 11, 1941, radio 
address.  He called the citizenry to reject those who argued the United States should 
defend itself only “if the torpedo succeeds in getting home, or if the crew and the 
passengers are drowned.”  Instead, Roosevelt confidently asserted that “we Americans 
are taking a long-range point of view in regard to certain fundamentals . . . a series of 
events on land and on sea which must be considered as a whole – as a part of a world 
pattern” of Nazi conquest and domination.  At the end of his radio address, Roosevelt 
exhorted his audience to respond as a unified, supportive public. 
The American people have faced other grave crises in their history – with 
American courage, with American resolution.  They will do no less today.  
They know the actualities of the attacks upon us.  They know the 
necessities of a bold defense against these attacks.  They know that the 
times call for clear heads and fearless hearts.   
 
The president reminded the citizenry of “other grave crises in their history” without 
directly stating the specific ones to which he was referring.  The most recent crisis, the 
Great Depression, most certainly was on the minds of his audience.  The “American 
people” had responded with courage, resolve, and determination.  Roosevelt was 
confident that the U.S. public would respond to this new threat with “clear heads and 
fearless hearts.”  Moreover, they would respond with  
. . . that inner strength that comes to a free people conscious of their duty, 
conscious of the righteousness of what they will do, they will – with 
Divine help and guidance – stand their ground against this latest assault 
upon their democracy, their strength, and their freedom.
407
 
 
Roosevelt called on his audience to be “conscious of their duty” and “stand their ground” 
in response to this “latest assault” by Germany on security of the United States.  By 
stating that democracy, strength, and freedom belonged to “them,” the “American 
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people,” Roosevelt personalized the attack on the U.S.S. Greer.  Instead of it being 
merely a Nazi submarine attacking a U.S. ship, Germany’s firing upon the U.S. naval 
vessel became a direct attack on the democracy, strength, and freedom of every 
individual listening to Roosevelt’s “Chat,” each and every member of the U.S. public.  
Just as Roosevelt had called his audience to sacrifice individually for the good of the 
nation as a whole in his December 29, 1940, “Fireside Chat,” the president now invoked 
a citizenry united around U.S. military action against Germany in the Atlantic Ocean.   
Adoption of the Role of Commander in Chief 
 
Presidential war rhetoric “not only justifies the use of force, but also seeks to 
legitimize presidential assumption of the extraordinary powers of commander in 
chief.”408  Although Roosevelt’s previous pre-war “Fireside Chats” dealt with issues of 
national defense and sending aid to Great Britain, Roosevelt never used the title of 
”commander in chief” to legitimize his actions.  In this September 11, 1941, “Fireside 
Chat,” however, Roosevelt stated that the “orders which I have given as Commander-in-
Chief of the United States Army and Navy are to carry out that policy [of shoot on sight] 
– at once.”409  Campbell and Jamieson express the force contained in this act of 
identifying oneself as commander in chief.  “It is noteworthy that, like the inaugural 
address, war rhetoric is a rhetoric of investiture.  In identifying a threat to the community 
and to its fundamental values, presidents implicitly argue that now is the appropriate time 
or them to assume the office of commander in chief.”410  In this instance, although the 
United States was not at war with Germany, Roosevelt’s decision to speak and act as 
commander in chief added additional gravity to his words.  He defended his order for 
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U.S. planes and ships to fire upon any German or Italian vessels they encountered as one 
made out of “obvious duty in this crisis.”  Because the United States faced an overt threat 
in the Atlantic, Roosevelt argued that he needed to assume the powers of commander in 
chief to defend the nation and the citizenry. 
It is also important to note that Roosevelt did not begin this chat by addressing the 
audience as “friends” as was his custom in the “Fireside Chats.”  Instead, Roosevelt used 
the more commanding statement of: “My Fellow Americans.”411  Although this initial 
greeting unified the audience with Roosevelt, reminding them that they all were 
“Americans,” it did not contain the same spirit of familiarity and warmth as the other pre-
war “Fireside Chats.”  In this address, Roosevelt spoke as commander in chief, adopting 
a formal, decisive tone to communicate the rightness of his actions and justifying the use 
of U.S. military force. 
Strategic Misrepresentations 
 
A final component of war rhetoric is the president’s use of strategic 
misrepresentations to persuade the nation.  Campbell and Jamieson write that “as a 
function of these other characteristics [of war rhetoric] . . . strategic misrepresentations 
play an unusually significant role” in the appeals of war rhetoric.412  As the first half of 
this chapter explains, Roosevelt’s argument for more decisive military action in the 
Atlantic, particularly the “shoot on sight” policy towards Germany submarines, relied 
directly on his misrepresentation of the U.S.S. Greer incident.  By describing the incident 
as an unprovoked attack against a U.S. ship, Roosevelt supported his claim that the 
Germans wanted to “abolish freedom of the seas” in the Atlantic Ocean, waters that had 
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once been a “free and friendly highway” for trade and commerce.  Because the Nazi 
submarine had attacked the U.S.S. Greer without cause, Roosevelt therefore had a 
responsibility to defend the United States against this act of aggression.
413
   
If Roosevelt had informed his audience that the U.S.S. Greer and a British 
military plane had followed the German submarine for several hours and the submarine 
fired on the U.S.S. Greer only after being shot at by the British plane, his case for 
military action would have been weakened substantially.  The United States and Great 
Britain would be seen as provocateurs, willing and eager to start a conflict in the Atlantic.  
Based upon archival evidence and Churchill’s report to his cabinet following the Atlantic 
conference with Roosevelt, the term provocateur provides an accurate description of the 
president’s actions in September 1941.  Roosevelt could have used other instances of 
German aggression against U.S. ships, such as the U.S.S. Robin Moor or the U.S.S. Steel 
Seafarer, to support his decision to take military action against the Nazis.  These events 
were, in fact, unprovoked and clear acts of hostility against the United States.  Instead, 
however, Roosevelt chose to capitalize on the U.S.S. Greer incident to justify his orders 
for any U.S. ship or airplane to attack any German or Italian “vessels of war.”  To do so, 
Roosevelt argued, was “no act of war.”  Instead, it was a decision “to protect the seas that 
are vital to American defense.  The aggression is not ours.  Ours is solely defense.”414  In 
spite of Roosevelt’s strategic misrepresentation of the events, however, the majority of 
the U.S. public responded favorably to the president’s plan.  It was, wrote Rosarah 
Campell of Los Angeles, California, “bold” but “absolutely necessary.”415 
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Public Response 
 
 The day after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chat,” the headline of the New 
York Times read, “Roosevelt Orders Navy to Shoot First if Axis Raiders Enter Our 
Defense Zones; Patrol to Protect British Ships Also.”416  “The difficulty of writing about 
the President’s address,” editorialized the Boston Globe, “is that no interpretation is 
required.”417  In their synopsis of Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chat,” the editors of the New 
York Times wrote that the president “spoke last night the words which we believe the 
country was waiting to hear.  There will be no yielding to Hitler’s threats.  There will be 
no surrender of American rights on the high seas.”  The editors acknowledged, just as 
Roosevelt did in his speech, “[t]hat this course of action involves the risk of open war 
with Germany is obvious.  It will be for Germany to choose.”  However, they wrote, the 
convictions of the U.S. public had shifted over the past year. 
Under the surface of American life an immense change has taken place in 
the thinking of the American people.  Risks that seemed too great to be 
accepted, even a year ago, now seem unimportant by comparison with the 
far greater risks of American inaction.  If we had chosen now to stand 
aside from the task that awaits our doing, if we had backed away from the 
challenge of Nazi guns and yielded control of the high seas to a predatory 
Power which is the sworn enemy of our democratic system, we might 
have succeeded in avoiding some of the risks involved in further 
“incidents” at sea, but we would have accepted the far greater risk of 
helping Hitler cut the lines of communication between the United States 
and Great Britain, and by that manoeuvre [sic] win the war and dominate 
the world. 
 
The “American people clearly understand” what a “Nazi victory would mean to us,” the 
editorial continued.  It was because they saw clearly the Nazi threat “that a great majority 
of the American people have given their support for a whole series of measures taken 
during the last year for the single purpose of defeating Hitler,” measures including 
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transferring U.S. destroyers to Great Britain, the Lend-Lease bill, the U.S. military 
presence in Greenland and Iceland, and large military appropriations for national defense.  
Although these measures “involved risks,” were “deliberately partisan and unneutral,” 
and “gave Hitler more than enough excuse to declare war upon the United States,” each 
one was supported by the U.S. public.  “Having come this far, and for these reasons, the 
American people realize that there can be no turning back,” the editors wrote.  Roosevelt 
had “nailed the flag of the United States” to the cause of defending the Atlantic ocean 
from German incursion.  “We are certain,” the article concluded by quoting Roosevelt’s 
words from the September 11, 1941, “Fireside Chat,” that “the American people will 
rally to his support, in defense of ‘their democracy, their sovereignty, and their 
freedom.’”418 
 The U.S. public did rally to support the president’s plan.  A Gallup Poll conducted 
on September 17, just six days after Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chat,” demonstrated this.  
When asked if they supported the president’s “shoot on sight” policy, sixty-one percent 
of respondents said they approved.  Another question inquired whether it was more 
important for the United States to keep out of the war or to help Great Britain, even if that 
meant the United States would enter the war against Germany.  Thirty percent of 
respondents said it was more important to “keep out of the war ourselves.”  Sixty-three 
percent supported helping Britain, “even at the risk of getting into the war,” while sixty-
seven percent said it was more important that Germany be defeated than for the United 
States to stay out of the conflict.  However, when asked if the United States should enter 
the war against Germany, only nineteen percent said yes.  Seventy-three percent 
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responded no.
419
  Although the majority of the U.S. public indicated support for 
Roosevelt’s defense of the Atlantic Ocean, they most certainly did not want the United 
States to declare war on Germany.  James MacGregor Burns comments that these poll 
numbers demonstrate that “many Americans were still accepting at face value 
Roosevelt’s promise that his defense measures would keep America out of war.”420   
James Meyberg from Los Angeles, California, wrote to Roosevelt after his 
“Fireside Chat.”  “I love my country and hope and pray that we may remain at peace.  I 
am grateful,” he continued, “that you, the Commander-in-Chief of our armed forces, 
desiring peace but valuing the safety of our country, have shown the courage to protect 
America from aggression.  You, our president, have kept faith with those who placed 
their trust in you,” he concluded.421  Not everyone was as supportive of the president, 
however.  Mrs. Rose G. Rockwell of New York, New York said, “I protest vigorously, 
the stand taken in the Radio Speech of Thursday night.  I consider the speech an 
unwarranted[,] dangerous, veiled provocation, inciting to war.”422  Both letters express 
the overall desire of the U.S. public to keep out of the European war.  However, as the 
poll numbers also reflect, the majority of the citizenry also believed that the United States 
should act to protect the country from German submarines sinking U.S. ships in the 
Atlantic. 
Conclusion 
 
Where Roosevelt’s four other pre-war “Fireside Chats” called the nation to 
support measures to strengthen U.S. defense and send aid to Great Britain, this last pre-
war “Fireside Chat” advocated military action against Germany.  In doing so, it 
 139 
 
functioned as a piece of war rhetoric.  Believing that the German attacks on U.S. ships 
were a direct threat to the security of the United States, Roosevelt assumed the role of 
commander in chief and prepared the country for war.  Although the United States 
officially would not enter the war until the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 
7, 1941, this “Fireside Chat” shifted the tone of Roosevelt’s rhetoric.  For the first time in 
his presidency, Roosevelt justified his actions as the commander in chief of the U.S. 
Army and Navy.  He provided a narrative of the German submarine attacks on the U.S.S. 
Greer, the U.S.S. Robin Moor, the S.S. Sessa, and the U.S.S. Steel Seafarer as acts 
intended “to acquire absolute control and domination” of the Atlantic Ocean.423  The 
president explained the careful and deliberate thought that went into his decision to 
implement his “shoot on sight” policy, arguing that the United States did not seek a 
“shooting war with Hitler.”424  However, Roosevelt said, he had a duty as president of the 
United States of America to defend the nation against hostile acts in the Atlantic Ocean.  
By strategically misrepresenting the events surrounding the U.S.S. Greer incident, 
Roosevelt thus supported his actions as commander in chief and prepared the citizenry 
for war with Germany.
425
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
CONCLUSION  
 
We do not accept, we will not permit, this Nazi “shape of things to come.”  It will never 
be forced upon us, if we act in this present crisis with the wisdom and the courage which 
have distinguished our country in all the crises of the past.
426
 
 
President Franklin D. Roosevelt, May 27, 1941 
 
The day after Franklin D. Roosevelt’s May 27, 1941, “Fireside Chat” proclaiming 
a state of unlimited national emergency, Anthony J. Kerin of New Rochelle, New York, 
wrote to the president. 
Yesterday I felt that we should stay out of the war and I telegraphed that 
regardless of the interventionists you would keep us out of the European 
conflict.  After hearing your inspiring and realistic speech of tonight[,] I 
have changed my mind.  I am now satisfied that I[,] a former soldier of the 
World War[,] was too definitely influenced regarding my sons getting into 
the next war.  Your forthright speech has changed my ideas[,] and now I 
think that you[,] our President[,] know what is best for our national 
welfare and I am therefore prepared to accept your leadership in whatever 
course you lay out for us . . .
427
 
 
In this short but poignant letter, Mr. Kerin expressed his faith in the president’s 
leadership, belief that Roosevelt would do what was “best for our national welfare.”  He 
also indicated how the president’s address had produced a change in his views on the war 
in Europe.  As a soldier who fought in World War I, Mr. Kerin acknowledged his 
aversion to engaging in another global conflict.  However, Roosevelt’s “inspiring,” 
“realistic,” and “forthright speech [had] changed [his] ideas,” and he was “prepared to 
accept [Roosevelt’s] leadership in whatever course” the president set forth.  Through this 
and his four other pre-war “Fireside Chats” to the nation, Roosevelt demonstrated his 
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ability as president to connect with the individual citizens listening to his address, his 
skill as a master rhetorician in persuading his audience to accept his foreign policy 
initiatives, and his underlying knowledge of the two main fears facing the nation: 
economic depression and involvement in another international conflict.  
The aim of this project was to demonstrate how Franklin D. Roosevelt used his 
five pre-war “Fireside Chats” to persuade the U.S. public that sending aid to Great Britain 
was the best way to avoid U.S. involvement in the European war.  The central research 
question of this study asked how Roosevelt used these “Fireside Chats” to appeal to his 
audience and convince them that sending military and economic aid to Great Britain was the 
surest way to keep out of war with Germany.  To answer these questions, this study argued 
that Roosevelt’s rhetorical approach was designed to appeal to the U.S. public’s desires for 
two specific things: economic growth and stability at home, and freedom from international 
entanglements abroad.   
In chapter one, I provided the historical context for these five “Fireside Chats” as 
a rhetorical text.  I also examined how Roosevelt established a relationship with his 
audience, the U.S. public, through the thirteen previous “Fireside Chats” he delivered 
between March 1933 and September 1939.  Using the new medium of radio to 
communicate with the citizenry, Roosevelt set a precedent for talking with the people, 
addressing them as “my friends,” instead of speaking to them as a distant chief executive.  
This chapter also surveyed current historical and rhetorical scholarship on Roosevelt and 
the “Fireside Chats,” arguing that this study bridges a gap in the relevant literature by 
examining how Roosevelt used his five pre-war “Fireside Chats” from 1939 to 1941 to 
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move a majority of his audience from total isolationism to support for sending U.S. aid to 
Great Britain.  
The second chapter specifically addressed my claim that Roosevelt recognized the 
U.S. public’s desire to maintain the economic stability of the United States by avoiding 
war.  To a nation recovering from the worst economic crisis of its history, the idea of 
sending monetary aid and military supplies to Great Britain seemed foolish and 
irresponsible.  Instead, Roosevelt argued that helping Britain in its struggle against Nazi 
Germany would protect the U.S economy.  To do this, Roosevelt invoked a citizenry 
united around his plan by recalling their shared efforts against the Great Depression, 
celebrating their shared moral values, appealing to the “patriotism of labor” to end 
strikes, and equating a German victory over Great Britain with the economic 
strangulation of the United States. 
Chapter three examined how Roosevelt addressed his audience’s fear of becoming 
involved in another international conflict by presenting Lend-Lease as a plan to keep the 
United States out of war.  World War I had jaded the citizenry from overseas 
involvement, produced a national climate of isolationism, and led to the America First 
Committee’s (AFC) formation in September 1940.  Although the AFC attempted to co-
opt Lend-Lease by portraying it as a bill designed to involve the United States in war, 
they were unsuccessful.  Instead, Roosevelt assured the citizenry that he shared their 
aversion to entering the war and argued that Lend-Lease was designed to maintain 
national security and promote peace.  
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In chapter four, I discussed Roosevelt’s final pre-war “Fireside Chat” as an 
example of war rhetoric.  In this address, Roosevelt detailed a “shoot on sight” policy in 
which he ordered the U.S. Army and Navy to fire on any German or Italian ship, 
submarine, or plane it encountered in the Atlantic Ocean.  Roosevelt justified his decision 
by providing a narrative of the incident and detailing the U.S. policy of maintaining 
“freedom of the seas,” emphasizing that the decision was a result of careful thought, 
calling on his audience to support his proposal, assuming the powers of commander in 
chief, and misrepresenting the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident in an 
effort to arouse the U.S. public to conclude that these controversial decisions were 
necessary.
428
 
In other words, I argue that Franklin D. Roosevelt’s five pre-war “Fireside Chats” 
must be analyzed in order to understand the political, historical, economic, and social 
culture of the United States from 1939 to 1941.   As the previous chapters of this project 
discussed, Roosevelt considered these radio addresses “a way to sit down with the 
American public and discuss with them the issues which pertained to their own well-
being.”429  They demonstrate Roosevelt’s ability to connect with the U.S. public on such 
issues, speaking to them directly and candidly about the problems confronting the nation 
and their individual lives.  Specifically, the five radio addresses Roosevelt gave between 
the German invasion of Poland in September 1939 and the Japanese attack on Pearl 
Harbor in December 1941 represent how Roosevelt appealed to the U.S. public to support 
his policy of sending aid to Great Britain.  These addresses are important beyond 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy initiatives or political concerns. 
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Because Roosevelt skillfully addressed the desires and fears of his audience in his 
radio addresses, these five “Fireside Chats” also reveal how the U.S. public responded to 
the growing German threat in Europe.  Roosevelt understood that the First World War 
and the Great Depression had shaped the public opinion of a generation, and he tailored 
his argument for aiding Britain as one that would prevent a repeat of these crises. 
Ultimately, these “Chats” reveal Roosevelt’s skill as a master rhetorician, a president able 
to connect with individual citizens in a personal way.  In the concluding pages, I briefly 
discuss how these five pre-war “Fireside Chats” provide insight into Roosevelt as 
President, Roosevelt as rhetorician, and Roosevelt as a keen observer of the fears and 
desires of the U.S. public. I also comment on areas for future research. 
Roosevelt as President 
 
 As noted, Roosevelt’s direct and personal communication with the U.S. public was a 
clear departure from the style of his predecessor, Herbert Hoover.  Where Hoover spoke in 
language that appeared aloof and unconcerned with the individual problems facing the 
citizenry, Roosevelt spoke as if he was talking to individual members of his audience face-
to-face.  “My friends,” he greeted his audience at the beginning of his May 26, 1940, 
“Fireside Chat,” “let us sit down, together again, to consider our own pressing problems that 
confront us.”430  The war in Europe affected the nation as a whole, but Roosevelt 
acknowledged the conflict also had personal implications.  Just as the Great Depression had 
impacted everyday men, women, and children, so too would the war in Europe affect 
members of the U.S. public.  Roosevelt warned the citizenry of the threat Germany posed to 
the United States and yet pledging to do all in his power to prevent a “blackout of peace in 
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the United States.”431  Mrs. J. A. Ringis of Detroit, Michigan, wrote to Roosevelt after his 
September 3, 1939, “Fireside Chat.”  She thanked him “for the very friendly and sincere 
speech.  It made me wish that I might pick up my telephone and talk to you.  You DO seem 
like a friend to each of us and oh I do hope that you will keep us out of War!”432 
 Roosevelt also demonstrated his ability to influence public opinion through his five 
pre-war “Fireside Chats.”  The second and third chapters of this project detailed the 
citizenry’s aversion to any policy that would undermine the economic stability of the nation 
or lead to U.S involvement in another war in Europe.  However, Roosevelt slowly 
convinced the U.S. public that sending aid to Great Britain was the best way to keep the 
United States out of war through his radio addresses.  In September 1939, just after 
Germany invaded Poland and Great Britain declared war on Germany, ninety-two percent of 
Gallup Poll respondents disapproved of U.S. entry into the war.  When asked if the United 
States should sell military supplies to Great Britain and France, fifty-six percent said yes and 
forty percent said no.
433
  Two years and five “Fireside Chats” later, sixty-three percent of 
poll respondents said that it was more important for the United States to send aid to Great 
Britain, even if doing so resulted in the nation getting into war.
434
   
 This shift was accomplished primarily through Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats.”  
Letters written to Roosevelt in response reveal that the citizenry understood that Roosevelt 
was advocating a shift of mindset in his radio addresses.  “You have spoken to me in your 
fireside chats about matters which are too important to leave settled by a one way of 
conversation,” wrote Nelson Handsalter of Saint Paul, Minnesota, after Roosevelt’s May 27, 
1941, “Fireside Chat.”  “[H]ence I am now addressing you in the only way I have of 
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replying.”435  Ann Patton Brown recorded her response to the “Fireside Chat” of December 
29, 1940: “I am a young woman intelligent and well bred, I listened to your last broad cast 
in which you called upon us to help with the defense program and I am most willing.”436  
One remarkable letter offering individual sacrifice for the nation came from Charles Fisher 
of Chicago, Illinois.  “Dear sir, I am colored & have listened to your message today.  Altho 
[sic] I am colored & am out of the conscription age at present you will find me ready to 
serve anytime men of my age are needed, either in peace or in war.”437  Despite the grave 
injustices facing African American members of the U.S. military at this period, Mr. Fisher 
volunteered his services to his country.
438
  These and many other letters demonstrated that 
the U.S. public responded to Roosevelt’s explanation of the international situation and 
approved the steps he proposed that the country needed to take. 
 In these “Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt also spoke directly and honestly about the 
situation in Europe.  He had proceeded similarly in his radio addresses during the Great 
Depression, developing a relationship with the U.S. public characterized by mutual trust.  
Future U.S. Presidents recognized the benefits of such a relationship.  John F. Kennedy, 
concerned that he was not speaking directly to “the people,” had Arthur Schlesinger 
research the frequency of Roosevelt’s “Fireside Chats” and was relieved to learn that the 
former president gave “far fewer fireside chats than people remembered, an average of only 
2.5 a year.”439  Jimmy Carter instituted his own brand of the “Fireside Chat” only a month 
into his presidency.  He delivered a nationally-televised address “beside a real fire – a 
crackling, three log blaze in the White House Library” while wearing a cardigan sweater.440  
The aura surrounding these legendary “Chats” continues to the present day; Barack Obama 
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frequently quoted Roosevelt’s first “Fireside Chat” during the 2008 presidential 
campaign.
441
  These attempts to emulate Roosevelt’s method of communication with the 
U.S. public demonstrate just how successful the president was at identifying with and thus 
influencing the citizenry in his “Fireside Chats.”  
Roosevelt as Rhetorician 
 
These five pre-war “Fireside Chats” also demonstrate Roosevelt’s skill as a 
master rhetorician and his ability to invoke a citizenry motivated by patriotism and to 
unify them around his plan for sending aid to Great Britain.  Roosevelt addressed his 
audience by describing their individual circumstances and their personal concerns.  He 
spoke of the “workmen in the mills, the mines, the factories; the girl behind the counter; 
the small shopkeeper; the farmer doing his spring plowing; the widows and old men 
wondering about their life’s savings.”  Roosevelt reminded his audience that he was 
aware that his decisions as president impacted their individual circumstances.  Just as he 
had done in the Great Depression, Roosevelt used the “Fireside Chats” to explain what 
his policies towards Great Britain and the European war meant to “the great mass of the 
American people . . . in their daily lives.”442 
Roosevelt also called forth a specific type of audience.  He made the “simple plea 
that partisanship and selfishness be adjourned; and that national unity be the thought that 
underlies all others.”443  He asked his audience to put away “fears and illusions,” and “in 
our homes in the midst of our American families,” join together as a national family and 
“consider what we have done and what we must do.”444  He called on his audience to 
respond to the international crisis with the same “courage and realism” they had shown in 
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the face of the Great Depression.
445
  He expected that the U.S. public would demonstrate 
“the same resolution, the same sense of urgency, the same spirit of patriotism and 
sacrifice as we would show were we at war.”446  He called on the citizenry to support 
civilian defense by using “American common sense in discarding rumor and distorted 
statement.”447  In his final pre-war “Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt flatly stated that it was 
“time for all Americans, Americans of all the Americas[,] to stop being deluded by the 
romantic notion that the Americas can go on living happily and peacefully in a Nazi-
dominated world.”448  By describing the reactions of patriotic citizens dedicated to the 
good of their country, Roosevelt called into being a nation ready to support his policy of 
sending aid to Great Britain.  He unified a patriotic citizenry around a common goal: 
keeping the United States out of war with Germany. 
 Roosevelt portrayed his policies as a way to preserve the ideals of the nation for 
future generations.  “[W]e build and defend not for our generation alone. We defend the 
foundations laid down by our fathers. We build a life for generations yet unborn. We 
defend and we build a way of life, not for America alone, but for all mankind. Ours is a 
high duty, a noble task.”449  Declaring a state of national emergency in his May 27, 1941, 
“Fireside Chat,” Roosevelt stated that he expected “all individuals and all groups to play 
their full parts, without stint, and without selfishness, and without doubt that our 
democracy will triumphantly survive.”  He quoted the words of the nation’s founding 
document to support his call to action: “I repeat the words of the Signers of the 
Declaration of Independence—that little band of patriots, fighting long ago against 
overwhelming odds, but certain, as we are now, of ultimate victory: ‘With a firm reliance 
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on the protection of Divine Providence, we mutually pledge to each other our lives, our 
fortunes, and our sacred honor.’”450  By identifying the nation’s current struggle against 
Germany with the United States’ struggle for independence one hundred and sixty-five 
years earlier, Roosevelt called on his audience to act as a nation unified by their past and 
committed to a shared future.   
Roosevelt and the U.S. Public 
 
 These five pre-war “Fireside Chats” also reveal Roosevelt’s ability to identify and 
address the fears and concerns driving the U.S. public during this period in U.S. history.  
Two were primary: the fear of another economic crisis and an utter distaste for U.S. 
involvement in another European war.  At the outset of the war in Europe, the president 
stated that he could not “prophesy the immediate economic effect of this new war on our 
nation” but declared that “no American has the moral right to profiteer at the expense 
either of his fellow citizens or of the men, the women and the children who are living and 
dying in the midst of war in Europe.”451  In subsequent “Fireside Chats,” Roosevelt 
addressed issues that directly affected the economic health of the nation, including the 
role businessmen and labor unions would play in manufacturing materials for national 
defense and the government’s pledge to protect U.S. consumers from the threat of 
inflation.
452
 
 Roosevelt repeatedly reminded the citizenry of his desire to keep the nation at 
peace.  To a nation scarred by U.S. involvement in the Great War, Roosevelt set forth his 
plan for sending aid to Great Britain as the best way to keep out of war in Europe and to 
ensure Hitler’s defeat.  He acknowledged his audience’s desire to avoid “permanent 
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alliances” with nations as George Washington had warned against in his farewell address.  
However, he argued that the country’s national safety was  
bound up with the safety of the Western Hemisphere and of the seas 
adjacent thereto. We seek to keep war from our own firesides by keeping 
war from coming to the Americas. For that we have historic precedent that 
goes back to the days of the Administration of President George 
Washington. It is serious enough and tragic enough to every American 
family in every state in the Union to live in a world that is torn by wars on 
other Continents. And those wars today affect every American home. It is 
our national duty to use every effort to keep those wars out of the 
Americas.
453
 
 
For Roosevelt, this duty involved sending aid to Great Britain, an action designed to 
“keep war from our own firesides.” 
Areas for Future Study  
 
Any project of this size must narrow its scope.  I chose to limit this study to 
considering how Roosevelt argued that sending aid to Great Britain was the best way to 
keep the United States out of war with Germany in the five “Fireside Chats” he delivered 
between September 1939 and December 1941.  Several areas deserve future study and 
analysis.  Although chapter three discussed President Woodrow Wilson’s rhetoric leading 
up to U.S. involvement in the Great War, there is room to discuss how Wilson’s foreign 
policy impacted his Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Franklin D. Roosevelt, and thus 
affected Roosevelt’s choices as commander in chief twenty years later.   
Another area for future analysis is how Roosevelt’s campaign rhetoric during the 
1940 presidential election affected U.S. public opinion and prepared the citizenry to 
accept Roosevelt’s Lend-Lease policy.  Running for an unprecedented third term in 1940, 
Roosevelt pledged during his campaign that he would keep the United States out of war 
 151 
 
with Germany and waited to announce his Lend-Lease plan until after his reelection in 
November.  His opponent, Wendell Willkie, openly supported sending U.S. aid to Great 
Britain.  After the election in 1940, members of the America First Committee charged 
that Roosevelt had lied during the campaign about his desire to keep the United States out 
of war. 
If these five pre-war “Fireside Chats” are taken as a rhetorical text to discuss the 
historical and political climate of the United States between 1939 and 1941, the absence 
of any mention of the deteriorating relationship between the United States and Japan is 
noteworthy.  Roosevelt’s silence on Japan demonstrates how he and the members of his 
administration viewed the critical areas of the war. Europe was central; Asia was 
secondary.  Franklin D. Roosevelt’s cousin, President Theodore Roosevelt, had warned 
that a deterioration of U.S. diplomatic relations with Japan could lead to an attack on 
Hawaii, specifically Pearl Harbor.
454
  The U.S. public also knew that the relationship 
between the United States and Japan was not strong.  In September 1940, forty-nine 
percent of the U.S. public believed that “Japan’s power in the Far East” posed a serious 
threat to the United States.
455
  Five months later, in February 1941, fifty-six percent said 
that the United States should “try to keep Japan from seizing the Dutch East Indies and 
Singapore.”456  On November 25, 1941, just two weeks before Pearl Harbor, seventy-
three percent of the U.S. public responded “yes” to the question of if the United States 
“should take steps now to keep Japan from becoming more powerful, even if this means 
risking a war with Japan.”457  Although Roosevelt was aware of the threat Japan posed to 
the United States, he chose not to discuss it with the U.S. public until after the Japanese 
 152 
 
attack on Pearl Harbor.  This silence, therefore, should be approached as a foray into 
Roosevelt’s foreign policy towards Asia and the United States’ diplomatic relations with 
Japan during this period.
458
 
Conclusion  
 
Reflecting on the “days of Mr. Roosevelt,” Pulitzer-prize winning novelist Saul 
Bellow wrote about the unifying power of Roosevelt’s radio addresses. 
I can recall walking eastward on the Chicago Midway on a summer 
evening.  The light held after nine o’clock, and the ground was covered 
with clover, more than a mile of green between Cottage Grove and Stony 
Island.  The blight hadn’t yet carried off the elms, and under them drivers 
had pulled over, parking bumper to bumper, and turned on their radios to 
hear Roosevelt.  They had rolled down the windows and opened their car 
doors.  Everywhere the same voice, its odd Eastern accent, which in 
anyone else would have irritated Midwesterners.  You could follow 
without missing a single word as you strolled by.  You felt joined to these 
unknown drivers, men and women smoking their cigarettes in silence, not 
so much considering the President’s words as affirming the rightness of 
his tone and taking assurance from it.  You had in some sense the weight 
of the troubles that made them so attentive, and of the ponderable fact, the 
one common element (Roosevelt), on which so many unknowns could 
agree.
459
 
 
Bellow recalled how total strangers were joined together by Roosevelt’s voice, mutually 
agreeing with the “rightness” of his “tone and taking assurance from it.”  The president 
was a unifying national figure, the “one common element . . . on which so many 
unknowns could agree,” and his “Fireside Chats” linked total strangers in a common 
cause.  In the five pre-war “Fireside Chats,” this common cause was keeping the United 
States out of the European war. 
 Although the country eventually entered World War II in December 1941, these 
radio addresses had prepared the nation for war.  Roosevelt had rallied the citizenry 
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around a common cause: defending the United States against other nations that threatened 
the national values of personal freedom and democracy.  He had reminded the nation that 
together, they had conquered the economic crisis of the Great Depression with courage, 
determination, and mutual resolve.  Together, they would meet this new crisis with 
similar “courage and realism.”460  He had inspired individual citizens to sacrifice for their 
country.  “After hearing your speech,” wrote one listener, “I resolved to live for my 
country, and live the best I can, [and] you know that’s a harder job than to die for it in 
war.”461 Thus, when Roosevelt asked for a declaration of war on Japan following the 
Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the citizenry rallied around their 
president once again, confident in his ability to lead the nation and united by their 
“absolute confidence that [their] common cause [would] greatly succeed.”462 
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